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by 
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Abstract 
This thesis proposes a hypothesis that a conventional, and essentially manual, HAZOP process can be 
improved with information obtained with model-based dynamic simulation, using a Monte Carlo 
approach, to update a Bayesian Belief model representing the expected relations between cause and 
effects – and thereby produce an enhanced HAZOP.  The work considers how the expertise of a 
hazard and operability study team might be augmented with access to behavioural models, 
simulations and belief inference models.  This incorporates models of dynamically complex system 
behaviour, considering where these might contribute to the expertise of a hazard and operability study 
team, and how these might bolster trust in the portrayal of system behaviour.  With a questionnaire 
containing behavioural outputs from a representative systems model, responses were collected from a 
group with relevant domain expertise.  From this it is argued that the quality of analysis is dependent 
upon the experience and expertise of the participants but this might be artificially augmented using 
probabilistic data derived from a system dynamics model.  Consequently, Monte Carlo simulations of 
an improved exemplar system dynamics model are used to condition a behavioural inference model 
and also to generate measures of emergence associated with the deviation parameter used in the study.  
A Bayesian approach towards probability is adopted where particular events and combinations of 
circumstances are effectively unique or hypothetical, and perhaps irreproducible in practice.  
Therefore, it is shown that a Bayesian model, representing beliefs expressed in a hazard and 
operability study, conditioned by the likely occurrence of flaw events causing specific deviant 
behaviour from evidence observed in the system dynamical behaviour, may combine intuitive 
estimates based upon experience and expertise, with quantitative statistical information representing 
plausible evidence of safety constraint violation.  A further behavioural measure identifies potential 
emergent behaviour by way of a Lyapunov Exponent.  Together these improvements enhance the 
awareness of potential hazard cases. 
Keywords: Hazards, Certification, Autonomous Systems, Systems Engineering, Behavioural 
Modelling, Bayesian Belief.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
“Ah, this is obviously some strange usage of the word 'safe' that I wasn't previously aware of.” 
Arthur Dent, “The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy” by Douglas Adams 
 
1.1. Background, Aim and Objectives 
An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is expected to be granted a certain amount of autonomy in the 
execution of its routine behaviour, at the least as a safeguard against any reduction or loss of 
situational awareness on the part of its human operator, whether through degraded or lost 
communications or simply due to the physical and temporal remoteness of the operation.  In the case 
of an air vehicle, especially a fixed wing air vehicle, it is not as though this safeguard might be as 
simple as bringing the vehicle to a complete halt and then to await further instructions.  It has its own 
momentum and intrinsic dynamics driving the continued evolution of the system state, with or without 
any intelligent external intervention – dictated by the physics of flight at least, with perhaps also on-
board sensory perception and intelligence providing a means to continue to obey the rules of the air. 
Given that such behaviour is dynamic and interactive, possibly involving another independent entity 
bound by the same physical laws and rules of behaviour, then a safety assessment of a system capable 
of such autonomous safeguarding behaviour necessarily entails a degree of complexity.  Assuming 
that the likely complexity of behaviour in an autonomous system has to be considered throughout the 
development process, from the system concept stage onwards, then it is necessary to take a systematic 
approach to develop the necessary models of behaviour.  This might include considering the 
formulation of any hazardous behaviour model so as to be used also in a diagnostic role with the 
potential to diagnose system design flaws.  Undoubtedly, particular system behaviours might be 
surprising when thus modelled and the trust in any such model also needs to be established before it 
can be used for safety assessment or diagnosis. 
Within the United Kingdom “Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in UK Airspace – Guidance” 
(CAP 722 [17]) is intended to assist those who are involved in the development of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) in describing the identification of the route to certification for future UK operations.  
This highlights the safety requirements that have to be met, in terms of airworthiness and operational 
standards, with the intent to develop a regulatory framework enabling the full integration of UAS 
activities with manned aircraft operations.  In this, autonomy is described as a capability to operate 
without human control or direct oversight.  Within this definition there is then provision for a range of 
lower level capabilities, from simple advisory systems where humans make the decisions and execute 
the actions, through intermediate levels of “semi-autonomous” systems.  Provision is not yet made for 
17 
 
fully autonomous airborne systems.  CAP 722 does promote the concept of a decomposed 
autonomous capability to address the perceived inherent complexity of autonomous operations.  It is 
suggested that an autonomous capability might be comprised of various decision-making sub-systems, 
each responsible for its own domain of concern.  In this view an autonomous capability might be 
made up from autonomous flight management, sense and avoid, route management, power 
management and prognostic health management systems, for example [17].  Some, or all, of these 
systems would collaborate with the human UAS pilot / operator.  No specific guidance is given as to 
how the partitioning and decomposition might be identified, affected or managed. 
In this thesis the broad hypothesis that risk events within complex systems are caused by deviations 
from design or operating intentions and unanticipated non-linear causal interactions among system 
elements that violate safety constraints is accepted as true.  Also it is believed that these interactions 
cannot be adequately intuitively assessed without a representation of likely system dynamics.   It is 
the author’s view that by augmenting the mental processes and expertise with live models of system 
dynamics, and drawing from these statistical inferences, helps to validate the assumptions formed 
within a Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) and point towards the refinement of the mental 
models used – in effect providing a necessary degree of self-testing of the hypothetical basis of the 
HAZOP, with the effect of improving the specification of software that is to exhibit intended 
behaviour in unexpected situations. 
The aim of this work is to investigate the interrelated nature of system modelling and inferred belief 
with respect to hazards arising within complex behaviour, such that plausible and informative models 
describing system dynamics and evidence of cause and effect might be systematically employed in the 
updating of more abstract representations of belief concerning hazard relationships, as captured within 
a Hazard and Operability study. 
So as to formulate a relationship between the HAZOP process, a system dynamics model and an 
inference mechanism validating
1
 the deviation – system flaw / defect – consequence relationships 
formed within the initial Hazard and Operability study, the following objectives ought to be satisfied: 
 Model behaviour, competence and situational awareness with a system dynamics (Monte Carlo) 
simulation incorporating three dynamically and “autonomously” interacting rule-bases 
(constituting in effect a three-body problem) – exploring sensitivity to initial conditions and 
capturing measures of potentially behaviourally complex and emergent behaviour; 
 Formulate this model, and the later inference model, within a provisional systems engineering 
modelling framework – formulating appropriate SysML [83] constructs and attempting to position 
the two (dynamics and inference) models as an extension to, or alongside, ARP 4754A [101]; 
                                                     
1
 If not validating then at least tilting revised belief towards the evidence generated by the dynamics model. 
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 Consider the views of “experts” and “practitioners” with a questionnaire based validation of 
observed dynamical behaviour arising from the above model(s); 
 Develop an inference based validation of behavioural flaws and defects with respect to anticipated 
deviations formed within the initial HAZOP; 
 Extend the initial HAZOP so as to incorporate the above derived estimated measures of emergent 
behaviour and inferences of uncertainty or otherwise; incorporating evidence derived from 
observed system dynamics encapsulating likely and plausible behaviour. 
Therefore the following sections outline a scheme to incorporate HAZOP to explore some particular 
complex and emergent behaviour, and associated representations, of a putative UAV sense and avoid 
subsystem.  The intention is to facilitate an approach to hazard identification as a UAS extension to a 
UAV Preliminary Aircraft Safety Assessment (PASA) [101]. 
A question might be addressed at this juncture as to what extent this modelling approach might be 
justified as representing an “autonomous system”.  Current doctrine [78] on the issue of Automated 
versus Autonomous Systems defines an Automated System as one “... Knowing the set of rules under 
which it is operating means that its output is predictable.”  Against this, an Autonomous System is 
considered to incorporate “... understanding and its perception of its environment, such a system is 
able to take appropriate action, from a number of alternatives, without depending on human oversight 
and control, although these may still be present.  Although the overall activity of an autonomous 
unmanned aircraft will be predictable, individual actions may not be.” [78]  
1.2. Hypothesis 
In formulating suitable objectives for this research, and in the context of the previously stated broad 
hypothesis that risk events within complex systems are caused by deviations from design or operating 
intentions and unanticipated non-linear interactions, a hypothesis relating specifically to Hazard and 
Operability (HAZOP) studies has been formulated against which the project outcomes are later 
assessed.  In this it is argued that a conventional, and essentially manual, HAZOP process can be 
improved with information obtained with model-based dynamic simulation, using a Monte Carlo 
approach, to update a Bayesian Belief model representing the expected relations between cause and 
effects – and through this approach thereby produce an enhanced HAZOP. 
Additionally, the inclusion of suitable metrics indicative of system behavioural complexity, or rather 
proxies by way of measures of system stability and complex behaviour, along with domain specific 
safety-constraint violation detection metrics (e.g. Air Proximity or other near-miss categories), might 
together further enhance comprehension of the specific system safety concerns arising within the 
various system behaviours – even where it might later be thought that the observed behaviours were 
obvious after the event. 
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1.3. Motivation in Context 
Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4754A [101] describes the information to be produced by 
the recommended Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) process, and sits at the core of aircraft 
system development processes with system safety assessment guidance to one side and item assurance 
guidance to the other – as depicted in Figure 1.1 below.  Guidelines of recommended processes state 
that information is to be produced both for individual aircraft-level functions and combinations of 
aircraft-level function.   This implies an iterative approach with an incremental incorporation of 
additional mitigation functions.  Specifically, the information to be produced includes: 
a) Identification of related failure condition(s) and their effects; 
b) Classification of each failure condition based on the identified effects – as defined in UAS 1309 
[16] in the case of an unmanned system; 
c) Identification of the required system development assurance level; 
d) A statement outlining what was considered and what assumptions were made when evaluating 
each failure condition. 
 
Figure 1.1 Certification Considerations for Complex Aircraft Systems [95, 97, 100] 
The goal of these guidelines is to clearly identify the circumstances and severity of each failure 
condition along with rationale for its classification.  However, the system reliability assessment 
methods that are recommended in ARP 4761 [100] address models of accident causation in what has 
been described as “chain of events” [70], where Leveson argues that accidents are not necessarily 
caused by an item failure but often rather through inadequate constraints against bounded complex 
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behaviour.  Consequently this research study has as an aim the development of a broader Systems 
approach towards hazard assessment for evaluating hypothetical deviations from declared intent 
within a behavioural modelling framework, broadly in the first instance based on the STAMP [67, 70] 
hazard assessment methodology drawing upon both STPA [86, 105] and HAZOP [13, 66].  It is also 
proposed that this might facilitate exploratory dynamic hazard assessment alongside a Preliminary 
Aircraft Safety Assessment (PASA) [101] – which could be seen as fitting into the system 
development process where depicted below in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2 System Development Process with HAZOP, adapted from ARP4754A [101] 
Therefore the consideration of intent, rather than item failure, ensures that extending FHA with 
HAZOP is more appropriate for earlier use, perhaps to be applied even before the Preliminary Aircraft 
Safety Assessment; whereas FMEA requires the existence of a specific and detailed system design.  
Again, this suggests that a first-cut hazard or accident model ought to facilitate the modelling of a 
system of interest’s intended behaviour whilst also capturing the effect of deviations from declared 
intent and emergent behaviour.  Consequently, when taking into account the argument against “chain 
of events” models, it is proposed that a behavioural modelling capability encompassing system intent 
is a requirement of this approach.  Aside from a particular system goal, or sub-goal, the system intent 
is also to enforce a particular safety constraint. 
Taking into account these and the previous considerations regarding the application of HAZOP into 
the domain of FHA, along with the intention to facilitate an inference mechanism for the diagnosis of 
suspected design faults, together suggests a data-flow model as depicted in Figure 1.3.  This model 
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represents the three processes required to: identify a hazard through a variant of STPA to construct an 
initial HAZOP table, produce the resultant modelled behaviours, and incorporate an inference 
mechanism that associates the deviations and flaws with the relevant violations.  This enhancement of 
a plain hazard modelling capability is investigated to determine a means to quantify and rank the 
sensitivity to different causal events, and to explore hazard scenarios and vignettes, through a “what-
if” approach.  For example this could include false alarm rate effect analysis, or analysis of an 
allowable tolerance on perceived separation estimates – and within this employ Monte Carlo 
behavioural simulation to produce distributions of constraint violations associated with degrees of 
belief or Bayesian probability estimates representing the flaw or defect causal relationships with 
respect to outcomes. 
 
Figure 1.3 Outline HAZOP inference process role [32] 
Therefore, in the nature and occurrence of an expected defect across a number of slightly differing but 
otherwise comparable models of systems – differing say in tolerance or performance – sensitivity in 
the belief relationship ought to be amenable to discovery through Monte Carlo simulation of either 
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including estimates of the likely number of scenario events or vignettes per vehicle or system 
operational life, and representation of the total number vehicles or systems of the same type. 
1.4. Project Overview 
A model has been developed for a simplified exemplar describing particular vignettes within a 
scenario of an air-proximity hazard arising between two air-vehicles.  This model is considered to be 
of sufficient fidelity so as to characterise the inherent complexity and emergent behaviour that might 
arise with this type of interaction. 
 
Figure 1.4 Autonomous Systems HAZOP Context 
This study incorporates a broad Systems Engineering approach towards hazard assessment 
incorporating system dynamical behaviour to evaluate behaviour as hypothetical deviations from 
declared intent within a behavioural modelling framework.   
The initial hazard assessment methodology is styled upon that derived from the Systems Theoretic 
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Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA [71]).  Within this Systems Engineering context, the work as 
presented here together might be seen as a portfolio of four smaller but integrated projects – a specific 
and novel Requirements Analysis phase, a construction and generalised Systems Dynamics modelling 
phase, a Hazard Belief Inference modelling phase, and a Validation by Questionnaire and general 
verification phase.  The proposed process model, facilitating the application of HAZOP from the 
system concept stage onwards, also incorporates dynamical modelling and an associated inference 
model; together closing the analysis process with the designer in the loop throughout. 
It is assumed that in the case of complex system behaviour a difficulty lies in assessing hazard and 
operability issues with human reasoning, intuition and mental methods alone – and hence the 
requirement is to effectively provide an additional tool for the “diagnosis” of system defects arising 
even at the system concept stage.  This includes the development of a provisional systems modelling 
framework, describing the context of the hazard modelling, as in Figure 1.4 along with the context of 
the scenario and system goal (Figure 5.5, etc.).  This modelling framework also encompasses the 
sequence of actions (Figure 6.4, etc.) required to build comprehensive interrelated HAZOP, dynamics 
and inference models; plus the various generic physical, dysfunction (defect), safety violation, model 
state monitoring and behaviour inference capture parametric models (Figure 7.3, etc.), along with the 
respective specific constraint descriptions (Figure 7.2, etc.). 
The actual system dynamics represents constrained simulated avoidance behaviour within a two-
dimensional model of the environment (strictly 2.xD, as “bank angle” also has some meaning within 
the model).  There is one fundamental safety requirement, or objective, which requires that each 
modelled entity avoids the other with a minimum separation of 500 feet, otherwise the fundamental 
safety constraint is violated.  Certain “surprises” within the relative perceptions of behaviour can also 
be seen to trigger additional safety constraint violations with respect to Air Proximity reporting.  
Analyses are in effect exported from the dynamics model as Monte Carlo data, to be processed within 
the inference model – in turn tied to the initial STPA / Hazard and Operability study.  Whilst the 
model intentionally represents various components comprising the system, along with three specific 
models of dysfunction for investigation, there is no meaningful representation of an operator within 
the current model. 
Cases exercising the model are created from a comprehensive set of combinations of low speed (71.5 
– 117 knot), medium speed (117 – 195 knot), and high (or excessive) speed (195 – 305 knot) 
interactions; combined with three dysfunctions, especially wherever sensitivity to these is either 
anticipated or later observed.  The position of the entity representing the UAV / UAS always forms 
the initial reference point, with the “non-cooperative traffic” positioned on a converging heading with 
an initial separation typically of 0.5 nautical miles.  Interactions are then investigated where the 
direction of approach arises within five broad segments encompassing the 360 degrees circumscribing 
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the 0.5 nm radius around the UAV, and with a smaller number of cases within narrower windows of 
approach where a particular sensitivity has been observed (q.v. Table A.1, Appendix A. 
 Enhanced HAZOP Employing Inference Test Cases). 
The results arsing with the initial system dynamics model and an initial attempt at capturing the 
inference in this behaviour were presented in the form of an objective multiple-choice questionnaire 
to a group of “experts” and “practitioners”, representing a HAZOP team.  The responses to this 
questionnaire where analysed using a non-parametric statistical approach (Cohen’s Kappa [20]).  In 
response to the questionnaire some improvements were subsequently made to the dynamics and 
perceptions within the final model, whilst the initial attempt at inference modelling was completely 
overhauled as a result (q.v. Chapter 9, along with Appendices B and C; Hazards Advising Autonomy: 
Questionnaire, and Respondent Results and Analysis). 
1.5. Contribution of Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the interrelated nature of system modelling and inferred 
belief with respect to hazards arising within potentially complex behaviour, such that plausible and 
informative models describing system dynamics might be systematically employed to more fully 
inform abstract representations of belief concerning hazard relationships.  By informing and 
improving the HAZOP process, the contribution of this thesis is to make unanticipated hazardous 
conditions more predictable.  This is achieved through combining models representing the simulation 
of the system dynamics and a corresponding representation of the relevant cause and failure effects, as 
described in the HAZOP process, presented in a Bayesian Belief Network. 
In attempting to test the validity and acceptance of this, by employing a properly formed 
questionnaire wherein a number of “experts” represented a group consensus regarding belief in the 
observed system behaviour, and whilst they also reasonably disputed certain aspects of the modelled 
behaviour, where they agreed with each other they also showed a slightly stronger agreement with the 
modelled behaviour.  This implies that whilst certain aspects of the modelled behaviour where 
accepted a priori by this group, other aspects could surprise even the “more expert” group.  Therefore, 
system dynamics modelling may usefully provide additional insight beyond individual experience and 
intuition – principally the characteristic sought of a HAZOP team.  However this has been tested only 
with 18 respondents here, a more in-depth investigation would be needed to properly test this 
assumption.  Alternatively, perhaps all that is required is for there to be a properly formulated “reality 
check” so as to baseline a representative system dynamics model, and then accepting this is to also to 
at least conditionally accept the other more esoteric and surprising behaviours as possibilities and 
counter examples for hazardous outcomes in the particular system of interest. 
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Figure 1.5 An Enhanced HAZOP Framework 
Overall, an enhanced HAZOP framework is suggested as depicted in Figure 1.5.  This posits that the 
HAZOP / STPA hazard assessment and mitigation processes might be jointly enhanced with the 
production of a simplified representative system dynamics model and associated inferred belief 
model.  The system dynamics model captures the defect, control flaw and design decisions 
provisionally identified in the STPA / HAZOP process, where an inferred belief model captures the 
provisional belief structure defined with the HAZOP table.  Combining the two using Monte Carlo 
data to update belief in the HAZOP table not only conditions the original belief but also may find new 
believable associations. 
As a Systems Engineering project, addressing the problem with an interdisciplinary and top-down 
approach viewing the system as a whole, this work consists of the following tangible aspects: 
 Inputs to the project: A conventional HAZOP study and a slightly adapted variant of STPA are 
incorporated as springboards for the project. 
 Models created within the project: A Systems Dynamics model is created, structured in part from 
information derived from the STPA process.  In conjunction with this a Bayesian belief model is 
also created, structured in part from structural information derived from the HAZOP process. 
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 Outputs arising from the project: Cases embodying emergent behaviours within the system 
dynamics are identified with Lyapunov Exponent values derived directly from Monte Carlo 
simulations of the system dynamics model.  System flaw, deviations and constraint violation case 
are similarly drawn from Monte Carlo simulations of the system dynamics model, and applied as 
experience to produce ranked and weighted combinations of these simulation and belief products.  
These are applied to the deviation cases from the original HAZOP, modifying some beliefs and 
raising awareness of the more significant risks, and thereby enhancing the hazard assessment by 
incorporating uncertainty and belief derived from modelling.  Given the problem of validating 
behaviour of a synthetic model in the absence of real data a trial method employing a validation 
questionnaire attempts to draw knowledge from “practitioners” and domain “experts”. 
 Combining the respective measures of belief within specific test cases with measures of constraint 
violation and a measure of emergent behaviour helps identify the most hazardous cases within an 
enhanced HAZOP.  A significant aspect of this lies in the choice of the appropriate parameter 
deviation and guidewords in the first formulation of the HAZOP, and how the choice of a 
particular parameter subsequently maps onto the system behaviour, emergent or otherwise – 
which in this case lies in treating the abstract noun “manoeuvre” as the system parameter of 
interest.  
 
Figure 1.6 A Scheme for Incorporating Behavioural Hazard Assessment into ARP 4754A 
Finally, an tentative view also points in the direction of incorporating behavioural hazard assessment 
(BHA) as a possible adjunct to the established functional hazard assessment (FHA) methodology as 
embodied within current guidance regarding the development of certifiable civil aircraft systems – 
Figure 1.6.  This attempts to place the enhanced HAZOP framework in context with the Preliminary 
Aircraft Safety Assessment (PASA) within ARP 4754A [101]. 
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1.6. Thesis Structure 
This thesis is comprised of three larger parts.  The first part encompasses a wide ranging review of the 
background and literature influencing this work.  The second part presents and discusses the 
framework within which this hazard-centric study has been developed.  The final part brings together 
the various outputs and conclusions arising from this study. 
Part one, the introduction and literature review, is comprised of four chapters, as follows: 
Chapter 1: This chapter provides an introduction and initial overview to the work.  Here the scene is 
set in identifying a need to provide better understanding of hazards as might arise where a designer’s 
account of likely system behaviour and dynamics arising with the autonomous system dynamics is 
insufficiently understood.  As the reader will have read thus far, this broadly describes the motivation, 
hypothesis, scope and contributions of the work. 
Chapter 2: This is the first of the three chapters considering the wider literature enveloping the 
subject, framed as a reflective regulatory context review; within which past accidents, certain aspects 
relating to human factors and situational awareness are considered – as all might inform the design of 
representative system models.  In addition further defining aspects and constraints are considered, 
including models representing varying degrees of Autonomy, human equivalence, the relationship 
between safety and reliability, analytic limitations, the current regulatory guidance and approaches to 
hazard assessment; raising questions as to whether the hazard assessment approach ought to be 
focused on function or behaviour abstractions. 
Chapter 3: The progressive issue of the state of the art and understanding in hazard identification is 
reviewed next.  In terms of the aims of this work, the extension of the HAZOP method, work 
addressing hazard emulation, hazard identification and assessment, Bayesian expression of risk, and 
scenario and deviation analysis are considered together.  Furthermore, how HAZOP and other 
scenario based methods might be extended with the application of the Systems Theoretic Accident 
Model Process (STAMP) and Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is reviewed, giving way to 
a discussion of systems representation, the representation of risks and hazards, and the application of 
Bayesian and Monte Carlo methods to build models of belief. 
Chapter 4: Completing the review of state of the art and domain literature the broader context of 
Systems Engineering is considered.  The contrasting development life-cycles as embodied by the 
recommended systems engineering processes characterised within ARP 4754A / 4761 is compared 
with reference to the spiral development model applied to software systems development.  The 
relevance of architecture and validation is considered in terms of design intent, and as used within this 
work, validation through questionnaire.  This chapter rounds off with a short overview of what 
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constitutes emergent and complex behaviour as understood in the robotic and autonomous systems 
community, concluding with a brief summary of the relevant influences and scope to be taken from 
the whole literature review. 
Part two, encompassing the systems framework, comprises three further chapters formed 
around the conventional system engineering process:   
Chapter 5: The first stage of any systems engineering process considers the system requirements. This 
describes where the broader project requirements were drawn from the (earlier) literature review using 
textual analysis and QFD.  Within this a number of representative stakeholders are identified; 
including certification evidence clients, safety objective clients, the HAZOP Team, and the 
engineering function.  The specific requirements relating to Sense And Avoid (SAA) Hazards and an 
approach to hazard scenario generation is then outlined. 
Chapter 6: Having obtained or formulated a set of requirements, the system model design proceeds 
with a description of the modelling framework, with the collision avoidance scenario and behavioural 
intent modelling, and the system goal and emergency behaviour vignette modelling. 
Chapter 7: This chapter continues with the system state modelling, including the parametric 
representations of the physical constraints, dysfunctions and defect properties, safety constraint and 
violation models, and the emergent system behaviour sensitivity modelling.  
Chapter 8: Having incorporated the system model requirements, composed primarily of the safety and 
other constraints within the particular scenario, along with the resultant design decisions and expected 
system dysfunction models, the interface to the Bayesian Network representation of the HAZOP is 
then described; along with representations of the parametric models of the interfaces used in the 
capture of the various parameters collected in the Monte Carlo generated cases.  The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of selected model test cases.  
Part three, the final three chapters summarise the work and final outcomes of the project 
Chapter 9: This chapter describes the design of the questionnaire and presents an interpretation of the 
results derived from the respondents to this questionnaire. These results are used to partially validate 
the system model requirements arising from the HAZOP in terms of their manifestation in the 
resultant system behaviour. 
Chapter 10: The penultimate chapter provides a sketched summary of the principal results as arising 
with the aforementioned questionnaire responses, and offers a possible interpretation of the emergent 
properties in the results correlating safety constraint violation outcomes and corresponding 
measurements of the Lyapunov exponent.  This is followed by a summary the lessons learnt, 
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alternative approaches and improvements, and a suggestion as to industry use and benefits of 
exploitation, with a final section on suggested future work. 
Chapter 11: The final chapter details the recommendations for implementation, reflecting upon the 
original stated objectives in Chapter 1, and finally draws together some conclusions relating to the 
need to consider complexity in system behaviour, a system dynamical model’s relationship to hazard 
assessment, and how this sits within the context of HAZOP. 
Annex: Completing the work, following the list of references, three appendices detail the composition 
of the enhanced HAZOP employing inference test cases, the Questionnaire, and finally the detailed 
questionnaire respondent results and analysis. 
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Chapter 2. Regulatory Context Review 
“Human beings, who are almost unique in having the ability to learn from the experience of others, 
are also remarkable for their apparent disinclination to do so.” 
Douglas Adams, “Last Chance to See” 
 
2.1. Accident Inevitability 
This work in systems engineering is concerned with how hazards arise with complex interactions 
within systems and how these might be identified, especially where high levels of automation or 
autonomous behaviour are employed, plus how they might be represented and assessed.  Often the 
very existence of some hazard may be obscured from the designer by the inherent complexity of the 
system, only to be discovered too late in the seemingly bizarre nature of the system behaviour from 
the point of view of the operator(s) working under pressure in adverse conditions.  So as to set the 
scene, two seemingly different, although in some ways comparable, incidents illustrate where inherent 
complexity and tight coupling of actions and events have occasioned possibly avoidable air accidents 
had the operators better understood and correctly interpreted the system behaviour at the time.  And 
yet, both of these accidents were perhaps inevitable given the expectations of the system designers 
and their understanding of the potential cause and event chains comprising a combination of physical 
failure, system design limitations, false or misinterpreted cues, situational awareness and human error. 
2.1.1. Accidents Past 
Seriously unpleasant and surprising things certainly do occasionally happen – especially so when the 
complexity of whatever unpleasantness then occurring overwhelms the operators.   
The evening of the 8th January 1989 just outside Kegworth, Leicestershire, on the approach to runway 
27 at East Midlands airport, was one such occasion and place.  At 20:25 that evening British Midland 
Airways Boeing 737-400, G-OBME, came to rest 900 metres short of the runway threshold on the 
north-bound carriageway of the M1 after a damaged No. 1 engine suffered total mechanical failure on 
final approach, where the fully serviceable No. 2 engine had earlier been mistakenly shutdown in 
flight.  As might be expected the series of events leading up to this accident started somewhat earlier, 
at 20:05, as reported by Trimble and Cooper [109] of the Air Accident Investigation Branch of the 
UK Department of Transport, wherein during the intervening twenty minutes the flight crew 
experienced severe engine vibrations and shuddering, incorrectly diagnosed the problem, shutdown 
the serviceable No. 2 engine, and finally attempted to land at East Midlands airport only with the 
faulty No. 1 engine. 
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The AAIB report for this accident (Conclusions 3(b), p148 [109]) identifies five factors that were 
deemed to have contributed to the incorrect response of the flight crew “ ...  1. The combination of 
heavy engine vibration, noise, shuddering and an associated smell of fire were outside their training 
and experience.  2. They reacted to the initial engine problem prematurely and in a way that was 
contrary to their training.  3. They did not assimilate the indications on the engine instrument display 
before the throttled back the No 2 engine.  4. As the No 2 engine was throttled back, the noise and 
shuddering associated with the surging of the No 1 engine ceased, persuading them that they had 
correctly identified the defective engine.  5. They were not informed of the flames which had emanated 
from the No 1 engine and which had been observed by many on board, including 3 cabin attendants in 
the aft cabin.” [109] 
Consequently the case was made that the serviceable No. 2 engine had been wrongly shutdown by the 
flight crew as a result of an unapproved diagnostic procedure and a misreading of the relevant engine 
instruments.  However, the No. 2 engine was not fully shutdown until two minutes and seven seconds 
into the incident, having only been reduced to idle subsequent to the first twenty-two seconds spent 
diagnosing the problem.  At the point where the No. 2 engine throttle was reduced to idle the 
autothrottle also had to be disengaged, with the coincidental effect that the damaged No. 1 engine 
recovered from the compressor stalls and settled down to run at a slightly lower fan speed, albeit still 
with unacceptable vibrations indicated on the instruments, but with an absence of the more severe 
shuddering felt on the flight deck.  It was this coincidence, if indeed it was mere coincidence, which 
wrongly convinced the flight crew that they had made the correct diagnosis during the hundred or so 
seconds before finally shutting down the No. 2 engine.  Since the publication of the AAIB report it 
has been suggested
2
 that the fuel surges associated with the damaged No. 1 engine, attempting to 
maintain speed whilst commanded by the autothrottle, abated as a direct consequence of the 
disengagement of the autothrottle.  This action would therefore have produced the same effect of 
reducing the shuddering irrespective of which engine had been reduced to idle – and therefore 
providing false positive support to the flight crew’s initial, albeit unapproved, diagnosis. 
With advances in automation, for example automatic reconfiguration, it might be thought that 
automation alone might alleviate the prospect of such human error.  The events of the early hours of 
25th April 2006, Nogales, Arizona, give lie to this view where a General Atomics Predator B 
unmanned air vehicle (UAV) operating on behalf of the US Border and Customs Protection was lost 
due to the pilot failing to appreciate configuration differences of an alternate operator console. 
The US National Transportation Safety Board describes the probable cause of this accident as “... The 
pilot's failure to use checklist procedures when switching operational control from PPO-1 (pilot 
                                                     
2
 “Motorway Plane Crash”, Seconds From Disaster, Season 2 (2005), Episode 3, National Geographic Channel. 
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payload operator console) to PPO-2, which resulted in the fuel valve inadvertently being shut off and 
the subsequent total loss of engine power, and lack of a flight instructor in the GCS (ground control 
station), as required by the CBP's approval to allow the pilot to fly the Predator B.  Factors 
associated with the accident were repeated and unresolved console lockups, inadequate maintenance 
procedures performed by the manufacturer, and the operator's inadequate surveillance of the UAS 
program.” [82]. 
Aside from the obvious human error, and the repeated equipment malfunctions causing the pilot to 
switch consoles initially, the design of the Ground Control Station and the “Lost-Link” procedure are 
also significant factors.  The aircraft control levers at each Pilot Payload Operator console – flaps, 
condition lever, throttle, and speed lever – appear identical, but may have very different functions.  In 
piloting mode the condition lever controls the fuel valve, engine shutdown and propeller feathering. 
However, in consoles configured to be used as the observer station the same lever operates the camera 
iris.  As soon as it was noticed that the aircraft was not maintaining altitude, although not knowing 
why and unsure as to what was happening, the pilot elected to shutdown the ground data terminal 
which has the effect of initiating the on-board pre-programmed lost-link procedure, which then causes 
the UAV to autonomously fly a pre-determined profile whilst waiting for the link to be re-established.  
Unfortunately, with the engine already shutdown the UAV continued to descend. 
For each of these accidents it is possible to categorise the Human Factor, Environmental, Hardware 
and Software aspects, as summarised in Table 2.1.  What is less easily characterised is the nature of 
the interactive complexity of each system as confronted by the operators on the day. 
 
Table 2.1 Categorising the causes of the Kegworth and Nogales accidents. 
Both Stringfellow [104] and Johnson [59] see this incident as a socio-technical issue.  Johnson in 
particular considers this as a problem of oversight in having one agency acting as both regulator and 
737 G-OBME Kegworth, 
January 1989
Predator B UAV Nogales, 
April 2006
Human Factors & Training Inappropriate procedure –
Premature and incorrect 
diagnosis leading to incorrect 
shutdown of RH engine.  Lack 
of communication with cabin 
crew.
Failure to use checklist when 
switching operational control 
between pilot operator stations 
leading to inadvertent fuel valve 
shutoff. 
Environment Smoke, fumes, vibration, 
extreme shudder, night-time, 
ATC distraction.
Crew located on the ground, 
flight instructor not co-located.
Hardware Failure LH Fan Blade Failure. Repeated and unresolved 
console lockups.
Software / System Design Behaviour of auto-throttle 
affecting fuel flow.   
Inconspicuous vibration 
indication and alerting. 
Differing control mode 
configurations depending on 
whether GCS is being used to 
pilot or observe.
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operator (the US Customs & Border Protection agency were operating under FAA delegated 
authority), along with a belief that there needs to be greater coordination between UAS operation staff 
and Air Traffic Management, and thereby improve mutual situation awareness.  Johnson also suggests 
that minimum equipment lists and deviations guides be used as means to establish the conditions 
under which operations should be suspended or describe alternate safe operating procedures – which 
assumes that all plausible deviations might be evaluated. 
Certainly, both of these sample accidents reveal underlying hardware reliability, flight crew training 
and performance issues.  However, whilst allowing for the associated random hardware failure, each 
unfamiliar situation led to an inability of the respective flight crew to form a correct understanding of 
what was actually occurring – in short a failure to correctly diagnose the problem such as to inform a 
correct decision and course of action.  In both cases expectations based upon an understanding, or 
lack of, aspects of the automation within the respective system misled the operator as to what the safe 
decision should be; from unrecognised behavioural interaction between engine autothrottle and fuel 
system, to an understanding of the capabilities of an autonomous lost-link procedure inhibited by 
operator action.  Each was tightly coupled producing a prompt impact and interactively complex.  
Where “complex” reads as “unsafe” Perrow [87] provides a list of characteristics that can be used to 
distinguish complex systems from more straightforward linear type systems, as detailed in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2 Complex v Linear Systems after Perrow [87] 
Perrow describes a system as being “interactively complex” where multiple discrete failures interact 
in unexpected ways, typically remaining incomprehensible for some critical period of time.  Often this 
complexity arises as a consequence of the system designer rightly incorporating some redundant sub-
system as a backup to preserve continuing safe operation.  However, when a failure occurs, or is 
Complex Systems Linear Systems
Proximity Spatial Segregation
Common-mode Connections Dedicated Connections
Interconnected Subsystems Segregated Subsystems
Limited Substitutions Easy Substitutions
Feedback Loops Few Feedback Loops
Multiple & Interacting Controls Single Purpose Segregated Controls
Indirect Information Direct Information
Limited Understanding Extensive Understanding
34 
 
believed to have occurred, in some other aspect of the system, but which also as a side-effect interacts 
with this backup system, then often the whole system behaviour appears “mysterious” or 
“incomprehensible”.  When the effects propagating through the various system sub-components have 
a prompt and major impact on each other, and not slowly enough for human thinking, then the system 
is deemed to be “tightly coupled”, and this increases the likelihood that operator intervention might 
actually make things worse.  In particular when an operator makes a tentative choice (No. 2 engine in 
the case of G-OMBE) this also creates a mental model of the situation and if the results of this choice 
appear consistent with the mental model then later results that contradict this often do not cause 
rejection of the model, instead they only give rise to confusion.  Systems with these properties are 
considered to be vulnerable to normal accidents – “normal” as in inevitable at some point. 
Overall, Perrow considers that accidents are inevitable for systems of ever greater complexity, as 
defined by the degree of interaction and coupling.  Therefore where the catastrophic potential 
outweighs the benefit, as depicted to the right in Figure 2.1, the use of these systems ought to be at 
least restricted, and, in Perrow’s view, abandon nuclear power and weapons altogether.  As to where 
an Unmanned Autonomous System might sit within this scheme, along with its associated Unmanned 
Air Vehicle, it would be reasonable to estimate that the degree of complexity lies somewhere between 
air traffic control, aircraft and space based systems, with the same catastrophic potential as an aircraft. 
 
Figure 2.1 Living with UAS, adapted from Perrow "Living with High-Risk Systems" [87] 
“To defend against normal accidents, we must understand the complex interactions of our programs, 
analyze close-calls and mishaps to determine root causes, and USE this knowledge to improve 
programs and operations.” Dr. Michael A. Greenfield, Deputy Associate Administrator (1998), 
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance [50]. 
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2.1.2. Human Factors 
Defensive barriers are considered to be the best protection from the worst effects of the unsafe act.  
Humans, as operators, designers, managers and regulators are involved with all aspects of the safe 
operation of a system.  This is no less true when the system is designed to run “autonomously”.  When 
we look beyond the immediate causes of any accident involving a complex system, it is necessary to 
consider what barriers, if any, have been erected to prevent a proximate cause from creating the 
accident.  In the main these barriers are centred upon human behaviour and socio-technical systems, 
and especially so the further the barrier is situated from the unsafe act. 
In a study of Human Error, Reason [91] puts forward a general model for the dynamics of accident 
causation – more colloquially known as Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” model.  In this he postulates that a 
“trajectory of accident opportunity” penetrates an alignment of gaps in the various defensive systems.  
This concept has since been applied to various socio-technical accidents, and in later [92] variants 
these general layers of defence hardened into four categories, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.  For example 
in an airborne encounter between a UAV and another aircraft, the assumed hazardous scenario might 
be that a procedural violation occurs through the failure of a number of defences.  Consequently, both 
aircraft then might violate the declared minimum separation, possibly due to a failure in air traffic 
management, where the dynamics of an unsafe act involving a final defensive barrier, say an 
emergency backup manoeuvre, might then be investigated in terms of decisions and delay. 
 
Figure 2.2 Hazard Model adapted from Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” Model [91, 92] 
Mishap
Perceived Range
Estimation,
Latency in Perceiving
Threat,
Clearance Margin,
Minimum Warning Time,
Sensor Degradation or
Failure,
Level Bust,
Etc.
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(at Separation Limit),
UAS Speed,
Initial UAS Heading,
Initial Non-Coop
Traffic Heading,
Non-Coop Traffic
Speed,
Weather & Flight
Conditions,
Etc.
Initial Traffic
Separation,
Inappropriate Air
Traffic Service,
Inadequate
Communication,
Ignore False
Alarms,
Desensitise Sensing
Capability,
Etc.
CAP393 ANO:
The Rules of the Air
Regulation
Rules 8, 9, 10 & 11,
CAP722:
Section 2, Chap 2,
Design Rationale,
Operating Assumptions,
Operational Policy,
Etc.
Some of the weaknesses in the various 
levels of defence may also be coupled: e.g. 
operating assumptions that may lead to 
false alarms being ignored.
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2.1.3. Situational Awareness 
Autonomy in systems, which is with autonomous machinery functioning as part of a system, is not 
treated as all or nothing where safety is concerned.  As long as humans (and perhaps corporations) are 
the only legitimate and legal entities imbued with responsibilities for any decision affecting others, 
then machine autonomy ought to remain subordinate to human authority.  Consequently, bearing in 
mind both Reason’s defensive barriers and issues of situational awareness, various degrees or levels 
of autonomy are now often used to define the relative scope and mediation of authority between the 
autonomous machine and the immediately responsible human agent – the operator.  In the case of an 
autonomous UAV, a major concern is to what degree the operator, or remote pilot, then retains their 
own situational awareness of the immediate and anticipated behaviour of this machine for which they 
retain responsibility for the actions that it might take, and therefore the correct assignment of the 
appropriate level(s) of autonomy to safeguard this. 
Endsley argues that situational awareness in the aviation domain can often be degraded by automation 
distancing the pilot / operator from the control loop and through “lack of synergy in human and 
machine decision making” [40], particularly in the effect of automation and application of artificial 
intelligence in cockpit systems.  The argument for improving the operator situational awareness is 
therefore directed towards the design of, and assistance given by, situational information displays – as 
opposed to the full automation of an avoidance task.  The particularly concern was where the 
automation has been designed deliberately so as to put the pilot or operator “out-of-the-loop”, with the 
possible effect that the operator's mental model of the system does not then enable them to recognise 
the actual state of the automated system when it fails.  Passivity and loss of vigilance is of particular 
concern.  It is suggested that automation introduces new forms of workload, and that this increases 
with the degree of automation.  Therefore cockpit automation ought to be more focused on improving 
pilot or operator situational awareness rather than automating tasks – where this study concerned the 
visualisation of “pop-up” threats, demonstrating improved situational awareness of imminent threats 
although poor for projecting ahead of the threats. 
Ruff, et al [98], envision a requirement for systems involving multiple semi-autonomous UAVs 
controlled by a single supervisor.   However previous studies have shown that increased automation 
can cause sudden significant fluctuations in operator workload along with a loss of situational 
awareness, and Endsley and others suggest that this reduces the benefit in multiple levels of 
autonomy.  In this workload study, involving automated planning and image selection, it was found 
that operators exhibit either limited confidence in an autonomous system, and / or prefer to do the 
work themselves – even if increasing their workload.  Within the levels of autonomy available, either 
managed by operator consent or by exception, it was found that the operators frequently pre-empted 
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autonomous decision making and automated actions were rare; albeit that these were non-safety 
related decisions. 
From these studies it would appear that there remains some doubt as to whether the introduction of 
different levels of automation and autonomy does improve an operator's situational awareness.  
However, in the case of a UAS there will inevitably be situations where the pilot or operator will be 
“out-of-the-loop” to a greater or lesser extent during certain critical events.  The challenge for hazard 
assessment of such a system is in constructing the best mental model encapsulating the possible 
degraded effect upon situational awareness. 
Consequently, additional hazard assessment modelling goals potentially arise with these issues: 
 There is a need to incorporate a formal representation of unsafe supervision or precondition 
leading to the unsafe act within this work, representing the final barrier to the unsafe act.  This 
might be denoted in the role of the backup emergency avoidance behaviour within the scenario. 
 Situational awareness might be modelled as a delay and / or confusion arising with the operator, 
pilot or controller response.  This might possibly be portrayed simply as sensitivity to a variable 
latency of response and a probabilistic error of omission or commission, and a confusion matrix. 
 A “consent or exception”, or other variable authority, model should be incorporated into the 
representation of the backup emergency avoidance behaviour.  Currently “latency” is the only 
causal parameter in the model that might be treated as a crude proxy for delayed authority. 
2.2. Defining Aspects & Constraints 
2.2.1. Degree of Autonomy 
Levels of autonomy are open to interpretation, and therefore where these to be accommodated in the 
system hazard assessment, for example representing a dynamic change of relative authority occurring 
within a scenario, it is expected that it would be necessary to declare which scheme is to be employed, 
and then also assign the appropriate range of levels to the various defensive barriers.  Currently there 
are two reasonably well established schemes denoting variable levels of autonomy as used in the 
domain of piloted aircraft and unmanned autonomous airborne systems.  These are Taylor’s, et al, 
Pilot Authority and Control of Task (PACT [106]) levels and Clough’s alternative Autonomous 
Control Levels [19]. 
Clough attempted to address the subjectivity inherent in the likely response to requests such as “tell 
us how autonomous a UAV is ...” [19].  In doing so ten Autonomous Control Levels (ACL) where 
defined, and adopted in their more tactical form from 2001 onwards in US Department of Defence 
UAV road-maps [25].  In this form these levels chart the progress of UAV development from simple 
remotely guided vehicles to fully autonomous swarms.  For example, the DoD road-map charts a 
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route from systems real time health diagnosis (L2), through UAVs that can adapt to failures and flight 
conditions (L3), and on to the development of an onboard route re-planning capability (L4). 
 
Table 2.3 Original Autonomous Control Levels (ACL) [19] 
Were these levels to be applied to a civil UAS and correspondingly to a civil certification route it may 
be more appropriate to adopt the initially proposed scheme, as abridged in Table 2.3.  For example, 
the degree of devolved autonomy associated with a UAV Sense & Avoid sub-system might be located 
between Autonomous Control Level 4 – robust response to anticipated faults and events, and Level 6 - 
real-time multi-vehicle coordination.  Level 8 and above might be deemed suitable to provide for 
operation in controlled airspace without continuous supervision, and arguably by extension, Level 9 
and above would be required of an autonomous vehicle so to enable it to operate outside of controlled 
airspace (class G airspace) without supervision. 
The UK Civil Aviation Authority’s guidance in CAP 722 [17] also promotes the concept of a 
decomposed autonomous capability, so as to address the perceived inherent complexity of 
autonomous operations.  True autonomy is described as a capability to operate without human control 
or direct oversight.  It is suggested that an autonomous capability might be comprised of various 
decision-making sub-systems, each responsible for its own domain of authority.  Within this 
definition there is then provision for a range of lower level capabilities, from simple advisory systems 
where humans make the decisions and execute the actions, through the intermediate levels of “semi-
autonomous” systems.  In this view an autonomous capability might be made up from autonomous 
flight management, sense & avoid, route management, power management and prognostic health 
management systems, for example.  Some, or all, of these would collaborate with the human UAS 
pilot / operator.  For the definition of these levels one might then elect to align these with the ACLs or 
Level Descriptor Situational Awareness
10 Human-like
9 Multi-vehicle tactical performance optimisation Detection & tracking of other air vehicles within airspace
8 Multi-vehicle mission performance optimisation Detection & tracking of other air vehicles within local airspace
7 Real-time multi-vehicle cooperation Multiple threat detection & analysis on-board
6 Real-time multi-vehicle coordination Single threat detection & analysis on-board
5 Fault & event adaptive vehicle Situational Awareness supplemented by off-board data
4 Robust response to anticipated faults & events On-board threat sensing
3 Limited response to real-time faults & events Situational Awareness via remote operator
2 Pre-loaded alternative plans Situational Awareness via remote operator
1 Execute pre-planned mission Situational Awareness via remote operator
0 Remotely piloted vehicle Situational Awareness via remote pilot
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the PACT levels, Table 2.4, as used within ASTRAEA [29], however, no specific guidance is 
provided as to how the partitioning and decomposition might be identified or managed. 
 
Table 2.4 Pilot Authorisation and Control of Task (PACT) Levels [106] 
The vignettes to be described later in this work, in the context of a hazard perception questionnaire, 
would likely be assigned to PACT levels.  Where a vignette follows the rules of the air the governing 
sub-system model will be operating at PACT 4 – that is committed to advised action unless revoked – 
but when responding with an emergency evasion manoeuvre this becomes PACT 5 – fully automatic. 
2.2.2. Human Equivalence 
Equivalence, or at the very least a measure thereof, appears to be the grail toward which the national 
regulator would appear to be working.  However, what this implies in terms of system behaviour 
requires some further consideration.  For example there is the “one in a hundred” argument, where 
Johnson, et al [60], express a view that the presence of a pilot “makes up the difference”.  In this view 
the presence of the pilot typically allows for a 100 fold difference in erroneous detection rates when 
compared with a safety critical fully automatic high redundancy electronic control system.  So where 
Fault Diagnosis and Isolation requirements are identified through reliability analysis methods, such as 
FMECA and Functional Hazard Analysis, and certification specifications CS-23 [37] and CS-25 [36] 
declare that false alarms should not be a “nuisance” to the crew, liable to distract them during critical 
phases of flight, and that they should not introduce new hazards to the system, this of itself does not 
help in the determination of an acceptable metric for the verification of a specific advisory function 
supporting real-time autonomous decision making. 
Equating autonomy and ‘human equivalence’ is a cause for concern according to Alexander, et al [1], 
in their view of the appropriateness of UK military safety standards for the certification of 
autonomous systems, questioning the emphasis given to achieving human equivalence rather than 
optimum safety.  Rather, the authors believe that scales used to categorise differing degrees of 
‘autonomy’ might be more useful in determining an exact understanding of the degree of challenge 
Level
Operational 
Relationship
Computer Autonomy Pilot Authority
5 Automatic Full Interrupt
4 Direct Support Advise and action unless revoked Revoke action
3 In Support Advise and action if authorised Accept advice and authorise (or not)
2 Advisory Advise Accept advice and act accordingly
1 At Call Advise only if requested Full
0 Under Command None Full
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and difficulty in certification.  Consequently, the authors suggest that the ascribed level of autonomy 
might be used as an indicator of the difficulty that should be expected in certification.  How this might 
be specifically measured and used in practice is still not described.  There is a hint that specific hazard 
vignettes might be aligned to each level of autonomy, for a particular class of vehicle.  However, 
whether the lower category levels truly describe autonomous behaviour is also questioned (for 
example ACL 0 to 3 – simple remotely piloted through to systems with a robust response to real time 
faults).  It might be argued though that the higher levels of autonomous control do contribute to a 
better understanding of the aims of an enhanced hazard assessment as at this point they merge with 
goal-directed behaviour – a necessary consideration if one is to properly grasp the intent of the system 
design.  
Alexander, et al. also consider the focus of the software engineering discipline as deficient in limiting 
itself to analysis of the software system without sufficient regard to the operating environment.  
Understanding the interrelationship of software systems to the extant environment is deemed as being 
essential to safety.  It is proposed therefore that models should be built of the environment that an 
autonomous system is likely to encounter – including sensors, actuators, and phenomena – and that 
the correspondence of these models to the real environment should be evaluated.  It is acknowledged 
that such an endeavour is a difficult task. 
2.2.3. Safety & Reliability 
Dissimilarity is a recurring theme in the guidance to the specification and design of fault tolerant 
systems embodying either functional or analytic redundancy.  Beware though of interactive 
complexity – for example an aircraft might employ a secondary effect of control to mitigate a control 
loop failure, as such effects couple orthogonal axis of control it would very likely be dangerous then 
to make decisions on an independent diagnosis employing a different mental model. 
From the perspective of the committee charged with developing ARP 4761 [100], Portwood [90], 
explains how the shift towards highly integrated systems, away from the more traditional federated 
architectures, has driven analyses now to be conducted at the aircraft or whole system level – which 
has even broader scope in the case of a UAS.  Such a broadening of scope fits with Alexander’s, et al. 
[1], view that hazard assessment ought to incorporate a holistic model of the UAS operating 
environment.  While in the analysis of the possible safety consequences arising in the loss or 
reduction of system functionality, Saglimbene [102] suggests that the application of service 
experience, engineering and operational judgement is used to classify by severity and qualitatively 
describe the consequent hazard effect.  These classified hazard effects are then tied to the relevant 
system safety objectives, thereby determining the maximum tolerable probability of hazard 
occurrence and tolerable level of risk.  Glavaski, et al [48], suggests that as in the earlier example 
where some types of failure might be accommodated by reconfiguring and altering control allocation 
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so as to employ dissimilar system or control surfaces in mitigation, these would incorporate means to 
maintain situational awareness of the revised limits of control authority. 
The “black-box” nature of “off-the-shelf” software components renders their trustworthiness and 
modifiability as limited in the view of Ye and Kelly [115], and consequently the choice of mitigation 
strategies is therefore also restricted.  The authors consider how this problem might be addressed 
through the use of a range of fault tolerant software techniques, and how failures in these might be 
represented and analysed.  In the identification of likely failure modes it is suggested that deviation 
analysis might prompt consideration of all plausible deviations that may occur in the functions 
provided by any particular component.  This would likely form a pessimistic view as some failures 
might not possibly occur due to the unknown internal implementation of the component. 
2.2.4. Analytic Limitations 
Explosions in the system state-space and complexity in the scientific sense pose fundamental 
challenges to the adoption of formal methods in the analysis of whole system dynamical behaviour – 
as seen in demonstrations of deterministic chaos in Poincaré's restricted three-body problem.  
Therefore, where Tribble and Miller [108] simulate the mode logic of a Flight Guidance System and a 
Vertical Navigation function using formal executable models, they recognise that the single variable 
for “altitude” alone results in the equivalent state space of more than 40 independent Boolean 
variables (10
12
); with the altitude parameter truncated to the required 12-bit numerical accuracy.  In 
passing, it is worthwhile to note Tribble and Miller’s interpretation of a lower level defensive barrier 
model as used in the safety assessment of this avionic software, as in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3 Accident Model & Defensive Barriers after Tribble [108] 
In this software safety analysis process they employed Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA), model checking and theorem proving – 
but had not completed the analysis of the larger state-space of the vertical navigation function. 
Similarly, Meenakshi, et al [75], describe a formal software verification methodology for an Autopilot 
Mode Transition Logic that is compatible with the objectives of DO-178B [95].  In this they evaluate 
an on-the-fly explicit state model checker, a symbolic model checker, and a combination of symbolic 
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Error 
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model checker, formal model simulation and a bounded model checker.  From this study it is 
concluded that state space explosion is a major problem for explicit state model checkers.  Symbolic 
model checkers need to create the whole state-space prior to verification, whilst bounded model 
checkers are used for falsification not verification.  From this guidance given is that explicit model 
checkers are suitable for verification of state spaces no greater than 10
7
 states, symbolic model 
checkers are effective up to 10
90
 states, while anything larger could be verified through bounded 
model checking (falsification). 
In the case of Systems of Systems, Porter, et al [89], suggest that special attention ought to be given to 
the integration issues manifest in networks of manned and unmanned systems (amongst others), with 
a need to consider the challenges of semi-automatic behaviour, functional allocation to operator and 
automation, complex non-linear interactions, and so on – all of which would likely exceed the limits 
of a formal proof of safety.  Therefore in capturing system dynamics for the hazard assessment the 
goal ought to be the falsification, rather than proof, of safe behaviour. 
2.2.5. Regulatory Guidance 
Failure categorisation and developmental assurance are at the heart of the current civil aircraft 
certification standards and regulatory guidance for airborne systems, although standards for military 
systems may allow the designer to adopt a more risk based approach to safety assurance.  DO-178C 
[97] describes the recommended airborne software development life-cycle, whilst DO-254 [96] 
performs the same purpose for airborne electronic hardware. 
In the certification of airborne software, DO-178B [95] directs that each potential failure must be 
categorised according to a Failure Condition.  Further guidance as to applicability is also to be found 
in the source definitions arising within AC25-1309-1A [44] and AMC/AMJ 25-1309 [36].  Alongside 
failure rates, qualitative probability classifications may also be used where appropriate, defined thus: 
1) Probable – likely to occur one or more times during the entire operational life of each aircraft; 
2) Remote – unlikely to occur to each aircraft during its total life, but several times in the life of a 
number of aircraft; 
3) Extremely Remote – not anticipated to occur to each aircraft during its total life, but a few times 
when considering the life of all aircraft of this type; 
4) Extremely Improbable – so unlikely that they are not anticipated to occur during the entire 
operational life of all aircraft of this type. 
With the advent of UAVs expected to be developed within a civil certification regime this guidance 
had been further adapted with draft AMC UAS.1309 [16], as detailed in Table 2.5, wherein a UAV 
sense and avoid sub-system would be treated as a specific “Certification Review Item” and subject to 
these definitions.  Consequently, as the vignettes adopted in this work relate to the modelling of the 
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behaviour of a putative UAV sense and avoid subsystem, then any aberrant behaviour of interest 
would be classed at best as Hazardous (a large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities) 
to Catastrophic (failure conditions that could result in multiple fatalities). 
This sub-system would be assigned a Development Assurance Level of A, or B if deemed to be only 
Hazardous.  Adopting Alexander’s [1] principle of associating this with the relevant level of 
autonomy, we might judge that a high level of difficulty is expected in certifying this system 
operating at ACL L6 and PACT 4/5, unsurprisingly.  For this approach to be useful a matrix of 
autonomous level to development assurance level ought to be mapped for a range of representative 
UAS sub-systems. 
 
Table 2.5 Probability and Severity of Failure Conditions, UAS 1309 [16] 
In this scheme raising the required assurance level also raises the demands on the objectives for the 
various development processes.  These processes include: software planning, software development, 
output verification of the requirements, output verification of the design, output verification of the 
software coding and integration, output testing of integration, verification of verification, 
configuration management, quality assurance, and certification liaison.  However, in the period since 
DO-178B [95] was published, there have been dramatic changes in the breadth of application, 
software languages and tools, and a revolution in software methods themselves; such that this has 
recently been supplanted by DO-178C [97].  This now aims to provide more consistency, whilst 
accommodating separate parameter data items that change the behaviour of executable code without 
modifying it, addressing model-based development and verification techniques, supporting object-
based technologies and supporting formal methods, plus a few others.  However, Eastaughffe, et al 
[38], note that in DO-178B [95] design safety and human factors only get limited treatment, and that 
formal methods are not mandated. 
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It can be argued that an assurance based approach predicated upon simple determinism will not 
address the exploration of the safety issues inherent in the inevitable emergence of behaviour present 
at a higher level of system abstraction, inevitably encompassing complex behaviour.  Rather 
emergence is currently rejected in the assurance of the higher integrity levels.  Unfortunately, 
behavioural systems exhibit properties determined by the physics of an interaction and complexity 
within the wider system space, where surprising behaviours do emerge – authentic machine-based 
autonomous behaviour may ultimately need to encompass the characteristics of apparent cognizance 
(seemingly aware) and apperceptive behaviour (with seeming awareness relating to past experience). 
2.2.6.  Hazard Assessment 
Whole system level developmental guidance, expectations and requirements are provided within ARP 
4754A [101], where the aircraft system developer is given basic tools for use throughout the system 
integration process.  However, the entire system scope of an autonomous air vehicle might be wider 
than that currently envisaged within ARP 4754A. 
ARP 4754A [101], and its recently superseded predecessor ARP 4754 [99], describe the information 
to be produced by a largely prescribed functional hazard assessment process.  However it is stressed 
that these are recommended practices and not regulatory requirements.  Information is to be produced 
both for individual aircraft-level functions and combinations of aircraft-level function.  This 
prescribes an iterative top-down approach applying the systems “V” integration life-cycle, from 
aircraft requirements through to aircraft verification, with system and item allocation, and the 
incremental incorporation of any additional mitigation functions as required.  For example, in the case 
of a UAV these might include additional discrete autonomous system state detection and system 
reconfiguration functions.  In general, the following information is to be produced: 
a) Identification of related failure condition(s); 
b) Identification of the effects of the failure condition(s); 
c) Classification of each failure condition based on the identified effects and assignment of the 
necessary safety objectives; 
d) Identification of the required system development assurance level; 
e) A statement outlining the scope and assumptions made when evaluating each failure condition – 
operational or environmental conditions and phase of flight. 
Also item members of a functional failure set comprising a given system function need not be assured 
to a single highest level of assurance, where parallel, dissimilar, multiple channel architectural 
mitigation provides protection from both random physical failures and design error anomalies.  This 
does not provide a free choice of level of assurance, and guidance is given (ARP 4754A [101], p44, 
Table 3).  At best the two most critical items leading to the top-level failure condition in any set might 
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be assured at a level lower than the assurance requirement for the whole function.  Unlike the earlier 
edition of these guidelines the term “functional independence” is now used to describe functions that 
might have previously described as “dissimilar”, and also a clearer distinction is now made between 
functional and item assurance. 
The approach taken with regard to a preliminary system safety assessment, as defined in ARP 4754A, 
refers to a list of acceptable methods to be found in the companion document, ARP 4761 [100], which 
in turn describes Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Dependence Diagrams (DD), and Markov Analysis 
(MA) as appropriate analytic methods, amongst others.  The focus of the work here is to address 
novelty in the field of system hazard modelling and analysis, sufficient at least to aid the derivation of 
UAS advisory function performance requirements, therefore these guidelines and further 
developments in the field of hazard identification warrant close consideration. 
In determining the requirements for an overall safe aircraft system design, the guidelines require that a 
Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) is first applied at the aircraft level.  Arguably, in the 
case of an Unmanned Air System (UAS), this ought to be assessed at the whole system level 
incorporating the human operator, ground control station, autonomous airborne elements and 
interactions with others; along with the necessary means of conveying information and maintaining a 
path for authority and control.  In all cases this preliminary assessment is required to produce a failure 
conditions list along with an identification of the corresponding safety requirements.  A further use of 
the assessment is to demonstrate how the system will meet both qualitative and quantitative 
requirements for the identified hazards.  Out of this preliminary assessment the protective strategies 
should then be identified, with account given to the fail-safe concepts and architectural attributes 
needed to meet the specified safety objectives.  This includes the identification and capture of all 
derived system safety requirements: e.g. protective strategies such as partitioning, built-in-test, 
dissimilarity, monitoring, and safety related tasks and intervals, etc. 
Consequently, the acceptable means of compliance for aircraft systems is predicated upon the 
relationship between probabilistic failure rates and severity classification of failure conditions, but in 
application to UAS this does not provide for the human aspects or issues of equivalence with human 
operation.  Conversely, the perspective on Air Traffic Management (ATM) and Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) does recognise the human and organisational aspects of safety.  For example, for 
EUROCONTROL [42] there is guidance on the harmonisation of risk assessment in this field, 
wherein also Reason’s [91] approach to accident causation is recognised by the French Service du 
Contrôle du Traffic Aerienne (SCTA). 
In the UK, guidance on the conduct of hazard assessment for aerodrome operators and air traffic 
service, CAP 760 [14], contains guidance on the application and conduct of Hazard and Operability 
Studies (HAZOP), recognising the need to incorporate the human roles and procedures within the 
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safety analysis.  Given the obviously different relationship between the human and machine that exists 
for an unmanned autonomous vehicle, as compared with a conventional piloted vehicle, it would be 
worthwhile to consider the adoption of these safety assessment, hazard analysis forms and techniques 
as being of at least as much relevance to a situation where the role of the pilot is likely to migrate 
towards that of a remotely situated controller. 
Evans and Kelly [43], view that the guidelines and methods in ARP 4761 [100] not only address the 
safety assessment and hazard analysis processes for avionic systems but also support the identification 
of all aircraft functional hazards as required by 00-56 [76, 77].  However, 00-56 [76] indicates an 
even broader scope than is covered by ARP 4754A [101] / 4761 [100], whereby a contractor is also 
required to ensure that the techniques selected are also suitable for identifying hazards and accidents 
arising from a wide range of potential causes.  These wider causes also include any credible failures 
arising from normal and abnormal use, interactions between systems, procedures, managerial and 
human factors – amongst others.  Consequently, it would appear to be quite appropriate, if not in fact 
necessary, to consider also the role of HAZOP, or something very much like it, and dynamical 
behavioural system analysis, alongside the application of FHA as described by ARP 4754A / 4761. 
2.2.7. Function or Behaviour Abstraction? 
Working solely within the current Functional Hazard Assessment framework is therefore unlikely to 
be sufficient in assessing hazards relating to the environmental interaction and high level goals of an 
unmanned autonomous airborne system.  Wilkinson and Kelly [114], propose that a more pro-active 
approach should be adopted in the identification of potential hazards such that Hazard and Operability 
analysis (HAZOP) might be usefully combined with Functional Hazard Assessment when assessing 
airborne system safety. 
 
Figure 2.4 Propagation of Effect Through Sub-system Layers after Wilkinson [114] 
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It is proposed that where complexity and issues of integration with other systems exist, rather than 
analysis through a “chain-of-event” model, an analysis considering the effects of “deviations” from 
intended function or behaviour should apply. 
A concern is how the effect of functional failure might be determined where an item is several layers 
removed from the environment, as depicted in Figure 2.4.  Whilst FHA focuses upon the potential 
failure of system functions, HAZOP is more flexible in considering the propagation of down-stream 
effects within a mental model of a system incorporating system deviations, as well as functional 
failure.  A necessary step towards the incorporation of HAZOP alongside FHA has been identified in 
the grouping of functions, wherein the different types of failure condition are associated with each 
failure type.  Hence control functions might be associated with failures arising in deviations.  Such an 
approach might be focused only upon critical combinations of functions and phases of flight so as to 
develop models of the “consequence chain” rather than the production of hazard checklists or an 
exhaustive FHA of computationally complex combinations of functions and phase. 
Nevertheless, higher level abstraction of design and design process is slowly being accommodated.  
Jaffe, et al [58], reported on the progress towards proposed upgrades now embodied in DO-178C [97].  
In this source code is just another, very detailed representation of a design, whereas DO-178B [95] 
cumbersomely and repetitively employed the phrase “design representation”.  Therefore an overall 
design representation may be many tiered, in which each tier comprises either, or both, source code 
not requiring further design, or a representation of further captured requirements defining a further, 
lower, tier.  This more abstract perspective ought to remove the repetitiveness in the use of the term 
“design representation” by making the representation iterative, where the components are elements of 
some machine-translatable language.  This approach lends itself better to a concept of the modelling 
software and the modern software development process. 
In the application of Object Oriented Technology to aviation system software, Rierson [93] 
considered the issues to be addressed for accommodation within DO-178B.  One of the issues is to 
understand how Object behaviour might be modelled.  In the case of C++ functions it is believed that 
extensive verification and testing will be required in order to understand their behaviour. 
From a more conservative perspective, Haddon [52] outlines the safety assessment equivalent for a 
UAV in terms of consequence and impact kinetic energy, as now defined in AMC UAS 1309 [16].  In 
this it is recognised that any related remote ground station equipment must also be subject to the 
certification review and treated as a part of the aircraft.  Haddon suggests that applying a safety code 
provides the aircraft designer with a target for the minimum acceptable standards applicable to all 
aspects of the design.  Paragraph “1309” of the aircraft airworthiness codes [16, 36, 37, 44, 45] is an 
example of a basic safety target.  In military systems other safety targets might be captured in a safety 
case.  However, Haddon states that “... current codes of civil airworthiness requirements do not 
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permit certification on the basis of such safety assessments alone” as “...  with the safety case 
approach a complete reassessment of the aircraft and its operating environment may be required for 
every change of role.”  In so far as autonomous behaviour is discussed it is apparent that the emphasis 
is on system reliability rather than intended system behaviour, although it is noted that “... the 
remoteness of the pilot / controller of a UAV raises major issues for aircraft operations in terms of air 
traffic management, compliance with the Rules of the Air etc, ...”  Therefore, it is likely that in 
embedding the Rules of the Air within the system, for which there is a strict interpretation for 
collision avoidance and rights of way, then on the principle of “no hazard, no benefit”, alternative and 
unconventional avoidance strategies may be permitted, but would not provide a justification for 
accepting non-compliance with the applicable airworthiness requirement.  Also, such alternative 
strategies would be required to demonstrate that no additional hazards were introduced. 
Under EASA regulations aircraft less than 150 kg are subject to national aviation authorities [53].  
Civil light UAV systems may be exempt from the principles of CAP 722 [17] if it can be 
demonstrated that the system poses no worse safety risk than that equivalent to existing model 
aircraft.  As such this places a restriction upon the operation of these vehicles so that they may only be 
operated on a direct line of sight no further than 500 metres from the operator.  It is unlikely that a 
smaller UAV operated in this manner would embody any significant degree of autonomy – consistent 
with Clough's ACL L0 [19]. 
2.3. Summary Considerations 
Taking the foregoing discussion in this section as the basis for further “exam questions” to be 
considered in this work: 
 As safety validation and assurance tools are also to be qualified to assurance criteria 
commensurate with the system model that they are to assure, arguably a hazard model used for 
this purpose might also be subjected to an equivalent degree of verification – and in some way fit 
with a model representation compatible with DO-178C. 
 This work should consider to what extent the required expertise in HAZOP might be extended 
with behavioural models and simulation where complex system behaviour results.  Part of this is 
to consider where exactly these models might be placed with respect to the experts, and what role 
might they play in either bolstering trust, in the portrayal of likely system behaviour, or 
alternatively prompting further investigation where scepticism exists. 
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Chapter 3. Hazard Identification and Analysis Review 
“I'll be more enthusiastic about encouraging thinking outside the box when there's evidence of any 
thinking going on inside it.” 
 Terry Pratchett 
 
 
 
3.1. Extending HAZOP 
3.1.1. Hazard emulation, Identification & Assessment 
Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) [13, 66] and hazard identification (HAZID) are established 
techniques arising originally with the chemical and process industries, and more recently also 
optionally applied to the development of safety cases in Air Traffic Management. 
For process industries computer based qualitative reasoning models supporting the HAZOP process 
have been developed, by in effect providing “HAZOP emulation” to the HAZOP team; for example 
the STOPHAZ and HAZID codes [72].  These have been developed in the main for the chemical, 
process and power generation plant industries, and utilise libraries of components embodying 
qualitative propagation models with associated effects attached, supporting the construction of 
complex plant models derived from Pipe & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID).  Using these software 
based tools and libraries the HAZOP team can discuss, reason and apply their expertise to the 
believed behaviour of individual components, some of which might be quite complex, with the 
software then capturing all of the permitted propagations of cause and effect between components, 
both down and up-stream.  In the nature of the problem space of these models, a typical HAZID 
model is constructed from a model library within a fluid modelling system, representing feasible flow 
bounded within qualitative constraints within which the propagation of deviations is modelled.  
Innovative features might then extend this to include asymmetric influences, detection of 
configuration problems, fluid compatibility checks, classification of consequence types, etc. [73] 
Therefore, propagation methods of qualitative flow deviation and effect have been addressed to a 
greater extent, at least for static and quasi-static flow models, so further consideration ought to be 
given to the encapsulation and propagation of behaviour of essentially dynamic systems.  The process 
plant models as described above are treated as closed systems, operating at particular set-points.  
However, autonomous and robotic systems with goal seeking behaviours aiming to maintain a state of 
dynamic equilibrium with respect to their environment cannot be safely treated as closed systems. 
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3.1.2. Bayesian Expressions of Risk 
Bayesian forms for the expression of risks and hazards are described by Hu, et al [56], wherein a 
Bayesian network models risk relationships learnt from statistics of ship navigation accident data.  
Once trained, this network is used for the identification of hazards in the navigation of ships.  A 
network structure is derived from ship accident data, producing a specific network model from a naïve 
Bayes model with learning facilitated by the accident data.  This incorporates sets of defined 
conjugate evidence to form the network nodes.   
Derived from Bayes’ original work on the probability distribution of an unobserved variable [6], a 
Bayesian inference gives the posterior probability of hypothesis (θ) being true where evidence (a) is 
observed as the product of the posterior probability that evidence (a) is observed given hypothesis (θ) 
true, and the prior probability of the hypothesis (θ), divided by the model evidence for (a) 
independent of the hypothesis, which is therefore constant for all hypotheses – equation 3.1 below.  
The probability term P(a|θ) is also known as the “likelihood” value of (a) given hypothesis (θ). 
 ( | )  
 ( | )  ( )
 ( )
                                                                                                                3.1 
This likelihood value is calculated from the joint probability distributions of parameter (aj) where (θ) 
true.  In Hu’s, et al., model this represents the joint probability of a series of (m) hazard attributes (aj) 
where hazard (θ) is true, each hypothesis being represented by a node in the network – equation 3.2. 
 ( | )  ∏  (  | )
 
                                                                                                             3.2 
Therefore this likelihood function is used within the Bayesian interpretation to update the posterior 
probabilities of the hazard hypothesis – equation 3.3.  This is the basis for an update function to train 
the naïve Bayes model and thereby derive the resultant Bayesian network.  This likelihood function is 
also used with the resultant network to facilitate a Bayesian inference model for quantitative risk 
assessment, where is calculated as Risk = Likelihood × Impact – equation 3.4. 
 ( | )    ∏  (  | )
 
     ( )                                                                                        3.3 
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                                                                     3.4 
In calculating the severity of an accident [56], equation 3.4 gives the risk for a particular hazard (k) as 
a product of the mean accident rate, the probability that the hazardous event (k) occurs due to the 
associated hazard attributes (aj), within the joint probability of the (m) hazards, and the sum of causal 
relationships for this event for the (n) types of accident cause class (Ci) weighted by an impact factor 
(ωi) for each accident cause class. 
Trucco [110] reports a similar study linking a Bayesian Belief Network representing Human and 
Organisational Factors in accidents at sea to importance measures and basic events in a fault tree 
51 
 
representation of maritime accident causation.  Bayesian methods applied to system safety assessment 
are also presented in a proposed methodology for the safety assessment of socio-technical systems in 
the form of a “hybrid” approach by Mohaghegh, et al [79].  This illustrates how a variety of 
deterministic, qualitative, quantitative and statistical techniques might be integrated within a hybrid 
Probability Risk Assessment – Figure 3.1.  The techniques include Systems Dynamics modelling, 
Qualitative-Quantitative inference models in the form of Bayesian Belief Networks, and Fault Tree 
models represented as Binary Decision Diagrams.  An example is developed consisting of the impact 
of airline maintenance operations on aviation safety risk consisting of system dynamics modules 
representing management commitment, financial pressure, training, hiring, human reliability, and 
technicians’ commitment.  In the example the systems dynamics model provides a technician error 
probability to a Bayesian belief network representing technical activities within aircraft maintenance.  
The Bayesian belief network then in turn generates beliefs about likely failures due to technician error 
to a fault tree or binary decision diagram representation of the system.  Top event probabilities are 
then passed to an event sequence diagram, returning an evaluation of risk.  The resultant risk values 
then are used to drive the relevant system dynamics models – and hence close the modelling loop. 
 
Figure 3.1 A Hybrid PRA Framework for Socio-technical Risks [79] 
For this hybrid approach further work remained with “... future research to extend the model to 
include other aspects of operations (e.g. flight crew model), and to analyze the common effects of 
organizational factors on both the operation and maintenance of an airline.” [79] 
3.1.3. Scenarios & Deviation Analysis 
Scenarios typically form the basis of deviation analyses such as HAZOP, wherein guidewords are 
applied to selected parameters, and through which the propagation of effects are considered by a team 
of system experts, preferably including operators, and possibly supported by scenario emulation. 
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Allenby and Kelly [2], note that the flow based technique of HAZOP and the function based approach 
of FHA are complementary in that both consider deviations from “design intent”, and these might be 
combined in a hazard identification approach “... using a suitably expressive requirements 
representation.” [2]  For Allenby and Kelly, the articulation of these safety requirements take the 
form of a Use Case diagram, a scenario, or perhaps a vignette within a larger scenario, a definition of 
any preconditions, the intended system response, and the expected post-conditions.  Such an 
expressive requirements representation, capturing the intended system behaviour, might be adequately 
described as a SysML model [83].  This modelling language facilitates the capturing of functional 
decomposition, information and event flow behaviour, wherein models might be used to describe both 
the extant system and the hazards considered to arise within it.  Allenby and Kelly also note that 
safety analysis techniques such as FMEA assess the effects of known behaviour.  Conversely, 
deviation based techniques can be employed with more abstract models of system behaviour, making 
them appropriate for use early in the system development lifecycle, whereas FMEA requires the 
existence of a more specific and detailed system design. 
This suggests that a first-cut hazard or accident model ought to facilitate the modelling of a system of 
interest’s desired behaviour whilst also capturing the effect of deviations from declared intent and 
emergent behaviour.  Consequently, it is argued that a behavioural modelling capability is required, 
and the highest level of abstraction for this suggests the development of a meta-model facilitating the 
exploration of potential hazards at the earliest possible point within the system lifecycle. 
Despotou and Kelly [22], consider the extension of such analyses addressing system dependability – 
security, trustworthiness, etc., with a view to the systematic definition of a specific set of guidewords 
augmenting the list of hazards.  Typically these hazards would be identified within a FHA, which 
together with additional guidewords might identify the totality of the system failure conditions.  For 
example the failure categories “loss of function”, “function provided when not required”, “incorrect 
operation of function”, arising from a FHA, should to be taken as guidewords incorporated into a 
HAZOP.  This approach needs to be specific with regard to the guidewords used and with which 
models these are to be associated.  Examples appear to show that the application of a guideword on a 
different element of a model can reveal different concerns.  Consequently, an additional proposal is 
that the projected effects of a deviation should not be restricted to a single dimension focused on a 
single attribute; rather the wider consequences ought to be assessed to gain an understanding as to 
how deviations affect the operation of the system as a whole.  The same principle should be applied 
during identification of causes.  Hence in the context of operation, a security failure condition such as 
“denial of service” (a security attribute) may reveal causes in failures regarding other attributes such 
as “limited processing rate of requests” (a performance attribute).  In order to identify hazards that are 
difficult to anticipate, and thereby identify the appropriate system interactions to be modelled, it is 
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likely that a combination of formal closed modelling and somewhat more exploratory open modelling 
be considered together. 
The wider realm of autonomous systems is perhaps the most complex for safety assessment, where 
the decomposed and devolved nature of any autonomous system should perhaps be considered to be 
either within, or in its entirety, a system of systems.  In order to obtain an understanding as to how 
possible deviations might cause accidents in System-of-Systems (SoS) Despotou, et al [23] suggest an 
alternative to the manual and mental reductive processing techniques in the determination of hazards 
– as is the established HAZOP method.  In a SoS the logical steps, between a hazard and its causes 
may be complex and range over a significant distance in time and space.  The proposed alternative 
combines these with, or derives these from, simulation-based approaches.  In the case of a SoS several 
different vignettes may be defined – varying the mission, environment, opposition (conflicts and 
incursions perhaps in the civil sense) and other parameters.  In the proposed approach a number of 
agents are employed and together these address a number of possible defined deviations, with a 
particular vignette being run repeatedly with different combinations of these.  In this scheme 
whenever simulated accidents, or near-misses, occur these are to be logged with respect to the specific 
deviation and hence then direct further simulation within this region so as to study the particular case. 
Various aspects of the foregoing suggested approaches for the extension of FHA into HAZOP, along 
with modelling and simulation, have been considered for incorporation into the scheme developed in 
this work.  Specifically in the hazard vignette, guidewords have been applied to an abstracted 
behavioural attribute – namely that described by the abstract noun ‘manoeuvre’.  In addition, the 
concern in the vignette is the violation of a separation constraint, within which the sensitivity to nearer 
misses can then be explored with Monte Carlo simulations. 
3.2. Systems Theory beyond Normal Accidents 
System dynamics modelling using computers has been around almost since the dawn of digital 
computing itself, where from the 1950s to the early 1960s Jay Forrester and a team of graduate 
students at MIT took system dynamics modelling from hand-simulation to formal computer 
modelling.  Forrester [46] developed system dynamics modelling with the intention of studying 
industrial system behaviour, and how the stability of these systems are influenced by policies, 
structures and delays. Subsequently Phyllis Fox and Alexander Pugh wrote the first version of 
DYNAMO (DYNAmic MOdels), a system dynamics computer modelling language that became a 
standard until the 1980’s.  
In their Introduction to Simulation in 1983 Roberts, Andersen, et al. [94] positioned DYNAMO as an 
educational tool and in a foreword by Forrester as “... a door leading to understanding of change.”  In 
this book examples are used that demonstrate how things are interrelated and how the states of these 
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things change as a consequence of the dynamics within these relationships.  These are used to 
illustrate where political processes effect change, and how rising and falling economic activity occur 
with physical and social behaviour.  Whilst DYNAMO exists now as a relic of an era alongside 
FORTRAN, more contemporary tools such as Vensim™, and others, have since displaced it. 
Taking inspiration from System Dynamics, and attempting to articulate the limitations of “chain of 
event” models of accident causation where tight coupling and interactive complexity appear as safety 
factors, Leveson [67] argues for the application of a systems approach to system safety analysis, 
especially applied to safety in socio-technical systems wherein such models are rooted.  While 
Normal Accident [87] theory and High Reliability Organisation theory have focused attention on the 
important issues of complexity and coupling, Leveson, et al. [68] view that they limit progress by 
defining the problem too narrowly, whether through excessive pessimism or optimism, and in 
confusing reliability with safety.  Engineers and sociologists should work more closely together with 
shared definitions and assumptions, applying a systems approach at the organizational and cultural 
level demonstrating how tradeoffs among safety, performance, schedule, and budget can be evaluated. 
3.2.1. Systems Theoretic Accident Model Process 
Theoretic models of systems accident processes are currently attracting a degree of interest from a 
number of quarters.  The claim is that system safety constraint violation and system dynamics should 
be the foundation of system safety analysis, potentially encompassing an entire socio-technical system 
from the role of the state regulator to the final defensive barrier and the unsafe act.  Systems-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) [67, 70] hypothesizes that risk events arise from 
unanticipated interactions among components, whether failed or working as designed, violating safety 
constraints within systems characterised by interactive complexity, and that safety culture can be 
modelled, formally analysed, and engineered.   
Leveson [71] argues that only systems exhibiting Organised Simplicity are amenable analytic 
reduction, where it is feasible to decompose a system into components that operate independently, and 
system behaviour is governed only by discrete events over time.  This holds where behaviour of 
individual components is the same whether viewed singularly or as a part of the whole – ruling out 
systems with feedback loops and non-linear interactions.  Systems that have no known underlying 
structure, treated as aggregates, and therefore not amenable to reduction, are said to exhibit 
Unorganised Complexity.  Between these two there is Organised Complexity, less than Unorganised 
Complexity in terms of randomness of behaviour, and more than Organised Simplicity on any 
measure of complexity.  This type of system is found to be too organised for statistical analysis, 
without consideration of the underlying structure, and too complex for complete analysis or reduction.  
Leveson sees systems exhibiting Organised Complexity as the most challenging to system safety. 
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Leveson [67, 70, 71] considered how the system theoretic approach aids understanding in an accident 
scenario where the third US Milstar satellite was placed in an unusable low orbit due to a complex 
interaction of mistakes and decisions.  It was judged that this accident occurred within a flawed 
development and operational process not amenable to the usual explanation as being caused by a 
simple chain of events.  Leveson argues for a generic model of socio-technical control within which 
hierarchical development and operations control structures, and specific system control loops might 
be modelled.  The argument is that the simple chain-of-event accident model is inadequate to deal 
with such complexity as it cannot account for indirect and nonlinear relationships, rather the entire 
safety control structure and accident process determine the role each part plays, and that at a given 
level of complexity certain emergent properties are irreducible.  Also it is observed that this approach 
does rather more to prevent future accidents than merely attributing blame at the point of failure.   
Leveson [67, 71] notes that the systems of interest are typically Open Systems, maintained in a state 
of dynamic equilibrium through closed loop feedback control.  Therefore, we might judge that 
alongside the other recommended “chain-of-event” methods provided by ARP 4761 [100] Markov 
Analysis is insufficient to predict complex forms of accident causation, as Markov models represent 
Closed Systems wherein equilibrium is effectively synonymous with Invariant or Stationary; when the 
probability of a subsequent system state is then identical to that of the preceding state. 
Considering the NASA Space Shuttle Columbia accident, Duclac, et al [35], illustrate how static 
control structures and dynamic behavioural models might be used together within the STAMP 
process.  A 200-run Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis was performed with a systems dynamics model 
representing an indicator of effectiveness and credibility of the Independent Technical Authority 
(ITA), and effect on the System Technical Risk; representing sensitivity to quantifiable variables such 
as risk, resource allocation, knowledge, shuttle aging, launch rate, safety efficacy, learning, and 
perceived success over a 1000 month period.  The resultant dynamic behaviours revealed the 
possibility of two modes relating to the credibility of the ITA and technical risk; one largely 
successful due the implementation of the recommendations of the ITA, although declining slowly 
later due to complacency; and an alternative mode starting with insufficient resources such that 
credibility rapidly declines towards a tipping point thereafter poor behaviours are reinforced and the 
system enters a permanent high risk state.  However, it is suggested that the creation and use of the 
resultant system dynamics models requires a high degree of effort and substantial domain expertise. 
STAMP has also been applied to the evaluation of security risk.  Laracy & Leveson [65] consider the 
application of STAMP to the safety analysis and protection of critical infrastructure.  In this they 
suggest that Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is unsatisfactory as the rate of intent and capability 
on the part of the attacker is unknown and not measurable – the likelihood of rare events cannot be 
accurately estimated, and especially where there is hostile intent.  Furthermore it is irrational to 
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assume that attacks will not be simultaneous, and therefore an attack upon security cannot be 
construed as being equivalent to a single point of failure.  The resultant security model considers 
incidents as a result of inadequate control, rather than as a system component failure event, requiring 
the enforcement of suitable constraints to shape the emergent properties providing security. 
Any independent entity may potentially threaten deleterious effects without hostile intent within a 
system of systems, for example in the reduction of safe separation due to the incursive behaviour of a 
‘non-cooperative’ vehicle in a ‘sense and avoid’ scenario.  For an accident to occur there need not be 
hostile intent in failing to observe or correctly respond to the behaviour of the controlled entity within 
the system of interest.  In this work it is proposed that an enhanced form of HAZOP might be created 
in a fusion with STAMP – coupling Bayesian representations with Monte Carlo data arising from the 
dynamics of system interactions.  It is argued that inferences drawn from this statistical and observed 
behaviour might usefully validate assumptions in the mental model used during the HAZOP process. 
The STAMP framework [67, 70], and associated system dynamics, may potentially span interactions 
between all entities, from legislature to those operating at point of the unsafe act, thereby 
accommodating defence in depth as described by Reason [91, 92].  In simulation however, Leveson 
[71] suggests wariness of the role it plays in systems safety, stating that “... care must be taken that 
any simulation or other planning tools to assist human problem solving do not rest on the same 
incorrect assumptions about the system that led to the problems in the first place.”  Nevertheless, 
SpecTRM-RL [69, 71, 86], a specification and requirements tool used to formulate black-box 
functional descriptions of system components, does incorporate a system simulation environment – 
although no examples of sensitivity simulation results revealing safety constraint violation appear in 
Engineering a Safer World [71]. 
3.2.2. Systems Theoretic Process Analysis 
Process analyses based upon the systems theoretic approach are now being developed to fulfil much 
the same role as HAZOP.  Owens, et al [86], and Stringfellow, et al [105], describe a hazard analysis 
methodology that encompasses not only component failure but also requirements and design errors.  
Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (or sometimes STAMP-based hazard Analysis – STPA) is the 
basis for a new hazard identification technique, wherein instances of inadequate control and the 
necessary safety constraints are identified, and how these constraints may be violated are represented.  
STPA is intended to be undertaken from the beginning of any system design process, and used to 
facilitate safety related design trade-off within a design space incorporating information regarding 
possible inadequate control actions and control flaws across a range of design options.  It is posited 
that unlike methods such as HAZOP, this new hazard analysis method does not require a pre-existing 
design description – rather it is formed around a system Intent Specification.  The concept of an Intent 
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Specification framework, as in Table 3.1, was introduced by Leveson [69] in developing the socio-
technical viewpoint as a central tenet in the integration of safety modelling into systems engineering. 
 
Table 3.1 STPA System Intent Specification Levels (simplified) [69, 86] 
It is argued that accidents occur when safety controls fail to enforce safety constraints, resulting in 
unhandled disturbances, uncontrolled failures, or unsafe interactions, and that the potential existence 
of these defects might be indentified during the system design and options selection phase; wherein 
architectural and behavioural requirements are formed and decomposed into lower level purposes.  
Furthermore, within this safety-driven design approach it is suggested that the regulatory, design, and 
operational controls might also be modelled in order to identify any migration towards states of higher 
risk due to external economic pressures, along with any safety issues in potential lack of cooperation.  
For example a “sense and avoid” scenario, modelling UAS systems dynamics, might also model the 
degree of cooperation between the two controllers where multiple controllers are present. 
 
Figure 3.2 Generic STPA Low-Level Process Control Loop after Stringfellow [104, 105] 
Level Descriptor Features
0 Project management plans, safety plans, etc.
1 System Purpose Assumptions, constraints, responsibilities, goals, hazard analysis, etc.
2 System Design External interfaces, tasks, controls, functional decomposition, validation, etc.
3 Black-box models Environment model, task / HCI models, functional models, analysis, etc.
4 Design Representation HCI design, Hardware & Software specifications, test plans & results, etc.
5 Physical Representation GUI & physical control designs, software code & hardware assembly, test plans, etc.
6 Operations Audit procedures, operator manuals, error reports, change requests, monitoring, etc.
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A safety-driven design process identifies potential accidents and the hazards that initiate them.  In the 
case of STPA this aims to identify the safety constraints, design decisions, inadequate control actions, 
control flaws, and inadequate control executions.  These are identified by adopting a generic Process 
Control Loop model, as in Figure 3.2, wherein a dynamic feedback process maintaining separation 
with respect to a safety constraint is represented by a closed-loop system. 
In cases where this implies physical separation within a dynamic process, for example collision 
avoidance, such loops are readily identifiable.  Where the control process and nature of the safety 
constraint separation is more abstract, further work may be required to identify this loop.  Having 
identified the safety parameter subject to deviation within this loop, usually a Command parameter, 
specific deviations known as Inadequate Control Actions are identified – for example a command to 
“manoeuvre” if deviated would affect the output in terms of physical separation.  Potential Control 
Flaws are identified for each block within the control loop, working around the loop for each 
deviation in turn, and these flaws are associated with the relevant deviation as potential causes.  These 
help identify safety constraints, and the process is applied iteratively to any inner loops.  These 
descriptors may also be used in a Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) formulation of a 
SysML representation of an Intent Specification. 
3.3. Systems Modelling 
3.3.1. Systems Representation 
Representations of systems take many forms.  Plain text, tables, schematics, block diagrams, assembly 
drawings, illustrations, models, and structural diagrams in a variety of forms are all used to represent 
the many facets of a real system.  Formal modelling languages provide a particular class of system 
representations with the intent of ensuring unambiguous interpretation and the possibility of 
manipulation and transformation for use by machines in automatic composition, analysis and 
documentation – all which is useful in maintaining accuracy and consistency whilst aiding system 
safety assessment  A formal language that encompasses system requirements, constraint and 
parameter modelling, amongst others, and continues to be developed in application to Systems 
Engineering is SysML [55, 83], a development of the Unified Modelling Language (UML) [84, 85], 
and accommodating descriptions of certain system viewpoints defined within DoDAF / MODAF [26]. 
In the mid-1990s Friendenthal & Lykins [47] discussed parameter-based representations, concerned 
with the apparent inadequacy and inconsistency in the then current systems engineering methods’ 
ability to encompass the parameterised behaviour of a system and capture the logical partitioning of 
multiple system attributes.  It was viewed that this required an encompassing representation of both 
the system of interest with its environment, each captured as models of processes; having inputs, 
outputs and mechanism, and each characterised by parameters.  Subsequently, Cantor, et al [18] 
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argued the case for developing the Unified Modelling Language, extending its use from the software 
domain into the systems domain.  It was argued that a need exists to “bridge the semantic gap” 
between software and the related systems engineering disciplines, and that this was also to capture 
system characteristics such as safety and reliability, and parametric relationships – as well as 
facilitating common standards for the exchange of information between tools.  All essential system 
attributes of hierarchical behaviour, continuous time, inputs and outputs, physical structure, 
performance and physical characteristics were to be included.  The result of this is the systems 
modelling language (SysML). 
Therefore, the adequacy of a representation capturing both intended and dysfunctional system 
behaviour, described using SysML [83], should be considered as framework within which to cast a 
safety assessment.  The SysML system modelling language facilitates the capture of functional 
decomposition, information and event flow behaviour.  Models in this form might be used to describe 
both the extant system (model), and the location and causal nature and likely effect of hazards 
considered to arise within it.  The system Intent Specification framework as described by Leveson 
[69], Owens, et al [86], and mentioned by Stringfellow, et al [105], is presented as a table, as in Table 
3.1, spanning the environment, operator, system & components, and validation & verification intent.  
Each type of entity within this table may be assigned a particular sub-set of SysML diagram types, 
effectively defining an intent framework in a form similar to DoDAF, an architectural framework. 
3.3.2. Representing Risks & Hazards 
Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is an approach to systems engineering employing formal 
modelling techniques that encompass system requirements, design, analysis, validation and 
verification.  Increasingly the aerospace and defence industry recognises that “something is missing” 
[112] in the current systems engineering processes, something that fails to properly take account of 
interactive and irreducible complexity, something required also to capture likely system side-effects 
within system-modelling tools, where it is suggested that this is fundamentally a modelling problem. 
Hazard analysis per se rarely appears to be the subject of a formal MBSE approach.  Soyler and Sala-
Diakanda [103] describe the beginning of a proposed SysML framework for defining and capturing 
disaster management systems.  The challenge in modelling disaster management systems is to 
quantify the impact, model evacuation, damage estimations and the state of preparedness, with a view 
to establishing new safety standards.  It is anticipated that a more formal generalised approach will 
address perceived failures to recognize the full impact of the many interdependencies between the 
agencies, or the length of time between successive disasters.  Soyler and Sala-Diakanda propose a 
MBSE methodology capturing the architectures of complex disaster management system and so 
encourage a holistic approach to problem solving by enforcing traceability.  These models are to 
consist of state machines representing transitions in the incident state, Use Case diagrams identifying 
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the role of government and non-governmental organisations, activity charts to model planning and 
preparedness, and block definition and internal block diagrams representing the structure and 
connections between the various management entities. 
Similarly, Guiochet, et al [51], argue that HAZOP applied to robotic systems might also be facilitated 
with UML Use Cases and Sequence Diagrams formally defining system requirements specifications 
embodying some behavioural characteristics with which to reason about deviations.  Consequently, a 
model for an interactive form of HAZOP might accommodate similar formalism in a unified 
modelling approach, extended to include Parametric diagrams and Constraint Blocks encapsulating 
the causal dynamics models as proposed in STAMP.  Each Use Case and Sequence Diagram might 
also represent the various types of element comprising an “Intent Specification” [69], encompassing 
the various perspectives as described previously whilst introducing the concept of a representation for 
any anticipated specific system “dysfunction models” also.  Therefore the beginning of a MBSE 
approach is partially adopted in this work to formally capture the system safety design intent, within a 
framework of an Intent Specification. 
3.3.3. Hazard Detection & Complex Behaviours 
It would appear that the great majority of works addressing hazard assessment in engineered system 
prefer to avoid safety issues arising within the regime of deterministic chaos. Work in this area 
appears to be relatively sparse, although the notion of Lyapunov exponents, strange attractors and the 
like as measures of emergent and complex behaviour are well established and accessible through 
standard textbooks on Control Theory (e.g. Baker and Gollub [4], Kapitaniak [61], and many more). 
Zhu, et al [116], describe a method to autonomous detection and avoid surface hazards based on 
Lyapunov control methods for a future planetary-lander.  The first part of this describes an optical and 
computational method of determining a median landing plane, surface normal and plane intercept 
point using optically observed statistical data and least-squares method.   The second part combines a 
position-velocity state-space model with a statistical hazard model based upon position (reflecting 
physical positions with respect to hazards in the unevenness of the reachable terrain) and processing 
these states produces a Lyapunov function surface, with aim then being to direct the trajectory 
towards the nearest local minimum derivative (flattest and least hazardous) point in this surface.  In 
this the Lyapunov function represents derivatives with respect to the two-dimensional spatial 
coordinate system describing the surface and statistical evidence of surface unevenness. 
Perhaps of more relevance to this project, which is concerned with behavioural hazards emerging over 
time, McCue, et al [74], employ a Finite Time Lyapunov Exponent (FTLE) in the detection of 
instabilities leading to ship capsize in real-time.  In this it is recognised that small variations in the 
initial conditions, described in terms of wave size and position, can result in large variations in 
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behaviour.  Expressing a predictor of this behaviour, the Lyapunov exponent is conventionally 
calculated along a trajectory x, as shown in equation 3.5. 
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         3.5 
In this case the trajectory described by x represents the extent of roll of the ship, and the finite time 
interval is fixed window shorter than the entire history of motion, where resultant positive Lyapunov 
values anticipate ship motions of a more chaotic nature and hence tendency to capsize, whilst negative 
values anticipate stable behaviour. 
3.3.4. Bayesian & Monte Carlo 
 Bayesian modelling, either as qualitative “belief networks” or as quantifiable statistical inference 
models, has a role in capturing probabilistic, likelihood and belief relationships between hazardous 
deviations, potential system failure causes, dynamical behaviour and externally imposed safety 
constraints.  But how might this best be achieved? 
Dilks, et al, [24], provides an example of the application of Bayes theorem to improving the 
estimation of uncertain parameters in water quality models, as used in the water treatment industry.  
Employing the Bayesian relationship for the posterior probability that an uncertain model parameter θ 
is correctly estimated given the observed data x (3.6), and that the effect of the observed evidence is 
constant (3.7), then substituting the value obtained from the “Likelihood function” L(θ|x) provides the 
general relationship for the probability that an uncertain parameter is given by the observed data (3.8). 
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The joint probability expressed in the above relationship (3.9) yields a single valued “Likelihood” that 
data value xi will be observed for a particular value of uncertain model parameter θ, where f(xi|θ) is 
the probability density function of x given θ.  Assuming a Gaussian (normal) and independently 
distributed error model, with an estimate for the standard deviation σ representing the expected 
deviation due to errors, the following expression yields a likelihood value from the joint probabilities 
arising with each observed data item with respect to common mean μ (3.10). 
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Substituting this expression of the “Likelihood”, calculated directly from the observed data xi with 
respect to the model prediction for this data, ui, gives the updated posterior probability that the 
uncertain model parameter correctly estimates any observation, in terms of the measured errors in 
prior observed data with respect to model predictions, assuming zero mean in the error distribution 
(3.11).  The prior probability distribution P(θ) is assumed uniform (rectangular) over some interval.  
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With this Dilks, et al, propose that data points used to calculate the likelihood
3
 be obtained using 
Monte Carlo simulations of measurement error applied to model input data derived from observed 
field data within the relevant model, to sample from preliminary estimates of parameter distributions, 
and thereby improve the estimated uncertainty in a given set of model parameters.  It is necessary 
however to ensure that any covariance is identified. 
In another related application of Bayesian methods, Dawsey, et al, [21] propose to combine evidence 
to better characterise contamination events and reduce false positive detections in water distribution 
systems, using a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) to integrate sensor data with validation evidence 
from contamination scenarios.  A particular concern is where the true probability of an occurrence is 
much less than the false positive rate of a contaminant detection sensor.  They propose that a BBN 
might represent the causal relationships between events and observations that comprise a 
contamination scenario.  Simulations are used to estimate the probability of detection given that a 
contaminant release has occurred.  Again the Bayesian network uses the Likelihood function (3.12) to 
determine the likelihood that a sensor value xi belong to Parents(Xi), for example a surrogate water 
quality measure, represented in preceding nodes of the network. 
 (      )  ∏  (  |       (  ))
 
                                                                              3.12 
In a network model where the causal events represent contaminants in a number of geographical 
locations, along with operation change events – Parents(Xi) – and imply observable evidence in a 
number of sensor outputs and operation record (xi), the authors claim some improvement in the 
discrimination of false positive sensor outputs.  However, the authors also note that time differences 
between detections and timing itself “... is relevant to the probability that observations are evidence 
of the same causal event” [21], where time is not represented in the current model. 
  
                                                     
3
 Mysteriously Dilks, et al, express the likelihood calculation without raising the term 1/√(2πσ2) to the power n. 
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3.4. Summary Considerations 
The Bayesian expression described so far contribute to the determination of a Likelihood function and 
point to the inference required to identify the probability that a cause, or combination of causes, lie 
behind a particular effect.  However, the principle power of the Bayesian approach lies in a capacity 
to update a Bayesian model of inference using new evidence. 
Returning to consider also Hu’s, et al [56] Bayesian risk assessment modelling for ship navigation, 
this approach combined with the other foregoing uncertainty modelling approaches, suggest an 
integration of dynamics modelling with Bayesian inference, coupled through Monte Carlo simulation 
of key causal parameters.  However, questions arise: 
 Is there adequate accident data available with which to validate this approach?  
 How otherwise might a learnt model be validated?  
 Consequently, would a system hazard model embodying a learnt structure provide acceptable 
evidence in the aerospace and defence domain? 
In the case of Bayesian networks, so far as learning from data is concerned, it is known that where 
data is only partly observed estimates of uncertain model parameters θ may be found using the 
expectation–maximisation (EM) algorithm.  This algorithm iteratively seeks the expected log-
likelihood with respect to the conditional distribution of the unobserved variable using a current 
estimate of the uncertain model parameter(s), and then within an iteration computes the parameter 
values that maximise the expected log-likelihood.  In this, the initial “Expectation” step uses current 
values for the observed variables (X) and the uncertain model parameter (θ) to calculate P(Z | X, θ) – 
where Z is the unobserved variable(s); then subsequently in the “Maximisation” step the current θ  is 
replaced by the expression            (  | ).  With iteration, this process is guaranteed to find 
the local maximum.  This is the method that is to be used to train the Bayesian network representing 
the inferred relationships between flaws and defects to the expected deviations derived from the 
HAZOP process.  This training data is to be generated with Monte Carlo simulations of a System 
Dynamics model.  As the particular network is to be derived from the structure and hierarchy of the 
HAZOP table representing the initial beliefs of the HAZOP team, in terms of relating believed cause 
and effect, then with such a “known” graph, the EM algorithm is an appropriate machine learning 
mechanism to be applied so as to learn and update belief from partly observed data. 
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Chapter 4. Systems Engineering Review 
“The major difference between a thing that might go wrong and a thing that cannot possibly go 
wrong is that when a thing that cannot possibly go wrong goes wrong it usually turns out to be 
impossible to get at or repair.” 
 Douglas Adams, "Mostly Harmless" 
 
4.1. Development Life-Cycles 
4.1.1. Beyond ARP 4754A / 4761 
Close upon the time when the first Certification Considerations for Highly-Integrated or Complex 
Aircraft Systems [99] was published, Hugge and Lang [57] considered how producers and integrators 
of military avionic systems had then for a while already addressed the necessary discipline and 
structure required to safely create highly integrated or complex avionic systems – putting forth the 
view that the Advanced Design for Quality Avionic Systems (ADQAS) process satisfied the same 
system development assurance processes as ARP 4754.  Within the ADQAS process six phases are 
identified: Avionics Requirements Definition, Avionics Preliminary Design, Avionics Detailed 
Design, Avionics Engineering and Manufacturing Development, Production, and Operation and 
Support.  Overall the system development process would appear to adopt the “waterfall” model, with 
the only obvious feedback being in the Reliability Centred Maintenance and analysis of results used to 
inform the next system development cycle.  It is also noted that “... Quality Function Deployment 
(QFD) provides an excellent tool to derive product requirements in a disciplined, documented way, 
and to ensure early conflict resolution so that the required balance of performance, supportability, 
and cost is defined up front.” 
In describing the systems engineering process, Blanchard and Fabrycky [7] detail and illustrate the 
general system acquisition process, with Conceptual Design, Preliminary Design, Detail Design and 
Development, Production, and Operational Use and Support phases; where these separate phases 
support the development at the System Level, Subsystem Level, Component Level, and in 
Modifications for Improvement, each within their own “waterfall” cascade of requirement, allocation, 
synthesis, and evaluation.  This broadly forms the basis of other processes that adapt this sequence of 
events with different approaches as to what, where and when validation and verification applies.  
From this, approaches have been developed so as to facilitate development of either self-contained 
integrated system architectures (e.g. aircraft), predicated upon decomposition and hierarchy, or 
incremental approaches allowing system developmental risk to be minimised.  The “waterfall” model 
is perhaps only best suited to the development of single, non-integrated, stand-alone software. 
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As might be assumed from the foregoing, ARP 4754A [99, 101] adopts the top-down self-contained 
integrated system architectural approach predicated upon decomposition and hierarchy, commonly 
understood to be represented in the Systems Engineering “Vee” process model, as depicted in Figure 
4.1 (with a small extension also to consider a place for HAZOP within this). 
 
Figure 4.1 Systems Engineering “Vee” Diagram, adapted from ARP4754A [101] 
Within the above process, the decomposition leg to the left produces aircraft, system and item 
requirements, with each lower level assessment being used to validate the decomposed requirements.  
Correspondingly, the integration leg to the right provides for the verification of the resulting system as 
it is composed.  Within Systems Engineering it is also important that language be used carefully, 
otherwise requirements may be misunderstood, therefore with reference to the US Project 
Management Institute guide [88] the following definitions apply: 
 Validation. The assurance that a product, service, or system meets the needs of the customer and 
other identified stakeholders.  It often involves acceptance and suitability with external customers; 
 Verification. The evaluation of whether or not a product, service, or system complies with a 
regulation, requirement, specification, or imposed condition. It is often an internal process [88]. 
 Where this work proposes a closed-loop safety assessment process, incorporating HAZOP styled 
upon STPA, system dynamics modelling, and Bayesian inference, it is also proposed that the 
process developed with this work is considered as an approach to extend the Preliminary Aircraft 
Safety Assessment (PASA) for a UAS / UAV – hence the upward extension of the “Vee” in 
Figure 4.1. 
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4.1.2. Spiral Development 
With a spiral development process, Boehm [8] posits that a risk-driven rather than a document-driven 
or code-driven approach to software development ought to be used where the overall requirement is 
unknown or embodies a great deal of uncertainty – upon reflection, a good example of such a 
challenge might be revealed with the National Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT) for 
the NHS.  "A primary source of difficulty with the waterfall model has been its emphasis on fully 
elaborated documents as completion criteria for early requirements and design phases. ... Document-
driven standards have pushed many projects to write elaborate specifications of poorly understood 
user interfaces and decision support functions ...", Boehm [8]. 
Boehm also challenges the belief that the automatic conversion of a formal specification into a 
program alleviates the problem of addressing risk with evolving and uncertain requirements, "The 
transform model also shares some of the difficulties of the evolutionary development model, such as 
the assumption that users' operational systems will always be flexible enough to support unplanned 
evolution paths." [8]  With this point in mind consideration ought to be given to what the framework 
ought to be to support the evolution of requirements and the overall modelling approach.  
With the spiral model, all iterations of evolutionary development incorporate a risk analysis phase 
involving prototypes to evaluate alternatives, and to identify and resolve risks, Figure 4.2.  Also, 
beyond the application of the spiral model to the principles of software development, the same 
principles apply to more general complex system engineering developments, for much the same 
reasons that SysML is presented as "systems" extension to the software oriented Unified Modelling 
Language – principally modern complex systems usually incorporate complex software elements and 
within this the hardware, software, and even “liveware”, aspects ultimately merge. 
 
Figure 4.2 A Simplified Interpretation of Boehm's Model of Spiral Development [8] 
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4.2. Architecture & Validation 
4.2.1. Design Intent 
A consideration also in developing the model architecture specification is the requirement to capture 
design intent with respect to behaviour.  For this it is proposed that a suitable model might be found in 
the field of behaviour-based robotics, for example with the Subsumption Architecture, after Brooks 
[12]; at least for machine based elements of the behavioural intent. 
In this work collision avoidance has been modelled as a layered competence and behaviour-based 
robotics architecture – as illustrated in Figure 4.3.  This depicts an intent to suppress a particular 
interpretation of the General Flight Rules within the Rules of the Air [15] in the event that an 
emergency back-up behaviour is required to avoid an imminent collision with threatening traffic.  
Whilst this representation does not perfectly model the actual software implementation, it can be 
argued that it does capture design intent, and might therefore be used to capture a behavioural 
requirement rather than a particular design solution. 
 
Figure 4.3 Behavioural Subsumption Model after Brooks [12] 
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Pursuant to the broad objective of developing a “unified” hazard analysis method, incorporating the 
techniques of HAZOP, STAMP and STPA, a collision avoidance scenario has been constructed 
complying with the Rules of the Air including a series of interaction vignettes,.  Incorporating these 
rules is clearly another aspect of design intent, in the adoption of operational rules generally, and also 
at higher levels of abstraction in the design rules.  Within the system dynamics model, both vehicles 
therefore are to embody the Rules of the Air Regulations 2010, as described in CAP 393, Section 4, 
General Flight Rules [15]; and as detailed in the following excerpt:   
“Avoiding aerial collisions – an aircraft which has the right-of-way under this rule shall 
maintain its course and speed. 
Converging – when two aircraft are converging in the air at approximately the same altitude, 
the aircraft which has the other on its right shall give way. 
Approaching head-on – when two aircraft are approaching head-on, or approximately so, in 
the air and there is a danger of collision, each shall alter its course to the right. 
Overtaking – an aircraft which is being overtaken in the air shall have the right-of-way and 
the overtaking aircraft, whether climbing, descending or in horizontal flight, shall keep the 
out of the way of the other aircraft by altering its course to the right.” 
The Air Navigation Order, The Rules of the Air Regulations 2007 [15]. 
The entity representing the UAV additionally embodies an emergency manoeuvre behaviour that 
provides an alternative interpretation of the above rules when immediately threatened by the course 
taken by the other aircraft, as suggested by Figure 4.3 – in general this back-up behaviour will cause 
the “UAV” to attempt to turn away from the direction of the threat.  Also within these rules, each 
vehicle will either take the shortest direction of turn towards its original heading, where a rule allows 
return to heading, or by default takes a turn to the left where the angle of turn required is 
approximately equal either way.  For each interaction vignette, dynamic behaviour arises partly as a 
consequence of the internal interactions between the intended behaviours, as defined by layers of 
subsumed competences (three in this case) along with the external interactions between the entities as 
defined by the above control rules, and also the system dynamics.  All are to be contained within an 
Intent Specification [69], and taken together also in effect articulate a requirement for a legal airborne 
collision avoidance rule. 
Opposed to avoidance, definitions of proximity should also be considered.  The UKAB [111] provides 
some formality of understanding in defining safety constraints through a definition of Air Proximity. 
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4.2.2. Validation through Questionnaire 
In the absence of actual UAS collision avoidance data, or other such accessible models, it is difficult 
(at least) to objectively validate the models created within this work. Therefore a quantifiable 
statistical approach has to be used, from subjective data derived through a questionnaire.  However, 
with the likelihood of only having access to quite low numbers of people with any relevant experience 
of expertise, and having to reconcile potentially widely varying opinions, also rules out conventional 
statistical parametric methods.  Instead a non-parametric statistical method has been chosen.  This 
method enables the reconciliation of opinions, given a fixed set of options to choose from, by seeking 
to measure the inter-rater agreement between respondents, and also in this case the outputs arising 
from the simulations.  Much as in setting a multiple-choice examination, greater effort and care has to 
be devoted in the construction of the questions than in the processing and assessment of the responses 
that can in fact be mechanised.  Cohen’s Kappa [20], is used as the requisite measure, calculated on 
the choice of options on a per question basis in the questionnaire – generating a pair of agreement 
values for each question, with respect to both the “correct” model based option and a “floating” option 
identified from the consensus as it emerges. 
In the Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data, Landis & Koch [64] suggest a 
refinement to Cohen’s method in that they propose a measure and categorisation for the Strength of 
Agreement, where Poor ≤ 0.0 < Slight ≤ 0.2 < Fair ≤ 0.4 < Moderate ≤ 0.6 < Substantial ≤ 0.8 < 
Almost Perfect ≤ 1.0. Whilst it is recognised that these divisions are arbitrary, the authors felt that 
these categories do provide useful “benchmarks”; likewise here for want of any better benchmark. 
4.3. Emergent and Complex Behaviour 
Whilst we have the popularisation of the science of deterministic chaos [49] misunderstanding may 
arise where the terms emergent or complex behaviour are conjoined with the expectations of the 
behaviour of deterministic systems, and especially where faults, failures and hazardous behaviour are 
being considered.  However, in the field of Behaviour-based Robotics it is understood that these two 
concepts are intimately connected, frequently arise with even quite simple interacting control system, 
and are indeed a necessary aspect in the consideration of the engineering, tailoring or shaping of 
useful behaviours from such robotic systems.  In particular Arkin [3] summarises the views of a 
number of other established and renowned researchers in the field of machine intelligence 
“Emergence is: ‘the appearance of novel properties in whole systems’ (Moravec); ‘Global 
functionality emerges from the parallel interaction of local behaviours’ (Steels); ‘Intelligence 
emerges from the interaction of the components of the system’ (Brooks); ‘Emergent functionality 
arises by virtue of interaction between components not themselves designed with the particular 
function in mind’ (McFarland and Bosser);” and a common thread is that  “... emergence is a 
property of a collection of interacting components (here, behaviours)” [3, 9-11, 80].  These are the 
70 
 
definitions and the nature of the interpretation that ought to be placed upon the application of the term 
emergent as it applies in this work – and also as applied in other relevant earlier work in Robotics by 
this author [5, 27, 28]. 
In considering the relationship between emergence and complexity a similar perspective comes from 
John Holland, a pioneer in the field of Genetic Algorithms, through observations made in the context 
of the execution of strict and deterministic rules within a game such as ‘checkers’.  In this Holland 
observes that “Emergence occurs in systems that are generated (where) the systems are composed of 
copies of a relatively small number of components that obey simple laws”, “Emergent phenomena in 
generated systems are, typically, persistent patterns with changing components”, and that “Generated 
complexity ... organized complexity can result from simple rules and procedures.” [54]  Holland 
provides a simile for this interpretation of complexity by comparing it with the persistent similarity of 
patterns formed by a standing wave in front of a rock in a fast-moving stream – ever changing and 
with no two patterns exactly the same, but all having common distinguishable characteristics – or 
“seeing the same thing twice” in the formations of pieces in the games of checkers or chess, not 
exactly the same formations but having the same salient characteristics – or waves of neurons firing in 
the brain, and so on.  This is the interpretation of emergence to be adopted in this work. 
Similarly, in the Origins of Order, Kaufmann [62, 63] considers the nature of self-organisation and 
adaptation in complex systems by exploring the behaviour of computer models of randomly 
connected ‘NK’ Boolean networks (logical switching networks having N nodes with K connections 
per node) from which study it is hypothesised that certain complex systems tend toward self-
organisation – “The transition from the ordered regime to the chaotic regime constitutes a phase 
transition, which occurs as a variety of parameters are changed. The transition region, on the edge 
between order and chaos, is the complex regime.” [63]  Kauffman also hypothesises that adaption to 
the edge of chaos may ultimately become a general evolutionary principle in that systems poised 
between order and chaos are the natural culmination of selective evolution – if true one might imply 
that this form of complexity is essential in the functioning of an adaptive system, and it therefore 
becomes inevitably necessary to understand how hazards arising in such systems might be modelled. 
4.4. Summary Considerations, Influences and Scope 
Where Hu, et al [56] demonstrate an assessment of risk in ship navigation using Bayesian learning, 
wherein networks are wholly derived by learning from accident data, no equivalent a priori data is 
available for UAV / UAS near-misses and collisions – or indeed for any type of risk event involving 
an autonomous system.  A challenge for this work is to reconcile any such learnt data or structures 
with information derived from a HAZOP process.  This suggests that at least a part of any such 
inference model must be derived from the hazard structure derived from the HAZOP process itself.  
For this investigation into hazard-centric analysis of complex autonomous systems, the focus is the 
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identification of a route towards “deviation”  based risk assessment akin to HAZOP applied to a 
system (or subsystem) operating within its environment, as suggested by Wilkinson and Kelly [114], 
and Despotou, et al [22, 23], within scenarios as identified by Allenby and Kelly [2]. 
In taking a more systems theoretic approach towards the system and risk modelling, Leveson [67, 69-
71] provides a suitable framework for consideration with the “Intent Specification” framework and 
STAMP, further developed by Owens, et al [86] and Stringfellow [105] to realise the beginnings of a 
new HAZOP type process by way of STPA.  Leveson [67, 71] also prompts us to explore the value in 
describing the dynamics of any potential accident system in terms as inspired by Forrester [46].  
Causal-loop and system dynamics modelling can be readily accomplished with a variety of simulation 
tools.  Vensim™ has been adopted in this work, and though DYNAMO4 is now obsolete Roberts, 
Andersen, et al [94] still provide some additional guidance when creating models of system dynamics.   
The purpose overall is to identify a plausible hybrid approach to system dynamic hazard assessment.  
This should integrate a mental model from within a HAZOP process with a Bayesian inference model 
relating cause, deviation, and effect.  In the absence of historic data or observations, this might derive 
belief for particular hazardous relationships from stochastically generated sensitivity data for 
parameters associated with hazardous behaviour within a Systems Dynamic model.  Hu, et al [56], 
Mohaghegh, et al [79], Trucco [110], and Dilks, et al [24] all provide different examples of Bayesian 
centred hybrid approaches to risk and uncertainty involving different sources of data, some associated 
with established Functional Hazard Assessment methods; for example fault trees and FMEA. 
In consideration of a suitable form of representation for the integration of modular behaviours one 
might look to the field of behaviour-based robotics, for example in Brooks’ decomposition of robot 
competences, known as the Subsumption Architecture [12].  This architectural approach provides a 
representation in the form of relatively simple controllers, defined as augmented finite state machines, 
interconnected so as to form layers of competence, each intended to realise a particular behaviour, and 
within which internal connections and mechanisms acting between layers act to subsume the lower 
primitive behaviours within higher and usually more purposeful behaviours.  Hence this approach 
defines a reactive robotic scheme that embodies a layering of behavioural control strategies, each 
potentially having different goals and priorities, and that these overall constitute the feedback control 
model for the robotic entity’s interaction with its environment – thereby providing a generic 
architecture with which to define behavioural interaction in autonomous systems.   
Combining Boyd’s Observe, Orientate, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop [34], Brooks robot behavioural 
competence levels [12], Taylor’s, et al, PACT authority levels [106], and Endsley’s situational 
                                                     
4
 For those with System Dynamic models in the DYNAMO language “Vensim” embodies a conversion utility. 
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awareness model [39, 41], creates the possibility of defining a general framework within which to 
consider autonomous system behaviour.  Such an approach might also be integrated with the 
processes for the development of civil aircraft systems as we introduce autonomous behaviour as a 
requirement into these systems, Figure 4.4.  Whilst this remains beyond the scope of the current work, 
potential connections within this wider development framework could be considered, Figure 4.5. 
 
Figure 4.4 SE Integration Equivalent to ARP 4754A for Autonomous & Robotic Systems 
 
Figure 4.5 A framework compatible with ARP 4754A and DO-178C [97, 101] 
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Comprehensive guidance is available to the aerospace systems engineer, providing for the 
development of safe manned aircraft and their associated systems, incorporating many decades of 
experience gained in the development of relevant systems and their operation.  Central to this 
guidance, Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4754A [101] provides the basic framework 
within which function and item developmental assurance is framed.  Also within this framework, 
ARP 4761 [100] then provides the additional guidelines and recommended hazard and reliability 
assessment methods considered to be appropriate to the undertaking of both qualitative and 
quantitative risk and reliability analysis; necessary to determine whether systems can meet their stated 
safety objectives.  These recommended reliability methodologies quantify statistical risk within a 
frequentist model of probability – that is a measure of the relative frequency of a (hazardous) event 
arising in a series of trials.  However, where particular events and combinations of circumstances are 
effectively unique and irreproducible in practice it may be more appropriate to adopt a Bayesian 
(belief based) approach towards probability.  With this approach a subjective basis in the degree of 
belief in the likelihood of an event occurring is modified by incorporating evidence arising with actual 
occurrences of that event; combining intuitive estimates based upon experience and expertise with 
quantitative statistical data.  Depending upon the reader’s point of view, one might perceive that the 
belief based approach sits on a spectrum between qualitative and quantitative perceptions, between 
subjective and objective measures of perceived risk.  Any general behavioural description and 
predictions of behaviour arising with a complex autonomous system is likely to embody qualities best 
described in a Bayesian form.  The question is what form should that take in practice? 
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Part 2. System Framework 
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Chapter 5. System Modelling Requirements 
“Everything makes sense a bit at a time. But when you try to think of it all at once, it comes out 
wrong.” 
 Terry Pratchett, "Only You Can Save Mankind" 
 
5.1. Textual Analysis & QFD 
 
Figure 5.1 Use Case Simplifying the Certification Purpose  
As this work is conducted within a systems engineering framework, a degree of rigour in the 
requirements analysis is necessary, and yet is also difficult to conduct in practice for this topic with 
the scarcity and relative inaccessibility of representative stakeholders – given the newness of the 
evolving niche being created by the discipline of Autonomous Systems.  Therefore, a different 
approach was proposed, as much is already published on the topic – and in some respects this 
provides a better, more informed and global viewpoint.  Therefore, relevant topic items were drawn 
from the literature to stand as proxies for stakeholder views.  Interpretation and the exercising of 
personal judgement upon the information so derived produced lists of “means” and “needs” through a 
process of textual analysis.  Together with a “differential” QFD analysis, Figure 5.2, this was used in 
place of a “live” requirements elicitation process – to be placed into the context shown in Figure 5.1. 
The QFD analysis technique is a systematic and structured method for turning customer requirements 
– primarily non-functional system requirements (and often tied to specific non-functional performance 
requirements) – into measurable requirements covering all aspects of delivering a product or service 
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from marketing through design, manufacturing, and production.  In order to be properly effective the 
process needs to clearly identify the customer and it is also complex and time consuming.  In this 
project the customer has necessarily been abstracted away, instead adopting a structured reading of 
the relevant literature – effectively making this published community the proxy customer. 
 
Figure 5.2 Deviation Analysis Requirements as QFD Analysis from Textual Analysis 
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With plenty of discussion and opinions regarding certification and safety of autonomous airborne 
systems in the literature, it appeared that a search using appropriately selected keywords could be 
used as the basis for a Systemic Textual Analysis.  Therefore, a series of keywords were identified 
and classified within four levels of abstraction of the certification process; UAV Context, 
Airworthiness & Certification, System Safety Assessment, and Safety Assurance.  A QFD analysis 
was performed with sentences found containing these identified keywords re-phrased to express 
potential operational or non-functional system requirements (WHAT or needs) and functional or non-
functional implementation requirements (HOW or means), with some shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.3 Requirement Sets Identifying selected Means or “How’s” 
In order to separate requirements from the literature a “differential” method was developed, where 
analysis is performed at two levels, in this case Safety Assurance (what) – Airworthiness & 
Certification (how), and Airworthiness & Certification (what) – System Safety Assessment (how).  
The process is repeated, first with the priority of classifying hazardous effects satisfying regulatory 
guidelines, and then prioritising the provision of information as to the extent of states analysed and 
academic challenges.  With these results, taking cuts from the upper halves of each set of functional 
requirements produces two sets of outputs.  Depicted to the left in Figure 5.3 are the requirements for 
a programme focused upon identifying and classifying hazardous effects, whilst to the right focuses 
upon providing information of the extent of states analysed.  Between these two, the conjunction 
identifies common requirements satisfying both of these sets.  The final result is then formulated as a 
Use Case, in Figure 5.4.  Further detail with regard to this approach is contained  in the paper [30]. 
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Figure 5.4 Use Case Scoping the Hazard Modelling Research Programme 
5.2. Stakeholders 
5.2.1. Certification Evidence Clients 
Evidence is required by design assessors from regulatory bodies such as EASA and the UK Civil 
Aviation Authority, or for military aircraft and systems, the UK Military Aviation Authority. 
5.2.2. Safety Objective Clients 
As the safety objective has to be realised by a design authority, this group comprises airworthiness 
engineers and departments, system and software safety engineers, and chief engineers. 
5.2.3. HAZOP Team 
HAZOP requires the expertise and insight of a relevant group comprising some or all of – system 
engineers and designers, system operators, experienced pilots and air traffic controllers, experienced 
system maintainers, human factor engineers, system safety engineers and reliability engineers, the 
customer or other authoritative “user”.  At least a Study Leader, a Recorder, a System Expert or 
Designer, and Users of the System are recommended [14]. 
5.2.4. Engineering 
This group represents the fundamental capability required to create a system, including chief 
engineers, assistant chief engineers, discipline heads, engineering professional leaders, systems 
engineers, human system engineering, and other engineering functions relevant to the system of 
interest – those highlighted have had at least some input into this work through the questionnaire. 
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5.3. Scenario Requirements 
5.3.1. Sense And Avoid (SAA) Hazards 
 
Table 5.1 Hazards identified in the report of NIAG SG-134 [81] 
 Sense and Avoid (SAA) is the “hot topic” upon which a significant degree of attention and effort is 
currently focused, unsurprising given the importance of this as indicated by guidelines [16, 17].  
Consequently professional committees, such as NATO Industrial Advisory Group SG-134, have 
already devoted a fair amount of effort in identifying a number of hazard scenarios, Table 5.1.  Of 
these hazard scenarios the simplest to model is HAZ10, given an assumption of a pre-existing failure 
of separation provision, and the VFR scenario opens up the interaction to all comers, where only the 
General Flight Rules of the Rules of the Air might be considered to apply – as such the scenario has 
the fewest constraints and is therefore likely to represent the most hazardous.  Therefore, this hazard 
forms the basis of the scenario, as it is simply represented yet provides scope for emergent behaviour. 
5.3.2. Scenario Generation 
Consequently, an outline exemplar describing an air-proximity hazard arising between two air-
vehicles has been developed, representing the control structure and system dynamics, and 
SAA Hazard Scenarios
[NATO Industrial Advisory Group SG-134]
Scenario 1 
(IFR)
Scenario 2 
(VFR)
Loss of Separation Provision
HAZ001
UAV does not comply with separation provision 
instruction from ATC
Yes No
HAZ005 Loss of separation provision from ATC Yes No
HAZ007
UAV does not maintain safe separation from other 
aircraft
No Yes
Separation Provision Error
HAZ002
UAV incorrectly responds to separation provision 
instruction from ATC
Yes No
HAZ006 ATC separation provision error Yes No
HAZ008 UAV breaches separation minima No Yes
HAZ010 UAV separation  minima is breached by other aircraft No Yes 
Delayed Separation Provision
HAZ004
Delayed response to separation provision instruction 
from ATC
Yes No
HAZ009
DUO (UAV pilot) issues separation provision instruction 
too late
No Yes
Intentional Deviation from Separation Provision Instruction
HAZ003
Excessive number of intentional deviations from 
separation provision instruction
Yes No
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representations of system behaviour across a range of vignettes within the scenario.  This poses a 
simple yet sufficiently challenging problem embodying representative complex behaviour.  The 
purpose of the scenario and model is not to furnish an exact and veritable representation of the 
putative system and its behaviour, but rather to represent what might be quintessential in the likely 
behaviour of comparable systems and thereby provide insight into where probable hazards and their 
actual causes lie, and how these might be measured and informed.  With this caveat, the system model 
represents a two-dimensional interaction space with a simplified implementation of the general flight 
rules, physics and perception. 
 
Figure 5.5 Mid-air Collision Avoidance Scenario 
The basic scenario is as presented in Figure 5.5.  As shown in this figure, and for all of the vignettes 
within the scenario, it is assumed that both vehicles are initially heading toward a common point of 
conflict (PoC), as indicated by the diamond shaped marker positioned directly ahead of the UAS.  
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Chapter 6. System Model Design 
“Real stupidity beats artificial intelligence every time.” 
 Terry Pratchett, "Hogfather" 
6.1. Modelling Framework 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Integrating System Dynamics and Inferred Constraint Violation Perspectives 
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The modelling framework, Figure 6.1, is describable on a number of levels.  In terms of context, the 
framework comprises two mental processes, HAZOP and Systems Theoretic Process Analysis, 
integrated with two computable models, Goal System Dynamics and Goal Bayesian Belief, the results 
from which update the HAZOP table with revised belief of causes and effects, Figure 6.2. 
In the context of Leveson’s Intent Specification [69], the purpose is not to decompose and refine 
system requirements but rather to formulate the nature of the system safety requirements in terms of a 
hierarchy of design and stakeholder intent.  Thereby, the modelling framework can also be described 
in this form as a collection of system requirements, process elements and viewpoints, within 
interactions spanning the system context across four levels of decomposed stakeholder intent.  With 
such a view of design intent and purpose, a hierarchy of lower systems models can be identified and 
formulated, so as to be described and if possible generalised with the systems modelling language, 
SysML – ultimate to lead to a meta-model accommodating “Intent”.  
 
Figure 6.2 Generic System Goal Model within a STHAZOP Framework 
So far the generalisation of the model has produced a definition of a generic system goal context, as 
shown above in Figure 6.2.  This generic model indicates where various packages comprising the 
framework are contained within each other, decomposing the framework into identifiable, discrete 
and manageable parts.  This model identifies the elements taken from the system context that form the 
system goal, in turn derived from a general form of the Intent Specification framework [86], and 
positions these alongside the external tool elements to be used to create an enhanced HAZOP output. 
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Figure 6.3 A framework compatible with ARP 4754A and DO-178C [97, 101] 
The purpose of this form is to succinctly and completely capture all the necessary model components 
required to construct a system dynamics representation, and also recognise the embodiment of this 
along with HAZOP and a Bayesian inference methodology – Figure 6.3.   Extensions are yet required 
to incorporate Operators, and with further abstraction, socio-technical elements too. 
 
Figure 6.4 STHAZOP Framework Sequence Diagram 
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The final viewpoint upon the modelling framework considers the order in which the various model 
aspects ought to be created and completed.  The sequence of activities and events encompasses the 
same group of stakeholders as identified in section 5.2, although out of necessity many of the parts 
representing these stakeholders have been executed by the author in this work – with particular 
stakeholder participation reserved for the validation of the model behaviour through questionnaire.  
As can be seen from the sequence diagram, Figure 6.4, certain activities that are to be performed in 
parallel, such as formulating the initial HAZOP whilst performing a STPA, or building and validating 
the system dynamics model whilst also building the behaviour belief model, and then to iterate both of 
these models in the light of new information gained from the analysis and validation of the system 
dynamics.  Having completed the system dynamics modelling, this then is used to formulate the final 
behaviour belief model and the outputs from this, along with measures of emergent behaviour, are 
finally used to update the initial HAZOP table.  It is conceivable that where more complex systems 
are to be considered the whole sequence as described above becomes an embedded activity within a 
larger iterative process, contain numbers of hazard assessments composed within many HAZOP 
tables and most probably contained within a hierarchy of models.  That has not been considered yet. 
6.2. Scenario Modelling 
Within the sequence of scenario modelling activities, an initial HAZOP table is constructed and the 
skeleton of the system model is defined in the context of the system goals.  This skeleton model is 
constrained by a minimalist model of the environment. 
Additionally obvious dysfunctions, identified during or before the initial HAZOP, and a means by 
which constraint violation is to be detected, should now be identified and incorporated into the 
skeleton Goal System Dynamics Model (see Chapter 7).  For this scenario, Air Proximity already 
stands as a framework within which to declare near-misses, with accessible reports providing 
examples of near-misses; as transcripts, diagrams and analysis, along with other relevant data [111].  
The reason that a model of near-misses or safety constraint violation is important, and should be made 
explicit in the hazard assessment process, is that when it comes to the validation of potentially 
hazardous behaviour or expressing the perceived internal states of the model in dangerous 
configurations, near-misses occur more often than collisions and are accidents waiting to happen – 
and are more often than not documented by those involved in the incident.   
Subsequently, having defined the system of interest and accident scenario, a command or control 
parameter is chosen, which in this case is the term or command “Manoeuvre”, with deviation 
guidewords then applied to this, with the result producing the initial HAZOP, in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 Initial HAZOP Table 
6.3. Behavioural Intent Modelling 
Before the behavioural model is created, the original design intent in the system safety control loop is 
assessed with an initial HAZOP as described.  As previously proposed, an adapted variant of STPA is 
also performed in conjunction with this HAZOP to identify a number of potential control flaws or 
defects for each functional element within a generic control loop – with these flaws identified with 
CF** designations in Figure 6.5.  By considering each deviation for each functional element around 
the control loop in turn, control flaws, safety constraints and mitigating design decisions are identified 
in a recursive process. 
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Representations of command failure, delay, and misestimating perceptions are all likely flaws to be 
incorporated into a system model along with the nature of protective mechanisms identified at this 
stage.  These representations might be termed “Flaw Modelling Requirements”, in that the purpose of 
the system dynamics and inference models is to explore worst case behaviour, and therefore 
appropriate representation of these potential defects should be formally captured as modelling 
requirements.  Specific system dysfunction models are also identified at this stage by the HAZOP 
team, and help to identify the direction of the exploration for hazards with the behavioural model 
(Figure 6.2).  New hazard cases and system dysfunctions may also be revealed later with the output of 
the behavioural model, and these too can be incorporated later into the HAZOP and modelling 
requirements. 
 
Figure 6.5 Scenario Collision Avoidance Process Control Loop, adapted from Stringfellow 
[104, 105] 
Obviously dangerous configurations, such as head-on encounters at speed, might be easily anticipated 
as a cause of system dysfunction.  Other dysfunctions such as arise with misperceived estimation of 
separation, or a delayed interaction leading to possible entrainment, all of these may not be so obvious 
or have an effect which is not properly understood at this preliminary stage.  Subsequently, equipped 
with the various models of behaviour, further safety constraints may be devised, internal and external 
parameters altered, and newly designed protective mechanisms included for a further iteration of 
exploration.  Each safety constraint and design decision is recorded and mapped into the HAZOP 
table for incorporation in the actual system design – as described for STPA by Owens, et al [86], and 
Stringfellow, et al [105]. 
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As stated previously, this study employs the abstract behavioural parameter “Manoeuvre” to which 
guidewords are applied, creating seven deviations or “Inadequate Control Actions in the language of 
STPA, as described below: 
ICA01 – Omission The UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) does not manoeuvre to avoid the other 
aircraft. 
ICA02 – Commission The UAV manoeuvres in the wrong direction attempting to avoid the other 
aircraft. 
ICA03 – Early The UAV prematurely ceases a manoeuvre to avoid the other aircraft and 
returns to the given heading. 
ICA04 – Late The UAV belatedly initiates a manoeuvre to avoid the other aircraft. 
ICA05 – Less The UAV rate of manoeuvre is insufficient to avoid the other aircraft. 
ICA06 – More The UAV rate of manoeuvre is excessive in attempting to avoid the other 
aircraft. 
ICA07 – Conflicting The UAV is unable to resolve the conflict between realising the System Goal 
and avoiding the other aircraft. 
In this work the deviation “Omission” has not been explicitly implemented.  However, manoeuvres 
that appear to deviate in not attempting to avoid the other aircraft nevertheless emerge.  From 
consideration of these deviations, fifteen potential control flaws (CF), or system defects have been 
identified through this STPA-HAZOP process.  Later, together with Monte Carlo outputs generated 
from the system dynamical behaviour, the relationship between these deviations and control flaws are 
used to configure a flaw belief model – aiding system hazard identification, inference and validation.  
However, only the control flaws shown in bold in Table 6.1 are legitimate in the context of the current 
model – incorporating the specific defect representations as described in the scenario previously: 
CF01 The UAV fails to detect the other aircraft altogether. 
CF02 The UAV does not command a turning manoeuvre from the flight control system (FCS). 
CF03  The UAV flight control surfaces do not respond to demands from the FCS. 
CF04 The UAV incorrectly estimates the location and direction to the predicted point of conflict. 
CF05 The UAV fails to follow established Rules of the Air. 
CF06 The other aircraft fails to follow established Rules of the Air. 
CF07 The UAV interprets the Rules of the Air too rigidly when closing within 500ft of the other 
aircraft. 
CF08 The UAV loses detection of the other aircraft. 
CF09 The UAV fails to detect the other aircraft at sufficient range. 
CF10 The UAV delays the commanding of a turning manoeuvre from the flight control system 
(FCS). 
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CF11 The UAV flight control surfaces are slow to respond to demands from the FCS. 
CF12 The UAV demanded rate of turn is insufficient for the closing angle, speed and range to the 
other aircraft. 
CF13 The UAV maximum demanded rate of turn exceeds the maximum achievable rate of turn. 
CF14 The UAV demanded rate of turn is excessive for the closing angle, speed and range to the 
other aircraft. 
CF15 The UAV does not arbitrate the competing heading demands appropriately. 
6.4. Vignette Modelling 
Within the sequence of vignette modelling activities above, the skeleton system dynamics model is 
configured around the system goals and formal rules, defining the various viewpoints within the 
model in conjunction with the framework defined previously, in Figure 6.2.  Subsequently, definitions 
of the initial conditions for the simulations (initial separations and heading, speeds, etc.), the motion 
dynamics, sensing models and the specific flaws as identified previously, are all added.  Finally, 
models to detect safety constraint violations are added to the system dynamics model, along with 
mechanisms to capture designated Monte Carlo outputs and the calculation of the Lyapunov exponent 
of the deviated control parameter, in this case “Manoeuvre”.  The following sections detail the form 
of the system dynamics control model, describing the implementation of rules and other assumptions. 
6.4.1. Scenario Goal Behaviour – Design Decisions 
 
Figure 6.6 Rule Modelling – The Rules of the Air Regulations 2007 [15] 
The representations of both vehicles should embody the Rules of the Air, as described in CAP 393 
[15] and illustrated in Figure 6.6.  The entity representing the UAV also embodies an additional 
SECTION 4 GENERAL FLIGHT RULES (CAP 393)
Avoiding aerial collisions – 8 (5)
… an aircraft which has the right-of-way under this rule shall
maintain its course and speed.
Converging – 9 (3)
… when two aircraft are
converging in the air at
approximately the same
altitude, the aircraft which
has the other on its right
shall give way.
Approaching head-on – 10
When two aircraft are
approaching head-on, or
approximately so, in the air
and there is a danger of
collision, each shall alter its
course to the right.
70 70 
Overtaking – 11 (1)
… an aircraft which is being
overtaken in the air shall have
the right-of-way and the
overtaking aircraft, whether
climbing, descending or in
horizontal flight, shall keep out
of the way of the other aircraft
by altering course to the right.
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emergency manoeuvre behaviour that modifies the interpretation of these rules of the air when 
immediately threatened by the other intruding aircraft with very little room for manoeuvre – in 
general this will cause the “UAV” to attempt to turn away from the direction of the threat.  Also 
within these rules, when starting to return to course, each vehicle either takes the shortest turn towards 
its original heading or by default turns left where the angle is approximately equal either way. 
Where previously the context diagram representing the scenario, in Figure 5.5, describes a potentially 
hazardous interaction due to vehicles on a converging course, the goal of the two vehicles avoiding 
each other, whilst attempting to maintain their respective headings, is summarised in Figure 6.7.  
From this statement and as shown below, it can be inferred that the dynamics model is required to 
embody at least two behaviours, or competences, for each entity.  The default behaviour is to maintain 
headings, as that is the goal in the absence of the hazard.  Avoidance behaviour is required also. 
 
Figure 6.7 Sense and Avoid Scenario System Goal 
«ContextDiagram»
Ibd SAA Scenario System Goal [SG01.1]
NB: for Level 1 Intent Spec., “Customer Usage & Usability View”
«block»
Remain Clear System Goal
Air Traffic
Unit
[ATSOCAS]
Non-Cooperative
Traffic
Designated UAV
Operator
Air Traffic Service:
Initial Headings
Traffic Service:
Initial Non-Coop
Traffic Heading
Deconfliction Service:
Initial UAS Heading
Civil Aviation
Authority
Air Navigation Order:
General Flight Rules
Assume that the 
deconfliction aspect of 
this service fails, and 
hence potentially 
invoking an emergency 
response from the UAS.
«diagramDescription»
Version = “0.1”
Description = “System 
goal represented in the 
context of the hazard / 
accident scenario – a  
mid-air encounter upon 
convergence to a 
common waypoint 
starting at a distance of 
between 0.5NM and 
3.0NM. Decomposition 
consistent with Leveson’s 
‘Intent Specification 
Hierarchy’ at level 1.”
Completeness = “partial. 
Showing only the goal in 
relationship to the 
designated actors.”
Satisfies
«requirement»
Identify System Goals
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Nautical Miles
ATC view on Surveillance Radar
UAS Track
NCT Track
PoC
UAS nearest approach
NCT nearest approach
90 
 
6.4.2. Default Avoidance Behaviour (Intended Behaviour Models) 
Arbitrating between avoidance and maintaining heading an interpretation of the Rules of the Air may 
be characterised by a table of rate-of-turn values, as shown in Figure 6.8.  Assuming also a need to 
minimise the arbitrary introduction of instability and limit-cycling, this might be represented in a 
more continuous fashion, as shown in Figure 6.9; facilitating a fuzzy control interpretation of the rule 
selection logic where this output function surface de-fuzzifies a commanded rate of turn.  
 
Figure 6.8 Scenario Rules of the Air Avoidance Decision Table 
 
Figure 6.9 Rules of the Air Avoidance Interpretation as Rate of Turn surface 
IF →
AND  ↓
destination to Port Ahead to Starboard Astern
Right of Way, 
Hold Course 
(HC)
UAS / NCT on 
left
No Rate of 
Turn
(0° s-1)
No Rate of 
Turn
(0° s-1)
Rate One turn 
to the right
(+3° s-1)
Rate Two turn 
to the right
(+6° s-1)
Give Way 
(GW)
UAS / NCT 
head on
Rate Four turn 
to the right
(+24° s-1)
Rate Two turn 
to the right
(+6° s-1)
Rate Three 
turn to the 
right
(+12° s-1)
Rate Four turn 
to the right
(+24° s-1)
UAS / NCT on 
right
Rate Four turn 
to the right
(+24° s-1)
Rate Four turn 
to the right
(+24° s-1)
Rate Two turn 
to the right
(+6° s-1)
Rate Three 
turn to the 
right
(+12° s-1)
Right of Way, 
Hold Course 
(HC)
UAS / NCT 
overtaking
Rate One turn 
to the left
(-3° s-1)
No Rate of 
Turn
(0° s-1)
Rate Three 
turn to the 
left
(-12° s-1)
Rate Two turn 
to the left
(-6° s-1)
Column “A” Column “B” Column “C” Column “D”
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Figure 6.10 Scenario Perceived Bearing Fuzzy Sets 
6.4.3. Emergency Avoidance Behaviour (Intended Behaviour Models) 
For the emergency behaviour, the behavioural model for the UAV is presented with a threat zone, of 
radius equivalent to that of a standard rate one turn (3° per second) at the current UAV airspeed and 
centred directly ahead along the extended Centre Line (℄), as illustrated in Figure 6.11. 
If the UAV model perceives that a threat exists, and with sufficient warning time, then an emergency 
manoeuvre is initiated to turn the UAV away from the centre-line – but this decision point may also 
be offset left or right by a number of degrees.  This decision point or threshold acts as a discontinuity 
with respect to the default “rules of the air” behaviour, and if this decision behaviour is incorrectly 
specified then the hazard may not be mitigated but worsened.  Otherwise, the UAV complies with the 
rules as specified in Figure 6.6, and manoeuvres are based solely upon detections along the line of 
sight to the intruding aircraft.  When safe separation is achieved, both model entities turn towards 
their original headings.  The intruder (NCT) always follows the general flight rules as specified. 
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Where applying the Rules of the Air as represented in Figure 6.8 
and Figure 6.9, the required avoidance fuzzy implementation 
employs linguistic variable terms describing the perceived bearing 
to the intruder, detailed in Figure 6.10.  For the simpler emergency 
manoeuvre behaviour an alternative two-valued linguistic variable 
is used to classify the relative threat, left or right, as represented in 
Figure 6.12, providing values arising with “Track Error Limits” 
(dys)function providing the manoeuvre direction – Figure 6.13. 
Figure 6.11 Alternative Emergency Manoeuvre and 
Collision Threat Zone Behaviour 
 
Figure 6.12 Scenario Perceived Direction of Threat 
 
Figure 6.13 Scenario Emergency Manoeuvre Internal Block Diagram (dysfunctions in red)  
Perceived direction of NTC: LinguisticVariable
NCT from left: FuzzySet NCT from right: FuzzySet
Note that “ahead” for the purposes of an emergency manoeuvre 
decision, in this version, has been offset to the right by 25 degrees.
sensed bearing to NCTrelative errors determining PoC
nearness threat
perceived bearing to NCTemergency manoeuvre demanded
UAS Emergency Manoeuvre
relative bearing to PoC
distances to PoC
UAS and NCT Threatened Intrusions:
CausalLoopSystemTruthView
UAS Detect Viewpoint:
CausalLoopSystemTruthInterface
UAS Track Error Limits:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
UAS Emergency Manoeuvre:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
Minimum Warning Time:
vensimConst
Non-Coop Traffic Speed:
vensimConst
UAS Speed:
vensimConst
relative bearing to UAS:
vensimVar
NCT longitudinal separation:
vensimVar
NCT lateral separation:
vensimVar
Perceived Range Estimation:
vensimConst
UAS Speed:
vensimConst
relative bearing to NCT:
vensimVar
UAS collision avoidance RoT:
vensimVar
separation with NCT:
vensimVar
Perceived Range Estimation:
vensimConst
Latency in Perceiving Threat:
vensimConst
Threat Offset Direction:
vensimConst
Inputs in bold text 
may be varied in the 
Monte Carlo runs.
All of the instrumentality of the believed 
known defect generation mechanisms is 
contained herein, having effect upon the 
backup (emergency manoeuvre) behaviour.
 
Emergency 
behaviour is 
invoked if the 
UAV is 
threatened 
within this zone
Emergency 
behaviour is 
invoked if the 
UAV is 
threatened 
within this zone
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℄
Collision 
threat zone 
radius = 0.5 
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6.4.4. Default Heading Maintenance Behaviour (Intended Behaviour Models) 
 
Figure 6.14 UAS Heading Maintenance Fuzzy Logic as “Causal Flow” Diagram 
The default heading maintenance logic and controller is implemented as a simple fuzzy logic system, 
as outlined above in Figure 6.14.  A number of the rule systems and controllers within the model are 
implemented as either single or two input fuzzy logic controllers, as described previously.  In this case 
Figure 6.15 and Figure 6.16 respectively represent the single input heading maintenance control 
model defuzzification value table, and the input linguistic variable within the “Universe of Discourse” 
of bearing to desired heading – both used to steer the UAS towards its original heading. 
 
Figure 6.15 Scenario Heading Maintenance Decision Table (Column Rules as in Figure 6.8) 
UAS bearing to
desired heading
UAS destination
to Port
UAS destination
Ahead
UAS destination
to Starboard
UAS destination
Astern
UAS bearing to
desired heading
(LV)
UAS RoT to Port
UAS RoT Ahead
UAS RoT to
Starboard
UAS RoT Astern
RoT to Port
RoT Ahead
RoT to Starboard
RoT Astern
UAS RoT for
Heading
UAS RoTs
<UAS heading>
-
<Initial UAS
Heading>
+
<UAS RoT to
Avoid>
d
This page represents
a synthesised UAS
view.
<UAS collision
avoidance RoT>
UAS returning to
heading
<Perceived Range
Estimation>
<separation
with NCT>
<Initial Traffic
Separation>
c Clearance Margin
<Beyond Visual
Range>
AND IF: to Port Ahead to Starboard Astern
If “separation 
with ...” > 
“Initial Traffic 
Separation”
Rate One turn 
to the left
(-3° s-1)
No Rate of 
Turn
(0° s-1)
Rate One turn 
to the right
(+3° s-1)
Rate Two turn 
to the left
(-6° s-1)
Else Use column 
“A” rules
Use column 
“B” rules
Use column 
“C” rules
Use column 
“D” rules
Defuzzify Output 
Determine Consequents Determine Antecedents 
Universe of Discourse 
Fuzzify Input 
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Figure 6.16 Scenario Bearing to Desired Heading Fuzzy Sets 
A systematic model such as this lends itself to a definition as a standard part within a library; 
configured with appropriate fuzzy membership functions and constants where required to fit a 
particular role.  Fuzzy logic and control generally fits well as a generic component in a hierarchical, 
behavioural and competence scheme of control and management; configurable for a wide range of 
representations and uses.  However, no succinct model representation of fuzzy logic has been created 
for SysML.  Arguably the increasing prevalence of fuzzy logic, along with neural networks, genetic 
algorithms and Bayesian networks, suggests that standard succinct models for all of these are required 
to be expressed and made clear in the wider systems engineering context – currently in SysML this 
amounts to a block labelled “fuzzy controller”, etc.  It will remain difficult to automate model 
construction without consistent and proper representations of generic items such as these. 
UAS bearing to desired heading: LinguisticVariable
UAS destination to Port: FuzzySet UAS destination Ahead: FuzzySet
UAS destination to Starboard: FuzzySet UAS destination Astern: FuzzySet
95 
 
 
Figure 6.17 Scenario System Goal Internal Block Diagram, as implemented 
 The entire system dynamics simulation model has been created as a Vensim™ model and hence the 
“CausalLoop” block type referenced in Figure 6.17, above.  This illustration shows the internal 
relationship between all of the major components in the model, albeit with some simplification.  The 
model itself is layered into “SystemTruth” views, representing the underlying physical motions and 
actual bearings and ranges, and “Synthesised” views, representing the internal system logic to which 
error and dysfunction may be introduced.  Chapter 7 continues to describe the physical model 
infrastructure that constrains the “truthful” behaviour of the above system, the model elements that 
introduce or describe the Control Flaws, and against these the descriptions of the safety constraints, 
including the means to capture any safety constraint violations as they arise during simulations.  
Ibd SAA Scenario System Goal [implemented]
UAS Heading Maintenance:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
UAS Emergency Manoeuvre:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
sensed bearing to NCT
UAS Dynamic Scenario Model Inputs:
CausalLoopSystemTruthInput
Initial Traffic Separation
UAS Speed
Non-Coop Traffic Speed
Initial UAS Heading
initial
northings
for UAS
initial
eastings
for UAS
initial
northings
for NCT
initial
eastings
for NCT
relative bearing to NCT
relative
bearing
to UAS
NCT RoT to Avoid
NCT bearing to
desired heading
NCT
RoT
NCT
heading
separation
with UAS
Initial Non-Coop
Traffic Heading
Initial Traffic
Separation
Initial Non-Coop Traffic Heading
UAS Speed
Non-Coop
Traffic Speed
Air Traffic
Unit
[ATSOCAS]
Non-Cooperative
Traffic
Designated UAV
Operator
Civil Aviation
Authority
Initial Non-Coop Traffic Heading
Non-Coop Traffic Speed
Initial UAS Heading
UAS Speed
Initial Non-Coop Traffic Heading
Initial Non-Coop Traffic Speed
Initial UAS Heading
Initial UAS Speed
Conforms to Rules 8, 9, 10 & 
11, "General Flight Rules", 
The Air Navigation Order 
(ANO). See also "Aviation 
Law, Flight Rules and 
Operational Procedures", 
The Air Pilots' Manual, Vol 2, 
p19, ISBN 1-84336-066-7.  
This version uses relative 
bearing only.
UAS RoT to Avoid
UAS bearing to desired heading
perceived
bearing
to NCT
UAS collision
avoidance RoT
UAS RoT: vensimVar
UAS heading: vensimVar
separation with NCT: vensimVar
Initial Traffic Separation: vensimVar
Initial UAS Heading: vensimVar
UAS returning
to heading
NCT returning
to heading
«block»
SAA Scenario Rules of the 
Air Avoidance Decision 
Table
«block»
Avoidance Behaviour 
Subsumption Arhcitecture
«block»
Rules of the Air Avoidance 
Rate of Turn Surface
Perceived bearing to NTC:
LinguisticVariable
UAS bearing to desired heading:
LinguisticVariable
«block»
UAS Emergency 
Avoidance 
Behaviour
Perceived direction of NTC:
LinguisticVariable
NCT returning to heading
UAS returning to heading
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
UAS and NCT Initial States:
CausalLoopSystemTruthView
UAS and NCT Relative Motions:
CausalLoopSystemTruthView
separation
with NCT:
vensimVar
UAS heading:
vensimVar
UAS RoT:
vensimVar
«block»
SAA Scenario Heading 
Maintenance Decision Table
UAS Detect Viewpoint:
CausalLoopSystemTruthInterface
UAS Track Error Limits:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
NCT Avoid Behaviour Viewpoint:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
UAS Avoid Behaviour Viewpoint:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
NCT Heading Maintenance:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
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Chapter 7. System Constraints Model 
“Where is the boundary, that encompasses the smallest number of components, within which dynamic 
behaviour under study is generated?” 
 Jay W Forrester, “Principles of Systems” 
7.1. System State Modelling 
7.1.1. Initial State – Defined Environment (Initial Conditions Model) 
 
Figure 7.1 UAS and NCT Initial States Specific (Constraints) Parametric Model 
Constraint models define the limits of behaviour of the system dynamics simulations.  Here these 
models are defined both in adapted SysML parametric diagrams, and also as individual Constraint 
blocks.  The first of these constraints describes part of the model initial conditions and relative states – 
defining some of the initial physical states of the model – as shown in Figure 7.1 above. 
Expressions, such as those shown overleaf, are used to describe the simulation model equations that 
propagate state values throughout the model.  In general these expressions may take two distinct 
forms; 
«constraint» representing simple expressions and assignments; and 
«heuristic» representing conditional assignments, alternatives and rules. 
par [constraint block] SAA Scenario Physical Constraints
«block»
Remain Clear System Goal
«block»
UAS and NCT Initial States
«block»
UAS and NCT Relative Motions
initial positions relative to PoC:Environment
NCTS : ktsUASS : ktsINCTH : deg
IE4N : NM IN4U : NM IE4U : NM
IUASH : deg
IN4N : NM
ITS : NM
IRB : deg
relative motion:Environment
IE4U : NM IN4U : NM IE4N : NM IN4N : NM RB2 : degLATS : ft LONGS : ft SW : ft
Initial Traffic Separation
Non-Coop Traffic Speed
Initial Non-Coop Traffic Heading
UAS Speed
Initial UAS Heading UAS rate of turn
NCT rate of turn
INCTH : deg IUASH : degUASS : kts UASR : deg/sNCTS : kts NCTR : deg/s
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
separation with UAS
All motion is constrained 
within the horizontal plane
For motion relative to the 
NCT frame of reference
relative bearing to UAS
Satisfies
«requirement»
Separation Provision 
Design Decision
Satisfies
«requirement»
State Assumptions
Satisfies
«requirement»
Pose Environmental
Constraints
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For example, the partial initial state expressions as presented above are presented as equivalent 
constraint definitions in Figure 7.2, the first being an example of a «constraint» and the other an 
example of a representative «heuristic».  As a further illustration, the implementation of these two 
example expressions within the system dynamics model, with equations (323) and (102), are detailed 
in the small excerpt taken from the Vensim model simulation code, and shown further below. 
 
Figure 7.2 Partial Parametric Definitions for Initial State Constraints 
 
Note also that within the parametric block “initial positions relative to the PoC” (Figure 7.1) there are 
also additional expressions not shown here for the sake of brevity.  However, some of the underlying 
connectivity is shown over the page, detailing the immediate source terms for the above constraints. 
bdd [constraint block] Partial Physical Constraints [Constraint definition]
parameters
ITS : NM – Constant
UASS : kts – Constant
NCTS : kts – Constant
constraints
{ (ITS * UASS / NCTS) / (1 + UASS / NCTS) }
«constraint»
Environment : UASInitialDistanceToTravel
parameters
BearingRelativeToPoC : deg
IRA : deg
IRB : deg – Physical State
constraints
{IF BearingRelativeToPoC > 180
THEN IRB = IRA
ELSE IRB = -IRA}
«heuristic»
Environment : IRB
(323) UAS initial distance to travel = (Initial Traffic Separation * UAS Speed  / "Non-Coop 
 Traffic Speed") / (1 + UAS Speed / "Non-Coop Traffic Speed") 
(102) initial relative bearing =  IF THEN ELSE (Initial NCT Bearing Relative to PoC > 180, 
 initial relative angle, -initial relative angle) 
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More generally, a number of types and forms of constraints appear to be an essential generic aspect of 
the system dynamics model definition, and each of these specific types ought to be applied at least 
once each within the model definition process.  Together, five generic types of constraint have been 
identified in the course of this work: 
a) Physical constraints including state initialisation, motions, transforms, etc. – Figure 7.3; 
b) Dysfunctions and defect properties – Figure 7.4; 
c) Safety constraint violations as proximity, exceedance, near-miss, etc. – Figure 7.5; 
d) Emergent property monitoring, with Lyapunov Exponent, entropy or other – Figure 7.16; and  
e) Test and training case (Monte Carlo) data capture interface – Figure 8.5 to Figure 8.9; as 
depicted below and later. 
 
Figure 7.3 Generic Physical Constraints Parametric Model 
UAS initial distance to travel
Initial Traffic Separation
Non-Coop Traffic Speed
UAS Speed
initial relative bearing
Initial NCT Bearing Relative to PoC
Initial Non-Coop Traffic Heading
Initial UAS Heading
initial relative angle
Initial Traffic Separation
NCT initial distance to travel
UAS initial distance to travel
par Generic Physical Constraints
«block»
System Goal
«block»
Initial States
«block»
Dynamic States
initial relative state:Environment
ICPN : dimICP1 : dim
ISP : dim
relative movement:Environment
DSP : dim
Initial / Constant Parameter 1
Initial / Constant Parameter N Dynamic Input N
ICPN : dim DIN : dimICP1 : dim DI1 : dim
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
Satisfies
«requirement»
Principal Design 
Decision
Satisfies
«requirement»
State Assumptions
Satisfies
«requirement»
Pose Environmental
Constraints
As 
required
Dynamic Input 1
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Figure 7.4 Generic Dysfunction Constraints Parametric Model 
 
Figure 7.5 Generic Proximity Constraints Parametric Model 
par Generic Dysfunction Constraints
«block»
System Goal
«block»
Control Loop Sub-model 1
«block»
Control Loop Sub-model N
dysfunction 1:Defect
CLSP : dim
DVP : dimICP : dim
dysfunction N:Defect
CLSP : dim
DVP1 : dim AO : dimDVP1 : dim
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
Initial / Constant Parameter N
Satisfies
«requirement»
ANO Control Flaw
Satisfies
«requirement»
A Control Flaw
 Defect Validation Parameter 1
Action Output Defect Validation Parameter N
Initial / Constant Parameter 1
ICP : dim
As 
required
Satisfies
«requirement»
Define Dysfunction & 
Misuse
par Generic Proximity Constraints
«block»
System Goal
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
«block»
Entity 1 Violation Detection
«block»
Entity 2 Violation Detection
Threat Parameter Value(s)
Safe Proximity Limit
Proximity Indicator 2
 Defect Validation Parameter
Proximity Indicator 1
constraint 1:Violation constraint 2:Violation
TPV : dim
EVP : dim
DVP : dim SPL : dimPI : dim
EVP : dim
SPL : dim PI : dim
Satisfies
«requirement»
Determine Safety 
Constraints
Satisfies
«requirement»
Determine Safety 
Constraints
Optional –
as required
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7.1.2. Relative Motion – Defined Environment (Motion Dynamics Model) 
The complexity of the model occasionally defies succinct readable interpretation as constraint blocks, 
as in the axis transforms, translations and equations of motions model shown below, Figure 7.6. 
 
Figure 7.6 UAS and NCT Relative Motions as “Causal Loop – Stock and Flow” Diagram 
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7.1.3. Integrated Manoeuvring Behaviour (Intended Behaviour Models) 
The behaviours shown in Figure 7.7 depict two typical sets of trajectories over 50 second periods 
starting from breach of separation – which in these instances starts at 3 nautical miles.  As depicted in 
the “intrusion” case, the UAV (shown initially heading in a northerly direction) continuously 
misestimates the range to the aircraft breaching separation – a Perceived Range Estimation (PRE) 
dysfunction.  In this encounter, the UAV attempts to manoeuvre behind the non-cooperative aircraft, 
as this is the aircraft that has the other on its right and so shall give way.  At a certain point the aircraft 
breaching separation observes that the UAV is now directly ahead, and so gives way to the right, 
whilst the UAV still attempts to manoeuvre behind it.  Conversely, an acceptable behaviour is 
depicted in the “ok” case, albeit with the UAV perhaps overreacting as it is only emergency 
behaviours that include a proper sense of separation in this model; otherwise the avoidance is largely 
determined by any visible detection perceived along a line-of-sight. 
 
Figure 7.7 Typical Vignette Behaviour 
Ibd SAA Scenario System Goal 3NM Perceived Range Estimation Vignette [behaviour]
NB: for Level 3 Intent Spec., “Black-box Model Behaviour View”
3NM PRE Vignette:
[Remain Clear System Goal]
Initial Traffic Separation = 3.0NM ±0.1NM
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 305° ±5°
Non-Coop Traffic Speed = 250kts ±5kts
UAS Heading = 0°
UAS Speed = 250kts ±5kts
Minimum Warning Time = 15s ±5s
Perceived Range Estimation = 25% .. 400%
3NM PRE Behaviour:
ok
3NM PRE Behaviour:
intrusion
«allocate» «allocate»
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 305°
Perceived Range Estimation = 100%
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 305°
Perceived Range Estimation ~ 360%
Range overestimated by 260%
Incurs a late decision change.
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
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NCT Track
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Expressing the Monte Carlo results relating to these behaviours, using the Monte Carlo plot tool in 
Vensim and a plot (using Excel) representing a stacking of the different beliefs with respect to 
“Inadequate Control Actions”, produces perhaps unfamiliar depictions of the relevant time-based 
data; as are employed in the inference questions described later in Chapter 9, and illustrated here in 
Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9.  In the time-series plots corresponding to this vignette, the separation 
distribution plot shown in Figure 7.8 reveals sensitivity information contained in the encounter as a 
spread of statistical distributions depicting the many separation distances over elapsed time.  This 
representation employs a native presentation format within Vensim.  From this estimates can be made 
as to how likely a given separation might be at a particular point in elapsed time.  Therefore with 
closer inspection of Figure 7.8 we can see for example that the closest point of approach (<3000 ft at 
> 37.5 seconds) lies in an outlier of the distribution of separations, sitting near to the 100% limit – 
note also the slight double-dip in the distribution plot at between approximately 35 and 40 seconds.  
Then with respect to these separation plots, the lower of the two time-series plots in Figure 7.9 
provide a representation of the degrees of “belief” that particular deviations, or Inadequate Control 
Actions (ICA), are responsible for the behaviour.  Although each belief value is expressed in a range 
from 0 to 1, as these beliefs are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the combination of these beliefs is 
represented as a stacked plot in Figure 7.9 – the total of which can exceed unity.  Notice also the twin 
peaks having some degree of correlation with the double-dip in the Monte Carlo distribution plot.   
Interpreting this combination of beliefs of possible Inadequate Control Actions, we might infer that at 
the first closest approach in the “intrusion” case shown in Figure 7.8, and at the corresponding initial 
peak in the lower plot in Figure 7.9, the UAV is manoeuvring the wrong way (ICA02), coupled with a 
belief that it is attempting also to prematurely return to heading (ICA03), whilst employing an 
emergency behaviour that is “conflicted” – or unresolved (ICA07).  A moment later, at the second 
peak, additionally it is inferred that the necessary manoeuvring has now occurred rather late (ICA04), 
is less than required (ICA05), but is also excessive (ICA06) considering the need to maintain line of 
sight contact – noting that these two interpretations span a decision point. 
Later, this type of interpretation is employed in certain questionnaire cases, for the respondents to 
correctly identify interpretations.  Eventually, and following the responses in the questionnaire, in the 
final version representation of the relative beliefs using this stacked plot representation was 
abandoned in favour of a pie-chart representation, which provides single cuts across the respective 
beliefs at a particular point in time sequence and providing a better relative representation of the 
respective beliefs. 
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Figure 7.8 Typical vignette separation sensitivity distribution 
 
Figure 7.9 Typical vignette inference of deviation 
time [testResult] SAA Scenario 3NM Perceived Range Estimate Vignette [separation]
NB: for Level 3 Intent Spec., “Black-box Model Behaviour View”
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7.1.4. Intrusion, Threat & Perception Model (Threat & Flaw Insertion Models) 
Three fundamental and representative system defects have been incorporated into the model, 
including: errors in the perceived range estimation, variation of the warning time of threats, and 
variation of the latency in reacting to threats.  Sensor models, fields and depth of view, explicit 
aerodynamic behaviour, inertial properties and delays in controller and actuator mechanisms are all 
either ignored, assumed to be “perfect”, or otherwise considerably simplified.  Only dynamics 
essential for avoidance are represented.  Separations less than a minimum (35’) are deemed collisions. 
 
Figure 7.10 SAA Scenario Threat & Detection Defect Constraints 
To this end, constraints have been defined representing the dysfunction expressions arising with these 
defects.  In the case of the dysfunctional threat detection mechanism this is divided into two parts, as 
depicted in Figure 7.10.   One part considers the behavioural relationship and source of dysfunction in 
misperceptions of perceived range (PRE) and insufficient minimum warning time (MWT), giving rise 
to potential failure to recognise the nearness or imminence of a threat.  The other part considers the 
effect of perceived range estimation also in how the system might interpret possible systematic errors, 
in the miscalculation of the vector along which it is believed that the intruder is travelling.  Note also, 
that the nearness threat determination is dependent upon the NCT speed – which defines the time to 
the point of conflict, whilst the vector dysfunction is dependent upon the UAS speed – which defines 
the radius of the threat zone as shown in Figure 7.12.  These constraint definitions are implemented in 
bdd [constraint block] Threat & Detection Defect Constraints [Constraint definition]
parameters
N2PoC : NM
U2PoC : NM
NCTS : kts – Constant
PRE : h% – Defect Validation
MWT : s – Defect Validation
NT : Bool – Defect Validation
constraints
{IF 3600 * ABS(N2PoC) * PRE / NCTS < MWT
AND U2PoC > 0
THEN NT = 1
ELSE NT = 0}
«heuristic»
Defect : NearnessThreat
parameters
SB2N : deg
RB2PoC : deg
SWN : ft
N2PoC : NM
U2PoC : NM
UASS : kts – Constant
PRE : h% – Defect Validation
UDD : LV – Defect Validation
constraints
{Figure 6.26 - Misestimating Separation}
«heuristic»
Defect : UASDegreeOfDetectionOfThreat
NB: Distances towards the 
Point of Conflict (U2PoC) 
are positive in value: i.e. In 
front of the vehicle.
NB: LV = Linguistic 
Variable (0 .. 1);
h% = hundreds of percent
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the system model with equations (198), and equations (293), (204-9), (240), (244-51) and (218-9) – 
showing examples of only equations (198) and (293) in the following extract from the Vensim model 
simulation code: 
 
The relationship of the various component calculations that propagate this particular error state 
through the model are shown below and specifically the detail the logical flow of the Perceived Range 
Estimation (PRE) error from its origin to its consequence in shown in Figure 7.11. 
 
UAS degree of detection of threat from NCT
Latency in Perceiving Threat
plausible earlier speed error threat from NCT
(relative actual error to determining PoC)
(relative farther speed error determining earlier PoC)
relative nearer speed error determining earlier PoC
plausible farther speed error threat from NCT
relative actual error to determining PoC
relative farther speed error determining earlier PoC
relative farther speed error determining later PoC
plausible later speed error threat from NCT
(relative actual error to determining PoC)
(relative farther speed error determining later PoC)
(relative nearer speed error determining later PoC)
plausible nearer speed error threat from NCT
(relative actual error to determining PoC)
(relative nearer speed error determining earlier PoC)
relative nearer speed error determining later PoC
plausible scale error threat from NCT
(relative actual error to determining PoC)
relative scale error determining earlier PoC
relative scale error determining later PoC
plausible vector error threat from NCT
(relative actual error to determining PoC)
relative vector error determining earlier PoC
relative vector error determining later PoC
(198) nearness threat = IF THEN ELSE ((3600 * ABS (NCT distance to PoC) * Perceived Range 
Estimation / "Non-Coop Traffic Speed") < Minimum Warning Time :AND: UAS distance to PoC 
> 0, 1, 0) 
(293)    UAS degree of detection of threat from NCT =  DELAY FIXED ( 
MIN (  
     MAX ( 
IF THEN ELSE (plausible farther speed error threat from NCT <> :NA:,  
          plausible farther speed error threat from NCT, 
          IF THEN ELSE (plausible earlier speed error threat from NCT <> :NA:,  
   plausible earlier speed error threat from NCT, :NA:)), 
     IF THEN ELSE (plausible nearer speed error threat from NCT <> :NA:, 
          plausible nearer speed error threat from NCT, 
          IF THEN ELSE (plausible later speed error threat from NCT <> :NA:, 
   plausible later speed error threat from NCT, :NA:)) 
     ), 
     MIN (plausible scale error threat from NCT, plausible vector error threat from NCT) 
), Latency in Perceiving Threat, 0)  
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Figure 7.11 Cause – effect chain from Perceived Range Estimation to separation with NCT 
 
Figure 7.12 Misestimating Separation – an example 
The determination of the effect of misestimating separation, illustrated as three different types of 
plausible error behaviour in Figure 7.12, can be abstracted to these three cases: miscalculating the 
distance to the threat zone (“speed” error), skewing the perceived direction of travel (“vector” error), 
or applying an incorrectly scaled triangle of velocities (“scale” error).  Together this involves an 
extended series of conditional equations, as alluded to above (in the square roots), but stands as a 
generic worst case (Min-Max) solution encompassing these plausible error cases. 
Perceived Range Estimation
relative actual error to determining PoC
plausible ... error threat from NCT
UAS degree of detection of threat from NCT
emergency manoeuvre demanded
UAS collision avoidance RoT
UAS RoT, UAS rate of turn
UAS turned, UAS heading
UAS eastern speed, UAS northern speed
UAS easterly position, UAS northerly position
UAS lateral separation, UAS longitudinal separation
separation with NCT
Colour Key: Sense, decide and act behaviour abstraction, 
controller behaviour, physical behaviour
Bearing to Non 
Cooperative Traffic 
(NCT) = 27.29 °
Relative bearing to 
Point of Conflict 
(PoC) = 237.60 °
Collision threat zone 
radius = 0.5 NM.
At the point where these 
two “earlier” “speed” error 
vectors swap places, as they 
exit the threat zone with 
the sightline intersecting 
the zone, their solutions are 
then imaginary.
Location of the UAS 
vehicle at 4 seconds 
into the encounter 
– starting at 2 NM 
initial separation.
Actual location of the 
NCT at 4 seconds into 
the encounter.
These are the outer limits to be 
applied to the errors within which 
plausible detection will occur.  If 
the actual (given) error is outside 
of the range of any of these error 
limits then the detection of the 
threat from the NCT is deemed as 
unlikely to occur – with the likely 
consequence being that the UAS 
vehicle continues upon its present 
heading, or otherwise as dictated 
by the Rules of the Air.
1
.0
9
1
 N
M
Errorvector = D1 (1 ± Δ1)               Tan(φ)
D2 Sin(-θ) – Cos(-θ)     Tan(-θ)
Tan(φ)                      Tan(φ)
Tan(-θ)
+ 1
–
– 1
.
Errorscale = D1 (1 ± Δ1)
D2 Sin(-θ) + Cos(-θ)
Tan(φ)
– 1.
Errorspeed = D1 Cos(φ) ± √ Cos2(φ) +       (1 ± Δ2)  
2 – 1   – 1 .
S
D2
D1
( ( ) )
φ = Relative bearing to Point of Conflict
θ = Bearing to Non Cooperative Traffic
D1 = UAS distance to Point of Conflict
D2 = NCT distance to Point of Conflict
S = Separation with Non Cooperative Traffic
Δ1 = proportion of distance in conflict with NCT
Δ2 = proportion of distance in conflict with UAS
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7.1.5. Delay & Offset Direction Model (Flaw Insertion Models) 
 
Figure 7.13 SAA Scenario Emergency Behaviour Defect Constraints 
Delays and offsets are simpler, with the emergency behaviour defect constraint definitions in Figure 
7.13 – implemented with equations (073), and with equations (131-2) and (282):  
 
For all of the defects there are traceable chains of effect or in some cases multiple paths through the 
model arising with a defect.  Each of these paths might be traced and can help in the validation of the 
bdd [constraint block] Emergency Behaviour Defect Constraints [Constraint definition]
parameters
UDD : LV – Defect Verification
NT : Bool – Defect Verification
L : s – Defect Verification
EMD : Bool – Defect Verification
constraints
{IF DELAY(UDD, L) = 1
AND NT = 1
THEN EMD = 1
ELSE EMD = 0}
«heuristic»
Defect : EmergencyManoeuvreDemanded 
parameters
PB2N : deg
NA : Not Applicable
TOD : deg – Defect Verification
NFL : deg – Defect Verification
NFR : deg – Defect Verification
constraints
{IF PB2N <> NA
THEN NFL = NFR = PB2N - TOD
ELSE NFL = 90; NFR = -90}
«heuristic»
Defect : ThreatOffsetDirection
NB: LV = Linguistic 
Variable (0 .. 1)
(073) emergency manoeuvre demanded = IF THEN ELSE ((UAS degree of detection of threat  
from NCT = 1) :AND: (nearness threat = 1), 1, 0) 
(131) NCT from left = WITH LOOKUP ( IF THEN ELSE (perceived bearing to NCT <> :NA:, 
 perceived bearing to NCT - Threat Offset Direction, 90), ([(-375,0)-(375,1)], 
(-375,1), (-345,0), (-195,0), (-165,1), (-15,1), (15,0), (165,0), (195,1), (345,1), (375,0) )) 
(132) NCT from right = WITH LOOKUP ( IF THEN ELSE (perceived bearing to NCT <> :NA:, 
 perceived bearing to NCT - Threat Offset Direction, -90), ([(-375,0)-(375,1)], 
(-375,0), (-345,1), (-195,1), (-165,0), (-15,0), (15,1), (165,1), (195,0), (345,0), (375,1) )) 
(282) Threat Offset Direction = 47  Units: **undefined** [-90,90]  
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model.  Defects arise in dysfunction constraints defined within the sense, decide and act abstraction, 
as below. 
7.1. Safety Constraint Modelling 
As stated previously, Air Proximity (Airprox) exists as a framework within which to declare near-
misses between two aircraft, with biannually published compilations of reports providing adequate 
background information, guidance and other data [111].  Codifying the near-miss as an air proximity 
event will help to provide a recognised formal framework within which to couch safety constraint 
violation.  Another, additional or alternative measure of hazardous behaviour demonstrating a 
tendency to violate safety constraints may be found in a suitable measurement of emergent behaviour.  
Later it will be shown that a degree of correlation exists between safety constraint categorisation of 
near-miss behaviour and the observed emergent properties within a group of nearby or similar cases. 
7.1.1. Air Proximity Model (Constraint Violation Detection Models) 
The dysfunctions provided in the model can be considered as representations of the “did not see”, 
“inadequate avoiding action”, and “late sighting” cases in Table 7.1, from a UAS viewpoint. 
 
Table 7.1 Dominant Air Proximity Causal Factors [111] 
The design intent of the collision avoidance system is as likely to be judged as much on the 
possibilities of it giving rise to air proximity events, as it is for any speculative probabilistic collision 
rate.  Therefore the modelled safety constraint ought to relate appropriately to the likelihood of near-
misses, wherein various categories of causal factors and potential hazard might be defined – wherein 
"... An Airprox is a situation in which, in the opinion of a pilot or controller, the distance between 
aircraft as well as their relative positions and speed was such that the safety of the aircraft involved 
Cause Attributed to
Did not separate / poor judgement Controller
Climbed / descended through assigned level Pilot
Did not see conflicting traffic Pilot
Inadequate avoiding action / flew too close Pilot
Late sighting of conflicting traffic Pilot
Misinterpretation of ATC message Pilot
Not obeying orders / following advice from ATC Pilot
Penetration of CAS/SRZ/ATZ without clearance Pilot
Conflict in other type of airspace Other
FIR conflict Other
Sighting Report Other
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was or may have been compromised." [111].  Consequently, this is not only a question of measuring 
the separation distance, but other relative indicators from the perspective of each participant are also 
required.  Note also that this judgement is subjective and expressible as belief. 
 
Figure 7.14 SAA Scenario UAS Airprox Constraints 
Therefore, in addition to a separation function – itself producing an inverse square relationship with 
separation distance, incorporating misperceived distances, normalised around the minimum 
acceptable separation distance (500’) – four additional constraints also apply: 
 Alarmed – whenever the vehicle banks beyond 40 degrees and outside of a forward looking cone 
with an internal angle of 130 degrees.  In these conditions the vehicle loses sight of the other 
vehicle, and would be justifiably alarmed; 
 Panicked – the vehicle is forced to perform excessive manoeuvring, with a rate of turn greater 
than Rate Three (12 degrees per second); 
 Surprised – the other vehicle appears not to be applying the Rules of the Air, either by crossing 
ahead from left to right at a rate greater than a certain Transit Sensitivity value (x 65 degrees per 
second azimuth), or behind from right to left within half a second – how far from right to left is 
determined by the value of the Transit Sensitivity (from 140 degrees at minimum to 220 degrees 
at maximum); 
bdd [constraint block] Air Proximity Constraints [Constraint definition]
parameters
RoT : deg s
-1
PR2S : deg s
-1
PR2P : deg s
-1
P : Bool – Proximity Indicator
constraints
{IF RoT > PR2S
THEN P = 1
ELSE IF RoT < PR2P
THEN P = 1
ELSE P = 0}
«heuristic»
Violation : Panicked
parameters
OL : LV
OR : LV
HO : LV
TS : LV
wasOL : LV
wasOR : LV
wasHO : LV
S : Bool – Proximity Indicator
constraints
{IF ((wasOL - OL) > TS AND (HO - wasHO) > TS)
OR ((wasHO - HO) > TS AND (OR - wasOR) > TS)
OR (wasOR > TS AND OL > TS)
THEN S = 1
ELSE S = 0}
«heuristic»
Violation : Surprised
NB: Rates to port (R2P) are 
negative (anti-clockwise).
parameters
BA : deg 
RB2 : deg
A : Bool – Proximity Indicator
constraints
{IF ABS(BA) > 40
AND ABS(MODULO(RB2, 360)) > 65
THEN A = 1
ELSE A = 0}
«heuristic»
Violation : Alarmed
parameters
TC : Enum 
P : Bool
S : Bool
A : Bool
UT : Bool
constraints
{TC + P + S + A + UT}
«constraint»
Violation : Airprox
NB: LV = Linguistic 
Variable (0 .. 1)
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 Threatened – the vehicle is forced into behaviour other than the default interpretation of the Rules 
of the Air, with a turn to port greater than Rate Two (-6 degrees per second). 
Together these are combined (added) to generate an “Airprox” value, as described in the air proximity 
constraint definitions in Figure 7.14 – implemented in the system dynamics model with equations 
(287-8), (336), (365): 
 
And with equations (118-9), (163), and (191) for the NCT: 
 
(118) NCT Airprox = NCT Panicked + NCT Surprised + UAS Too Close + NCT Alarmed 
(119) NCT Alarmed = IF THEN ELSE ((ABS (NCT banked) > 40) 
:AND: ABS (MODULO (relative bearing to UAS, 360)) > 65, 1, 0) 
(163) NCT Panicked = IF THEN ELSE (NCT RoT > Panic Rate to Stbd, 1, 
IF THEN ELSE (NCT RoT < Panic Rate to Port, 1, 0)) 
(191) NCT Surprised = IF THEN ELSE ((((UAS was on left - UAS on left) 
> Transit Sensitivity) :AND: ((UAS head on - UAS was head on) > Transit Sensitivity))  
:OR: (((UAS was head on - UAS head on) > Transit Sensitivity) :AND: 
 ((UAS on right - UAS was on right) > Transit Sensitivity)) 
:OR: ((UAS was on right > Transit Sensitivity) :AND: 
(UAS on left > Transit Sensitivity)), 1, 0) 
(287) UAS Airprox = NCT Too Close + UAS Panicked + UAS Surprised + UAS Threatened + 
UAS Alarmed 
(288) UAS Alarmed = IF THEN ELSE ((ABS(UAS banked) > 40) 
:AND: ABS (MODULO (relative bearing to NCT, 360)) > 65, 1, 0) 
(336) UAS Panicked = IF THEN ELSE (UAS RoT > Panic Rate to Stbd, 1, 
IF THEN ELSE (UAS RoT < Panic Rate to Port, 1, 0)) 
(365) UAS Surprised = IF THEN ELSE ((((NCT was on left - NCT on left) 
> Transit Sensitivity) :AND: ((NCT head on - NCT was head on) > Transit Sensitivity)) 
:OR: (((NCT was head on - NCT head on) > Transit Sensitivity) :AND: 
 ((NCT on right - NCT was on right) > Transit Sensitivity)) 
:OR:  ((NCT was on right  > Transit Sensitivity) :AND: 
 (NCT on left > Transit Sensitivity)), 1, 0)  
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Figure 7.15 SAA Scenario UAS Threatened Constraints 
The UAS only threatened constraint definitions presented in Figure 7.15 are implemented in the 
system dynamics model with equations (366) and (193): 
 
Summations of the UAS and NCT proximity threat producing values above 6.5 are placed in Category 
A – defined in Table 7.2, values between 4.5 and 6.5 are placed in Category B, values between 2.5 
and 4.5 are placed in Category C, and values between 0.5 and 2.5 are placed in Category D – values 
less than this are categorised as None.  In the case of category D, whilst this may not be a strictly 
correct interpretation of the evidence, or lack of, it appears to work sensibly in practice within the 
model.  Together then a selection of these constraint violation indicators are also presented later 
within the Bayesian belief model. 
 
bdd [constraint block] UAS Threatened Constraints [Constraint definition]
parameters
UCARoT : deg s
-1
TRP : deg s
-1
NA : Not Applicable
UT : Bool – Proximity Indicator
constraints
{IF UCARoT < TRP
AND UCARoT <> NA
THEN UT = 1
ELSE UT = 0}
«heuristic»
Violation : UASThreatened
parameters
SWN : ft
PRE : h% – Defect Validation
CPA : ft – Safe Proximity Limit
NTC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
constraints
{IF SWN * PRE > 160
THEN NTC = SQUARE(CPA / (SWN * PRE))
ELSE NTC = 10}
«heuristic»
Violation : NCTTooClose
NB: Rates to port (RP) are 
negative (anti-clockwise).
NB: h% = units in 
hundreds of percent
(366) UAS Threatened = IF THEN ELSE (UAS collision avoidance RoT 
< Threatened Rate to Port :AND: UAS collision avoidance RoT <> :NA:, 1, 0) 
(193) NCT Too Close = IF THEN ELSE (separation with NCT * Perceived Range Estimation 
> 160, (Closest Point of Approach / 
(separation with NCT * Perceived Range Estimation)) ^ 2, 10) 
 Too Close – lack of safe separation, as judged according to the  perceived range estimate 
in the case of the UAS. 
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Table 7.2 Air Proximity (Airprox) Classifications [111] 
7.1.2. Emergent System Behaviour Sensitivity Modelling 
 
Figure 7.16 Generic Lyapunov State Monitoring Parametric Model 
An established measure of the emergent behaviour of a system is its Lyapunov Exponent [4, 61, 107] 
– equation 7.1. This is a measure of the rate of separation of initially nearby trajectories, which in this 
instance are the differences in headings due to the initial respective rates of turn. 
|   |  |   |   
                                                                                                                   7.1 
This measure provides a comparison between this initial movement of the system, and that observed 
at a later time T, such that if the modulus (absolute value) of the average the rate of change decreases 
over time then the system must be dissipative, otherwise divergent rates of change indicate that the 
system is potentially chaotic.  If the average of the rates of change remains constant then the system is 
conservative and stable.  Inspection of a family of Lyapunov exponents, generated by Monte Carlo 
Airprox Risk Interpretation Occurrence
Category A Risk of collision
an actual risk of 
collision existed
7 pa in UK on a 5 
year average
Category B Safety not assured
the safety of the 
aircraft was 
compromised
24 pa in UK on a 5 
year average
Category C No risk of collision
no risk of collision 
existed
56 pa in UK on a 5 
year average
Category D Risk not determined
insufficient 
information, 
inconclusive
2 pa in UK on a 5 
year average
par Generic Lyapunov State Monitoring Constraint
«block»
System Goal
«block»
Dynamic States
Lyapunov:MonteCarlo
DSP : s
-1
LE : val
Lyapunov ExponentLambda Tee
LT : val
allocatedTo
«message»
Deviation Parameter 
Lyapunov Exponents 
(Emergent Behaviour)
Verifies
«requirement»
Obtain Validation 
Results
Lyapunov Exponent
DSP : s
-1
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
113 
 
simulation, provides insight into the likelihood of a particular case being a member of a family with 
more or less emergent behaviour. 
The exponent λ is formulated as the averaged logarithm of the rates of change being measured, taking 
advantage of the “chain rule” for a chained series of derivative ratios, producing the exponent from 
the running average of the logarithms of the modulus of the ratios of successive rates of change – 
equations 7.2 and 7.3.  As λ is an exponent, then positive values are indicative of divergent behaviour 
and negative values are indicative of convergent behaviour, whilst values tending towards zero 
indicate stable oscillatory behaviour.  For the purposes of this study the Lyapunov exponents have 
been calculated for the change of heading δθ  of the UAV (equivalent to the UAV rate of turn with 
fixed time steps), and similarly δφ for the NCT. 
As the prior histories of these two values are unknown, and a need to scale the two initial exponent 
values to appropriately capture the respective influences of the UAV and NCT on the exponent, then 
an assumption is made that the first value will be used as the first ratio.  In this manner the often more 
aggressive initial manoeuvring of the UAV is allowed dominate, unless the NCT is the first to 
manoeuvre.  This appropriately scales the remainder of the Lyapunov calculation – formed by adding 
both UAV and NCT values together, and from which a maximum value is obtained – equation 7.4. 
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For the constraint definitions represented in Figure 7.16 and Figure 7.17, the Lyapunov exponent is 
formed in the system dynamics model with equations (115), (109), (328), (157), (360) and (187), 
implementing these constraints.  Note that as a short cut, derivatives with respect to heading are 
obtained directly from the respective rates of turn.  The relationship between heading and rate of turn 
is also directly associated with the parameter term “Manoeuvre”.  
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Figure 7.17 SAA Scenario Lyapunov State Monitoring Constraints 
 
For the visualisation of these exponents, directly accessing the exponent value prior to the division of 
the integral by Time (T) – or “Lambda Tee” (λT) – shows behaviour more clearly.  This viewpoint 
bdd [constraint block] Lyapunov State Monitoring Constraints [Constraint definition]
parameters
Time : s
LT : val – Lambda Tee
constraints
{LT / (Time + 1)}
«constraint»
MonteCarlo : LyapunovExponent 
parameters
URoTLyapunov : val – Lyapunov Time
NRoTLyapunov : val – Lyapunov Time
constraints
{URoTLyapunov + NRoTLyapunov}
«constraint»
MonteCarlo : LambdaTee
parameters
RoT : deg s
-1
PRoT : deg s
-1
PRoTLyapunov : val – Lyapunov Time
RoTLyapunov : val – Lyapunov Time
constraints
{IF RoT <> 0
AND PRoT <> 0
THEN RoTLyapunov = PRoTLyapunov + LN(ABS(RoT / PRoT))
ELSE IF RoT <> 0
THEN RoTLyapunov = PRoTLyapunov + LN(ABS(RoT))
ELSE RoTLyapunov = PRoTLyapunov}
«heuristic»
RateOfTurnLyapunov
(115) Lyapunov Exponent = (UAS Lyapunov + NCT Lyapunov) / (Time + 1) 
(109) Lambda Tee = UAS Lyapunov + NCT Lyapunov 
(328) UAS Lyapunov = UAS RoT Lyapunov 
(157) NCT Lyapunov = NCT RoT Lyapunov 
(360) UAS RoT Lyapunov = IF THEN ELSE (((UAS rate of turn <> 0) :AND: 
(UAS previous RoT <> 0)), 
(previous UAS RoT Lyapunov + LN (ABS (UAS rate of turn / UAS previous RoT))), 
IF THEN ELSE((UAS rate of turn <> 0), 
previous UAS RoT Lyapunov + LN (ABS (UAS rate of turn)), 
previous UAS RoT Lyapunov)) 
(187) NCT RoT Lyapunov =  IF THEN ELSE (((NCT rate of turn <> 0) :AND: 
(NCT previous RoT <> 0)), 
(previous NCT RoT Lyapunov  + LN (ABS (NCT rate of turn / NCT previous RoT))), 
IF THEN ELSE((NCT rate of turn <> 0), 
previous NCT RoT Lyapunov + LN (ABS (NCT rate of turn)), 
previous NCT RoT Lyapunov)) 
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facilitates easier observation of changes in the direction of the integral, which itself provides useful 
insight into the nature of the manoeuvring and with familiarity also allows interpretation of this 
behaviour directly from the calculation of the Lyapunov exponent.  For example upward inflections 
from negative values indicate increases in the rate of manoeuvre and often also indicate changes in the 
direction of the turn, as illustrated with the examples in Figure 7.18, both of which embody “S” 
shaped turns by the UAV, and clearly recognisable as occurring at around 12.5 seconds with the dip in 
the right-hand example; both of which capture a particular characteristic emergent behaviour with a 
manoeuvre not explicitly defined in the model. 
 
 
Figure 7.18 Example Lyapunov “Lambda Tee” plots with similar emergent behaviour (TC1 
and TC2) 
7.2. Summary of Purpose and Recapitulation 
To recap, the purpose in the definition and creation of this model is to satisfy the following broad 
requirements, and with the aim of refuting the null hypotheses and seeking evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis.  The next stage is to see to what extent these objectives have been achieved. 
02.23 Simulate different combinations of deviations; 
o 02.23.01 Model exemplar hazard HAZ010 for the VFR case, from the NIAG SG-134 
Hazard Scenarios; 
o 02.23.02 Define a simplified but believable and informative mid-air collision avoidance 
scenario with which to evaluate the hazard model. 
02.17 Evaluate hypothetical deviations from intent; 
02.20 Associate failure conditions with corresponding failure types; 
02.14 Combine flow based HAZOP and function based FHA. 
ATC view of Unmanned Autonomous System on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
UAS Track
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
NCT Track
ATC view of Unmanned Autonomous System on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
UAS Track
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
NCT Track
Test Case
50% 75% 95% 100%
Lambda Tee
20
10
0
-10
-20
0 6.25 12.5 18.75 25
Time (Second)
Test Case
50% 75% 95% 100%
Lambda Tee
20
10
0
-10
-20
0 6.25 12.5 18.75 25
Time (Second)
116 
 
Chapter 8. Belief and Model Validation 
“A plausible impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility.” 
 Aristotle 
8.1. Inference Modelling 
The overall modelling approach is constructed within the scope of two reactive models, a System 
Dynamics model and a Bayesian Inference model.  The remainder of the models are static descriptive 
models, mostly formulated in SysML some of which are meta-models, as for example with the.  The 
aim here is to validate plausibility of the reactive models, and thereby furnish measures of the 
satisfaction of requirements 02.23 and 02.17, as were drawn from the earlier textual and QFD 
analysis.  As the Bayesian model also serves a continuing purpose of providing internal validation and 
verification of the assumptions formed within the HAZOP process, how this is constructed should be 
dealt with first. 
 
Figure 8.1 Simple Example Flaw – Deviation Bayesian Belief Network 
Within the sequence of inference modelling activities, a Bayesian network describing the belief that 
flaws cause deviations is created; in a form as shown in the simplified example illustrated in Figure 
8.1.  So as to represent absence of certainty, three states are defined for each node – True, False and 
“Don’t Know”.  The initial bias is towards not knowing or not having very much certainty of belief – 
either True or False, but greater belief that the truth of this is largely unknown.  
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Let the Flaws (Fx) in this example, have three states “True” (FxT), “Don’t Know” (FxD) and “False” 
(FxF), as defined below.   
 (   )   (   )        (   )   (   )        (   )   (   )       
Also let us assume that in the case of Flaw B (FB), we are quite sure that in 98% of cases this flaw, 
when true, does directly causes the deviation D to be true also – as indicated in example case (b). 
 (  |   )        (  |    )       
 (  |   )        (  |    )       
Consequently as the deviation state, either as true or unknown, is solely dependent the state of Flaw 
B, we can directly calculate the probabilities of these states as the sums of the conditional 
probabilities below – with the result shown also in example case (a), above. 
 (  )   (  |   )   (   )   (  |   )   (   )   (  |   )   (   )         
 (  )   (  |   )   (   )   (  |   )   (   )   (  |   )   (   )         
 (  )       
From this we might now infer the likelihood of either Flaw A or B being a cause of deviation, 
whenever a deviation is observed as “True” – as is the illustrated in case (c) above, and as expressed 
overleaf.  As representations of belief, the outcome can be expressed thus: if it is known that 98% of 
cases of Flaw B cause the Deviation, but also with a possibility that the cause of the deviation might 
be with Flaw A, then the only evidence being a single observation of the (true) existence of the 
Deviation suggests that the likelihood that Flaw B is actually the cause may be equally true as "Don't 
Know" – as in the absence of any other evidence, Flaw B is just as likely to be present as Flaw A 
where the belief in Flaw A is mostly "Don't Know".  With the certainty of Flaw B as a known cause 
close to 100%, then this split of likelihoods from the point of view of B is close to 50:50, the 
remainder covering the possibility of the small number of known false cases in this situation. 
 (   |  )  
 (  |   )   (   )
 (  )
 
 (  )
 (  )
  (   )   (   )       
           (   |  )   (   )              (   |  )   (   )       
 (   |  )  
 (  |    )   (   )
 (  )
         
           (   |  )  
 (  |   )   (   )
 (  )
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           (   |  )  
 (  |   )   (   )
 (  )
           
Assuming that no evidence of the certainty of a deviation or otherwise is presented, such that the 
deviation adopts an uncertain “Don’t Know” state, then the likelihood that Flaw B exists is reduced by 
an order of magnitude as the evidence is counterfactual, the possibility that the state of Flaw B is 
unknown increases slightly, and the likelihood that it is false increases slightly also; as expressed 
below
5
 and shown in case (d), Figure 8.1.  Such counterfactual evidence also has an effect on the 
revised probabilistic belief update propagated through the Bayesian model during training using 
evidence derived from the Monte Carlo simulations applied to the System Dynamics model. 
 (   |  )  
 (  |   )   (   )
 (  )
           
           (   |  )  
 (  |   )   (   )
 (  )
         
           (   |  )  
 (  |   )   (   )
 (  )
          
With this method all of the nodes and relationships in the HAZOP Bayesian belief network are 
preconfigured with a 98% bias towards “Don’t Know”, and after training from data extracted through 
the Monte Carlo simulations, any still unobserved cases remain clearly represented as “Don’t Know”. 
8.1.1. HAZOP Inference Modelling 
The purpose of this is to provide a mechanism whereby belief as formulated with the HAZOP table 
can be updated with evidence obtained from a System Dynamics model.  Therefore this belief 
inference model may be used to validate the beliefs formed within the HAZOP process, assuming that 
we might also find another and independent means of validating the System Dynamics model. 
With this methodology in mind, the initial HAZOP as produced in Table 6.1, and as represented also 
in Figure A.1, is employed in the construction of a Bayesian belief network as shown in Figure 8.3.  
So as to tie the control flaw likelihood to measurable physical effects, additional causative 
assumptions may also be wired into the belief model; for example assuming a cause and effect model 
where a latency defect may be expected to produce particular flaws – in this case where the non-
cooperative traffic’s interpretation of the rules of the air does not allow sufficient time to respond 
(ICA05), or a delayed response causes the UAS to alter its decision failing to arbitrate correctly 
(IAC07), or simply the UAS just acts after too much delay (ICA04).   The flow of cause and effect is 
                                                     
5
 The sum of these probabilities ought to be unity, as can be seen here these truncated values produce a small 
apparent cumulative rounding error of 0.093%. 
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in the direction of the arrows; Figure 8.3.  However, the earlier version of the composition of HAZOP 
table and Bayesian Network, shown below in Figure 8.2 [32], reversed this CF – ICA relationship and 
was used to produce the inferences for the questionnaire, but this proved ultimately unsatisfactory. 
 
Figure 8.2 Original HAZOP for Control Flaw Diagnosis and Cause Inference [32] 
 
Figure 8.3 Later HAZOP Causal Relationships as a Bayesian Network 
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There may also be occasion to believe that a deviation associated with a particular guideword might 
also have a cascade effect, in that a particular deviation variant gives rise to a new flaw, and thereby 
cascades to realise other deviations – for example where excessive (MORE / ICA06) manoeuvring 
causes the UAS to lose sight of the other aircraft (LostNCT), potentially for the manoeuvre behaviour 
to further deviate with premature (EARLY / ICA03) disengagement of the avoidance behaviour; as in 
Figure 8.3.  Note that in this case the direction of the cause and effect arrow is from the specific 
deviation, and to the newly introduced flaw, and cascading back to further possible deviations. 
 
Figure 8.4 Generic Bayesian Network Parametric Model 
par Generic Bayesian Network Constraints
Defect 1:MonteCarlo
DVP : dim
BNDx : Bool BNDy: Bool
Defect 2:MonteCarlo
BNDP : Bool BNDA : Bool
DT : dim
BNDA : Bool
DVP : dim
Flaw 1:MonteCarlo
PI : Enum
CFT : Bool CFF : Bool
Flaw 2:MonteCarlo
CFT : Bool CFF : Bool
Flaw N:MonteCarlo
PI : Enum
CFT : Bool CFF : Bool
BNDP : BoolBNDA : Bool BNDP : Bool BNDA : Bool DSP : dimPI : Enum
Deviation 1:MonteCarlo
PI : EnumICAT : Bool ICAF : Bool
Deviation 2:MonteCarlo
PI : EnumICAT : Bool ICAF : Bool
CFT : Bool
BND : Bool
CFT1 : Bool CFT2 : Bool CFT3 : Bool
«block»
System Goal
«block»
Control Loop Sub-model 1
«block»
Control Loop Sub-model 2
 Defect Validation Parameter 1
 Defect Validation Parameter 2
Defect Threshold
Proximity Indicator
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
Defect 
Verification 
Parameters
Primary Proximity Indicator used to 
synchronise the capture of the flaw 
deviation relationships at the point 
of safety constraint violation.
Defect 
Threshold 
Parameters
BN Behaviour X
Deviation M:MonteCarlo
PI : EnumICAT : Bool ICAF : Bool
DSP : dimCFF : Bool
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As with previous aspects describing the constraints surrounding the System Dynamics model, the 
need to define a consistent interface between the data to be captured from this model, through Monte 
Carlo simulation, and the presentation of this revealed data to the Bayesian network model is also 
provided in a framework of constraints.  In its generic form (Figure 8.4) the Bayesian network 
interface model describes three sets of interconnected constraint blocks, representing Defect, Flaw 
and Deviation capture constraints respectively, in a parametric relationship to models within the 
System Goal model.  
Deviation capture constraints may be related to one or more Flaw capture constraints, and may also 
exhibit direct linkage to specific physical behaviours.  Flaw capture constraints may also be related to 
one or more Defect and Deviation capture constraints.  Defect capture constraints are used to validate 
defect and decision threshold parameters.  Flaws and Deviations are captured for training, evaluation 
and later inference, triggered by a valid proximity or other safety constraint violation – with this 
“Proximity Indicator” trigger synchronising these events as shown on the previous page in Figure 8.4. 
8.1.2. Defect, Flaw & Deviation Behaviour Capture – Monte Carlo Generated Cases 
 
Figure 8.5 Generic Defect Bayesian Capture Parametric Model 
As with the earlier defined Physical, Dysfunction, Safety Constraint Violation, and Emergent Property 
constraint models, the Test and Training case data capture interfaces can also be similarly described – 
par Generic Defects Bayesian Capture Constraints
«block»
System Goal
«block»
Dynamic Scenario Bayesian Outputs
Defect 1:MonteCarlo
BNDx : Bool BNDy : BoolBNDA : Bool
Defect 2:MonteCarlo
DVP  : dimBNDP : Bool BNDA : Bool
BN Defect 1 Absent
BN Defect 1 Type y
BN Defect 2 Present
BN Defect 2 Absent
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
DVP : dim
BN Defect 1 Type x
 Defect Validation Parameter 1
 Defect Validation Parameter N
Defect Threshold N
DT : dim DT : dim
allocatedTo
«message»
Scenario Vignette Nodes
Verifies
«requirement»
Identify Relevant 
Hazards
Defect Threshold 1
Scenario Vignette
Nodes
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defining the limits of behaviour of the system dynamics model to be captured through Monte Carlo 
simulations.  Again these models are defined both in adapted SysML Parametric diagrams, and also as 
individual Constraint blocks.  
In the case of the system Defect events, Figure 8.5, input values are derived from constants 
representing decision thresholds and tolerances driving the model behaviour, although the constraints 
themselves are associated with the dynamic scenario and the Bayesian interface model they do not 
take values from the internal dynamics of the model itself.  The Flaw event capture constraints 
respond to Defect events and observable physical behaviour, Figure 8.6.  Deviation event capture is 
constrained by Flaws, and occasionally also by certain physical behaviours, and by the broader model 
of safety constraint violation and detection, Figure 8.7.  Observable physical behaviour and Proximity 
violation events are also separately captured, Figure 8.8 and Figure 8.9.  All of these constraint 
models employ «heuristic» block models as each represents a decision as to whether to capture a 
particular event value or not – based either upon the violation of a system safety constraint, an 
exceedance event, or the occurrence of an out of tolerance value driving the model in that case. 
 
 
Figure 8.6 Generic Flaw Bayesian Capture Parametric Model 
par Generic Flaws Bayesian Capture Constraints
«block»
System Goal
«block»
Dynamic Scenario Bayesian Outputs
Flaw 1:MonteCarlo
BND : Bool
CFF : BoolCFT : Bool
Flaw N:MonteCarlo
DSP  : dim
CFT : Bool CFF : Bool
CFxx Nature 1 True
CFxx Nature 1 False
CFyy Nature N True
CFyy Nature N False
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
PI : Enum PI : Enum
allocatedTo
«message»
Control Flaw – 
Inadequate Control 
Action Node Structure
Verifies
«requirement»
Identify Control 
Flaws
Identified Control
Flaws
123 
 
 
Figure 8.7 Generic Deviation Bayesian Capture Parametric Model 
 
Figure 8.8 Generic Behaviour State Bayesian Capture Parametric Model 
par Generic Deviations Bayesian Capture Constraints
«block»
System Goal
«block»
Dynamic Scenario Bayesian Outputs
Deviation 1:MonteCarlo
DSP : dim
ICAF : BoolICAT : Bool
Deviation N:MonteCarlo
DSP  : dim
ICAT : Bool ICAF : Bool
ICAxx Guideword 1 True
ICAxx Guideword 1 False
ICAyy Guideword N True
ICAyy Guideword N False
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
PI : Enum PI : EnumCFT : Bool CFT : Bool
allocatedTo
«message»
Control Flaw – 
Inadequate Control 
Action Node Structure
Verifies
«requirement»
Incorporate 
Inadequate 
Control Actions
Inadequate Control
Actions
par Generic Behaviour State Bayesian Capture Constraints
«block»
System Goal
«block»
Dynamic Scenario Bayesian Outputs
Behaviour State 1:MonteCarlo
DSP : dim
BNBn : BoolBNB2 : Bool
Behaviour State N:MonteCarlo
DSP  : dim
BNB1 : Bool BNBn : Bool
BN Behaviour 1 S2
BN Behaviour 1 S1
BN Behaviour N S1
BN Behaviour N Sn
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
BN Behaviour 1 Sn
BNB1 : Bool
allocatedTo
«message»
Physical Behaviour & 
Initial State Nodes
Verifies
«requirement»
Identify Accident 
Scenario
Physical Behaviour
& Initial State Nodes
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Figure 8.9 Generic Proximity Bayesian Capture Parametric Model 
 
Figure 8.10 SAA Scenario Defect Capture Bayesian Data Constraints 
par Generic Proximity Bayesian Capture Constraints
«block»
System Goal
«block»
Dynamic Scenario Bayesian Outputs
Proximity Indicator 1:MonteCarlo
PI1 : Enum
BN1 : Bool BNN : BoolBN2 : Bool
Proximity Indicator 2:MonteCarlo
PI2  : Bool
BNT : Bool BNF : Bool
BN Proximity Indicator 1 Category 1
BN Proximity Indicator 1 Category 2
BN Proximity Indicator 1 Category N
BN Proximity Indicator 2 True
BN Proximity Indicator 2 False
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
allocatedTo
«message»
Constraint Violation 
Detection Nodes
Verifies
«requirement»
Determine Safety 
Constraints
Constraint Violation
Definitions
bdd [constraint block] Flaw Capture Bayesian Constraints [Constraint definition]
parameters
PRE : h% – Defect Validation
BNPF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNPN : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNPT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF PRE > 1.1
THEN BNPF = 1
ELSE BNPF = 0
IF PRE < 0.9
THEN BNPN = 1
ELSE BNPN = 0
IF BNPF + BNPN > 0
THEN BNPT = 0
ELSE BNPT = 1}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : PerceivedRangeEstimation
parameters
LPT : s – Defect Validation
AL : s – Defect Threshold
BNLA : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNLE : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF LPT <= AL
THEN BNLA = 1
ELSE BNLA = 0
BNLE = 1 - BNLA}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : Latency
parameters
US : kts – Constant
NS : kts – Constant
SD : kts – Defect Threshold
BNNA : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNNE : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF ABS(US - NS) < SD
THEN BNNA = 1
ELSE BNNA = 0
BNNE = 1 - BNNA}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : NCTSpeed
parameters
US : kts – Constant
NS : kts – Constant
SL : kts – Defect Threshold
BNSA : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNSE : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF US < SL AND NS < SL
THEN BNSA = 1
ELSE BNSA = 0
BNSE = 1 - BNSA}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : UASSpeed
parameters
MWT : s – Defect Validation
SWT : s – Defect Threshold
BNMS : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNMI : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF MWT >= SWT
THEN BNMS = 1
ELSE BNMS = 0
BNMI = 1 - BNMS}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : MinimumWarningTime
BNPF = Perceived Range Estimate Farther, BNPN = Perceived Range Estimate Nearer
BNPT = Perceived Range Estimate Tolerable
BNMS = Minimum Warning Time Sufficient, BNMI = Minimum Warning Time Insufficient
BNLA = Latency Acceptable, BNLE = Latency Excessive
BNSA = UAS Speed Acceptable, BNSE = UAS Speed Excessive
BNNA = Non-Cooperative Traffic Speed Acceptable
BNNE = Non-Cooperative Traffic Speed Excessive
PRE = Perceived Range Estimation
MWT = Minimum Warning Time
SWT = Sufficient Warning Time
LPT = Latency in Perceiving Threat
AL = Acceptable Latency
US = UAS Speed
NS = Non-cooperative Traffic Speed
SL = Speed Limit
SD = Speed Difference
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Each heuristic model usually returns two values – “True” and “False”, where each respectively takes a 
value of nought or one, and obviously for each value taken one output should complement the other.  
Whilst this approach appears to be redundant, this obvious disambiguation does help guarantee a 
consistent interface to the Bayesian model where nodes in general might embody an arbitrary number 
of states.  In the case of the system defect capture constraint definitions these are represented on the 
previous page in Figure 8.10, and are also implemented in the system dynamics model with equations 
(041-3), (024-5), (022-3), (048-9) and (028-9): 
 
 
However, of particular note in this case is the fact that these heuristic blocks define these output 
values slightly differently from the general cases as applied to the Flaw and Deviation capture models.  
Notably, one of the above blocks contains a tri-state output representing events that may occur above, 
below, and within a range of tolerance – for example: too far, too near, and tolerable.  Also, although 
the remainder of the above blocks do represent bi-state outputs these are more descriptively described 
as the defective behaviour being captured is not necessarily best described as logical values, True or 
False.  Taken together these five heuristic blocks describe the requirement to capture the three explicit 
defective design precursors, as related to the Bayesian nodes shown in Figure 8.10, along with the two 
implied speed related defect precursors which are related to observable physical behaviour nodes. 
 
(022) BN L Acceptable = 
IF THEN ELSE (Latency in Perceiving Threat <= Acceptable Latency, 1, 0) 
(023) BN L Excessive = 1 - BN L Acceptable 
(048) BN Speed Acceptable =  
IF THEN ELSE ((UAS Speed < Speed Limit) 
:AND: ("Non-Coop Traffic Speed" < Speed Limit), 1, 0) 
(049) BN Speed Excessive = 1 - BN Speed Acceptable 
(028) BN NCTS Acceptable =  
 IF THEN ELSE (ABS(UAS Speed - "Non-Coop Traffic Speed") < Speed Difference, 1, 0) 
(029) BN NCTS Excessive = 1 - BN NCTS Acceptable  
(041) BN PRE Farther = IF THEN ELSE (Perceived Range Estimation > 1.1, 1, 0) 
(042) BN PRE Nearer = IF THEN ELSE (Perceived Range Estimation < 0.9, 1, 0) 
(043) BN PRE Tolerable = IF THEN ELSE (BN PRE Farther + BN PRE Nearer > 0, 0, 1)  
(024) BN MWT Insufficient = 1 - BN MWT Sufficient 
(025) BN MWT Sufficient = 
IF THEN ELSE (Minimum Warning Time >= Sufficient Warning Time, 1, 0)  
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Figure 8.11 SAA Scenario Flaw Capture Bayesian Data Constraints 
Selected Control Flaws as defined in Chapter 6 are now added as event capture heuristics 
encompassing: CF04, “Estimation”; CF05, “UASRulesOfTheAir”; CF06, “NCTRulesOfTheAir”; 
CF07, “Rigidity”; CF08, “LostNCT”; CF10, “Delay”; and CF15, “Arbitration”, as detailed above in 
Figure 8.11.  Note that any behaviour indicating “Don’t Know” or unknown cases is not captured 
from the simulations as by definition it is not directly observable and only exists by implication.  It is 
for this reason that the untrained Bayesian network is preconfigured with a significant bias towards 
the unknown and uncertain – although not entirely naive; thereby the conditioning of the respective 
Bayesian nodes is later biased away from the uncertain model by the training data derived only from 
“known” correlated events and data, as observed within the Monte Carlo outputs taken from the 
model and as captured above. 
The flaw (CFxx) capture constraint definitions as represented in Figure 8.11 are implemented in the 
system dynamics model with equations (056-7), (062-3), (064-5), (058-9), (060-1), (054-5) and (066-
7), respectively: 
bdd [constraint block] Flaw Capture Bayesian Constraints [Constraint definition]
parameters
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
BNPT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNMI : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CFT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CFF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3 AND ((NOT BNPT) OR BNMI)
THEN CFT = 1
ELSE CFT = 0
CFF = 1 - CFT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : Estimation
parameters
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
BNSE : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CFT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CFF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3 AND BNSE
THEN CFT = 1
ELSE CFT = 0
CFF = 1 - CFT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : UASRulesOfTheAir
parameters
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
BNLE : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CFT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CFF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3 AND BNLE
THEN CFT = 1
ELSE CFT = 0
CFF = 1 - CFT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : Delay
parameters
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
BNMI : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNNE : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNSE : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CFT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CFF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3
AND (BNMI OR BNNE OR BNSE)
THEN CFT = 1
ELSE CFT = 0
CFF = 1 - CFT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : Rigidity
parameters
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
BNLE : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNNE : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNPT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNSE : Bool – Bayesian CaptureCFT : 
Bool – Bayesian Capture
CFF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3 AND (BNLE OR BNNE OR 
(NOT BNPT) OR BNSE)
THEN CFT = 1
ELSE CFT = 0
CFF = 1 - CFT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : Arbitration
parameters
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
BNMS : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNLA : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNNE : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CFT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CFF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3
AND BNMS AND BNLA AND BNNE
THEN CFT = 1
ELSE CFT = 0
CFF = 1 - CFT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : NCTRulesOfTheAir
parameters
UBA : deg
RB2N : deg
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
CFT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CFF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3 AND ABS(UBA) > 40
AND ABS(MODULO(RB2N, 360)) > 65
THEN CFT = 1
ELSE CFT = 0
CFF = 1 - CFT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : LostNCT
BNSE = UAS Speed Excessive
BNLE = Latency Excessive
BNMS = Minimum Warning Time Sufficient
BNLA = Latency Acceptable
BNNE = Non-Cooperative Traffic Speed Excessive
BNMI = Minimum Warning Time Insufficient
BNPT = Perceived Range Estimate Tolerable
UBA = UAS Bank Angle
RB2N = Relative Bearing to Non-
cooperative Traffic
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(056) CF05 UASRoTA False = 1 - CF05 UASRoTA True 
(057) CF05 UASRoTA True = IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) 
:AND: BN Speed Excessive, 1, 0) 
 CF05: The UAV assessment model shall incorporate a mechanism that fails to follow 
 established Rules of the Air. 
(062) CF08 LOSTNCT False = 1 - CF08 LOSTNCT True 
(063) CF08 LOSTNCT True = 
 IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) :AND: (ABS(UAS Bank Angle) > 40) 
:AND: (ABS (MODULO (relative bearing to NCT, 360)) > 65), 1, 0) 
 CF08: The UAV assessment model shall incorporate a mechanism that causes the loss of 
detection of the other aircraft when manoeuvring. 
(064) CF10 DELAY False = 1 - CF10 DELAY True 
(065) CF10 DELAY True = 
IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) :AND: BN L Excessive, 1, 0) 
 CF10: The UAV assessment model shall incorporate a mechanism that delays the 
commanding of a turning manoeuvre from the flight control system. 
(058) CF06 NCTRoTA False = 1 - CF06 NCTRoTA True 
(059) CF06 NCTRoTA True = IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) 
:AND: BN MWT Sufficient :AND: BN L Acceptable :AND: BN NCTS Excessive, 1, 0) 
 CF06: The UAV assessment model shall incorporate a mechanism whereby the other 
aircraft fails to follow established Rules of the Air. 
(060) CF07 RIGIDITY False = 1 - CF07 RIGIDITY True 
(061) CF07 RIGIDITY True = IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) :AND: 
(BN MWT Insufficient :OR: BN NCTS Excessive :OR: BN Speed Excessive), 1, 0) 
 CF07: The UAV assessment model shall incorporate a mechanism whereby the UAV 
interprets the Rules of the Air too rigidly when closing within 500ft of the other aircraft. 
(054) CF04 ESTIMATION False = 1 - CF04 ESTIMATION True 
(055) CF04 ESTIMATION True = IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) 
:AND: ((:NOT: BN PRE Tolerable) :OR: BN MWT Insufficient), 1, 0) 
 CF04: The UAV assessment model shall incorporate a mechanism that incorrectly 
 estimates the location and direction to the predicted point of conflict. 
(066) CF15 ARBITRATION False = 1 - CF15 ARBITRATION True 
(067) CF15 ARBITRATION True = IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) :AND: 
(BN L Excessive :OR: BN NCTS Excessive :OR: (:NOT: BN PRE Tolerable) 
:OR: BN Speed Excessive), 1, 0) 
 CF15: The UAV assessment model shall incorporate a mechanism whereby the UAV does 
not arbitrate the competing heading demands appropriately. 
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Figure 8.12 SAA Scenario Deviation Capture Bayesian Data Constraints 
Likewise the Inadequate Control Actions, otherwise known as Deviations, also as defined in Chapter 
6, are now added as event capture heuristics encompassing: ICA01 – Omission; ICA02 – 
Commission; ICA03 – Early; ICA04 – Late; ICA05 – Less; ICA06 – More; and ICA07 – Conflicting.  
As can be seen above, in Figure 8.12, these blocks also reference the corresponding Control Flaw 
capture parameters with which these deviation behaviours are to be associated.  Again, the “Don’t 
Know” state is implied in the absence of an event for any particular node, and as also stated earlier 
both these heuristics, and those for the Control Flaws in Figure 8.11, utilise an active proximity safety 
constraint violation indicator to trigger the capture of an event – otherwise at other times within the 
context of simulation the event relationships remain unknown. 
bdd [constraint block] Deviation Capture Bayesian Constraints [Constraint definition]
parameters
UM : deg s
-1
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
CF04 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3 AND UM < 3 AND CF04
THEN ICAT = 1
ELSE ICAT = 0
ICAF = 1 - ICAT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : Omission 
parameters
UM : deg s
-1
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
BNPA : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CF04 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CF05 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CF06 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CF07 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3 AND UM > 3 AND BNPA
AND (CF04 OR CF05 OR CF06 OR 
CF07)
THEN ICAT = 1
ELSE ICAT = 0
ICAF = 1 - ICAT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : Commission
parameters
UBA : deg
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
CF04 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CF05 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CF10 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3 AND ABS(UBA) <= 40
AND (CF04 OR CF05 OR CF10)
THEN ICAT = 1
ELSE ICAT = 0
ICAF = 1 - ICAT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : Less
parameters
UM : deg s
-1
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
CF04 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CF10 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3 AND UM < 3
AND (CF04 OR CF10)
THEN ICAT = 1
ELSE ICAT = 0
ICAF = 1 - ICAT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : Late 
parameters
UBA : deg
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
CF04 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CF05 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3 AND ABS(UBA) > 40
AND (CF04 OR CF05)
THEN ICAT = 1
ELSE ICAT = 0
ICAF = 1 - ICAT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : More
parameters
UR2H : LV
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
CF04 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
CF08 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3 AND UR2H > 0.04
AND (CF04 OR CF08)
THEN ICAT = 1
ELSE ICAT = 0
ICAF = 1 - ICAT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : Early
parameters
NTTA : Bool
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
CF15 : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ICAF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC >= 3 AND CF15 AND NTTA
THEN ICAT = 1
ELSE ICAT = 0
ICAF = 1 - ICAT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : Conflicting
UM = UAS Manoeuvred
UR2H = UAS Returning to Heading
UBA = UAS Bank Angle
BNPA = Perceived Bearing to Non-
cooperative Traffic Ahead
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The deviation (ICAxx) capture constraint definitions as represented in Figure 8.12 are implemented in 
the system dynamics model with equations (078-91): 
 
(078) ICA01 OMISSION False = 1 - ICA01 OMISSION True 
(079) ICA01 OMISSION True = IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) :AND: 
(UAS Manoeuvred < 3) :AND: CF04 ESTIMATION True, 1, 0) 
 ICA01: The assessment model for the UAS shall provide a means to produce a deviation 
in the manoeuvre behaviour whereby the UAV does not manoeuvre to avoid the other 
aircraft. 
(080) ICA02 COMMISION False = 1 - ICA02 COMMISION True 
(081) ICA02 COMMISION True = IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) :AND: 
(UAS Manoeuvred > 3) :AND: BN perceivedBearingToNCT Ahead :AND: 
(CF04 ESTIMATION True :OR: CF05 UASRoTA True :OR: CF06 NCTRoTA True :OR: 
CF07 RIGIDITY True), 1, 0) 
 ICA02: The assessment model for the UAS shall provide a means to produce a deviation 
in the manoeuvre behaviour whereby the UAV manoeuvres in the wrong direction 
attempting to avoid the the other aircraft. 
(082) ICA03 EARLY False = 1 - ICA03 EARLY True 
(083) ICA03 EARLY True = IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) :AND: 
(UAS returning to heading > 0.04) :AND: (CF04 ESTIMATION True :OR: 
CF08 LOSTNCT True), 1, 0) 
 ICA03: The assessment model for the UAS shall provide a means to produce a deviation 
in the manoeuvre behaviour whereby the UAV prematurely ceases a manoeuvre to avoid 
the other aircraft and returns to the given (initial) heading. 
(084) ICA04 LATE False = 1 - ICA04 LATE True 
(085) ICA04 LATE True = IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) :AND: 
(UAS Manoeuvred < 3) :AND: (CF04 ESTIMATION True :OR: CF10 DELAY True), 
1, 0) 
 ICA04: The assessment model for the UAS shall provide a means to produce a deviation 
in the manoeuvre behaviour whereby the UAV belatedly initiates a manoeuvre to avoid the 
other aircraft. 
(086) ICA05 LESS False = 1 - ICA05 LESS True 
(087) ICA05 LESS True = IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) :AND: 
(ABS (UAS Bank Angle) <= 40) :AND: (CF04 ESTIMATION True :OR: 
CF05 UASRoTA True :OR: CF10 DELAY True), 1, 0) 
 ICA05: The assessment model for the UAS shall provide a means to produce a deviation 
in the manoeuvre behaviour whereby the UAV rate of manoeuvre is insufficient to avoid 
the other aircraft.  
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8.1.3. System State and Violation Capture – Defining Monte Carlo Generated Cases 
 
Figure 8.13 Airprox constraint violation & system state association in the Bayesian Network 
For the purposes of this study it has been decided not to use a fully connected naïve Bayesian 
network, but rather structure the skeleton network around beliefs as expressed within a HAZOP study.  
However, particular physical relationships observed throughout a sequence of events might be used to 
contextualise the whole range of system flaws with implied, but unknown, casual relationships, as 
represented in Figure 8.13 above.  Therefore, the states of these five observable physical properties or 
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(088) ICA06 MORE False = 1 - ICA06 MORE True 
(089) ICA06 MORE True = IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) :AND: 
(ABS (UAS Bank Angle) > 40) :AND: (CF04 ESTIMATION True :OR: 
CF05 UASRoTA True), 1, 0) 
ICA06: The assessment model for the UAS shall provide a means to produce a deviation 
in the manoeuvre behaviour whereby the UAV rate of manoeuvre is excessive in 
attempting to avoid the other aircraft. 
(090) ICA07 CONFLICTING False = 1 - ICA07 CONFLICTING True 
(091) ICA07 CONFLICTING True = IF THEN ELSE ((Airprox Categories >= 3) :AND: 
CF15 ARBITRATION True :AND: NCT threat arises again, 1, 0) 
ICA07: The assessment model for the UAS shall provide a means to produce a deviation 
in the manoeuvre behaviour whereby the UAV is unable to resolve the conflict between 
realising the System Goal and avoiding the other aircraft. 
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behaviours are coupled directly to all of the identified flaws with initially unknown probabilities, and 
with an initially equally likely probability across each set of states. 
 
Figure 8.14 SAA Scenario Behaviour State Capture Bayesian Data Constraints 
For the purpose of behaviour capture, the constraining heuristics for three assumed possible physical 
precursors are set out in Figure 8.14, above – noting that the speed related events have already been 
captured as potential defects in Figure 8.10.  The system relative physical behaviour constraint 
definitions as represented above are implemented in the system dynamics model with equations (037-
40), (044-7) and (018-21), respectively: 
 
bdd [constraint block] Behaviour Capture State Bayesian Constraints [Constraint definition]
parameters
PB2N : deg
BNPL : Bool - Bayesian Capture
BNPA : Bool - Bayesian Capture
BNPR : Bool - Bayesian Capture
BNPB : Bool - Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF PB2N > -110 AND PB2N <= -32.5
THEN BNPL = 1
ELSE BNPL = 0
IF PB2N > -32.5 AND PB2N < 32.5
THEN BNPA = 1
ELSE BNPA = 0
IF PB2N < 110 AND PB2N >= 32.5
THEN BNPR = 1
ELSE BNPR = 0
IF PB2N <= -110 OR PB2N >= 110
THEN BNPB = 1
ELSE BNPB = 0}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : PerceivedBearingToNCT 
parameters
SWN : ft
BNSC : Bool - Bayesian Capture
BNSL : Bool - Bayesian Capture
BNSA : Bool - Bayesian Capture
BNSS : Bool - Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF SWN <= 35
THEN BNSC = 1
ELSE BNSC = 0
IF SWN <= 500 AND SWN > 35
THEN BNSL = 1
ELSE BNSL = 0
IF SWN <= 3038.05 AND SWN > 500
THEN BNSA = 1
ELSE BNSA = 0
IF SWN > 3038.05
THEN BNSS = 1
ELSE BNSS = 0}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : SeparationWithNCT
parameters
IRB : deg
BNL : Bool - Bayesian Capture
BNA : Bool - Bayesian Capture
BNR : Bool - Bayesian Capture
BNB : Bool - Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF IRB > -110 AND IRB <= -32.5
THEN BNL = 1
ELSE BNL = 0
IF IRB > -32.5 AND IRB < 32.5
THEN BNA = 1
ELSE BNA = 0
IF IRB < 110 AND IRB >= 32.5
THEN BNR = 1
ELSE BNR = 0
IF IRB <= -110 OR IRB >= 110
THEN BNB = 1
ELSE BNB = 0}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : IntialRelativeBearing
(037) BN perceivedBearingToNCT Ahead = IF THEN ELSE (perceived bearing to NCT > -32.5 
:AND: perceived bearing to NCT < 32.5, 1, 0) 
(038) BN perceivedBearingToNCT Behind =  IF THEN ELSE (perceived bearing to NCT <= 
-110 :OR: perceived bearing to NCT >= 110, 1, 0) 
(039) BN perceivedBearingToNCT Left =  IF THEN ELSE (perceived bearing to NCT > 
-110 :AND: perceived bearing to NCT <= -32.5, 1, 0) 
(040) BN perceivedBearingToNCT Right = IF THEN ELSE (perceived bearing to NCT < 110 
:AND: perceived bearing to NCT >= 32.5, 1, 0) 
(044) BN Separation AvoidanceZone = IF THEN ELSE (separation with NCT <= 3038.05 
:AND: separation with NCT > 500, 1, 0) 
(045) BN Separation Collision = IF THEN ELSE (separation with NCT <= 35, 1, 0) 
(046) BN Separation LessThanCPA =  IF THEN ELSE (separation with NCT <= 500 :AND: 
separation with NCT > 35, 1, 0) 
(047) BN Separation SeparationZone = IF THEN ELSE (separation with NCT > 3038.05, 1, 0) 
 6076.11 feet per nautical mile.  
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Figure 8.15 SAA Scenario Proximity Capture Bayesian Data Constraints 
With the majority of the assumed flow of cause and effect directed from top to bottom in the diagrams 
shown so far as representing the Bayesian network model, this now leads us to the final assumed 
effects – the safety constraint violation.  As stated previously, the form of the safety constraint is 
chosen to reflect the nature of near-miss cases arising with system misbehaviour.  In this example, in 
addition to the prime event categorising the severity of the near-miss event, only four out of the seven 
available “subjective” events are also included separately in the Bayesian network.  A more thorough 
bdd [constraint block] Air Proximity Capture Bayesian Constraints [Constraint definition]
parameters
AC : Enum – Proximity Indicator
ACA : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ACB : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ACC : Bool – Bayesian Capture
ACD : Bool – Bayesian Capture
AN : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF AC = 0
THEN AN = 1
ELSE AN = 0
IF AC = 1
THEN ACD = 1
ELSE ACD = 0
IF AC = 2
THEN ACC = 1
ELSE ACC = 0
IF AC = 3
THEN ACB = 1
ELSE ACB = 0
IF AC = 4
THEN ACA = 1
ELSE ACA = 0}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : AirproxCategories 
parameters
US : Bool – Proximity Indicator
BNT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{BNT = US
BNF = 1 - BNT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : UASSurprised
parameters
UT : Bool– Proximity Indicator
BNT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{BNT = UT
BNF = 1 - BNT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : UASThreatened
parameters
NS : Bool – Proximity Indicator
BNT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{BNT = NS
BNF = 1 - BNT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : NCTSurprised 
parameters
NP : Bool – Proximity Indicator
BNT : Bool – Bayesian Capture
BNF : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{BNT = NP
BNF = 1 - BNT}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : NCTPanicked
parameters
NTC : (4µ) ft
-1
 – Proximity Indicator
NCA : Bool – Bayesian Capture
NCB : Bool – Bayesian Capture
NCC : Bool – Bayesian Capture
NCD : Bool – Bayesian Capture
NN : Bool – Bayesian Capture
constraints
{IF NTC <= 0.5
THEN NN = 1
ELSE NN = 0
IF NTC > 0.5 AND NTC <= 2.5
THEN NCD = 1
ELSE NCD = 0
IF NTC > 2.5 AND NTC <= 4.5
THEN NCC = 1
ELSE NCC = 0
IF NTC > 4.5 AND NTC <= 6.5
THEN NCB = 1
ELSE NCB = 0
IF NTC > 6.5
THEN NCA = 1
ELSE NCA = 0}
«heuristic»
MonteCarlo : NCTTooCLose
To obtain the true separation, multiply 
NTC by 4µ, invert and then take the 
square root, with the result expressed in 
Feet; the estimation of NTC is 
implemented as an Inverse Square Law 
with respect to the Closest Point of 
Approach permitted (500 ft).
(018) BN InitialBearing Ahead = IF THEN ELSE (initial relative bearing > -32.5 :AND: 
initial relative bearing < 32.5, 1, 0) 
(019) BN InitialBearing Behind = IF THEN ELSE (initial relative bearing <= -110 :OR: 
initial relative bearing >= 110, 1, 0) 
(020) BN InitialBearing Left = IF THEN ELSE (initial relative bearing > -110 :AND: 
initial relative bearing <= -32.5, 1, 0) 
(021) BN InitialBearing Right = IF THEN ELSE (initial relative bearing < 110 :AND: 
initial relative bearing >= 32.5, 1, 0) 
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investigation might include all seven.  The “Too Close” heuristic is actually a categorisation of 
separation distance through the violation event sequence.  These air proximity categorisation and 
capture constraint definitions, as represented in Figure 8.15, are implemented in the system dynamics 
model with equations (013-7), (050-1), (032-6), (030-1), (052-3) and (026-7), respectively: 
 
  
(013) BN Airprox CatA = IF THEN ELSE (Airprox Categories = 4, 1, 0) 
A - Risk of collision: an actual risk of collision existed. 
(014) BN Airprox CatB = IF THEN ELSE (Airprox Categories = 3, 1, 0) 
 B - Safety not assured: the safety of the aircraft was compromised. 
(015) BN Airprox CatC = IF THEN ELSE (Airprox Categories = 2, 1, 0) 
 C - No risk of collision: no risk of collision existed. 
(016) BN Airprox CatD = IF THEN ELSE (Airprox Categories = 1, 1, 0) 
 D - Risk not determined: insufficient information was available to determine the risk 
involved, or inconclusive or conflicting evidence precluded such determination. 
(017) BN Airprox None = IF THEN ELSE (Airprox Categories = 0, 1, 0) 
(050) BN UASSurprised False = 1 - BN UASSurprised True 
(051) BN UASSurprised True = UAS Surprised 
(032) BN NCTTooClose CatA = IF THEN ELSE (NCT Too Close > 6.5, 1, 0) 
(033) BN NCTTooClose CatB = 
 IF THEN ELSE( (NCT Too Close > 4.5) :AND: (NCT Too Close <= 6.5), 1, 0) 
(034) BN NCTTooClose CatC = 
 IF THEN ELSE ((NCT Too Close > 2.5) :AND: (NCT Too Close <= 4.5), 1, 0) 
(035) BN NCTTooClose CatD = 
 IF THEN ELSE ((NCT Too Close > 0.5) :AND: ( NCT Too Close <= 2.5), 1, 0) 
(036) BN NCTTooClose None = IF THEN ELSE (NCT Too Close <= 0.5, 1, 0) 
(030) BN NCTSurprised False = 1 - BN NCTSurprised True 
(031) BN NCTSurprised True = NCT Surprised 
(052) BN UASThreatened False = 1 - BN UASThreatened True 
(053) BN UASThreatened True = UAS Threatened 
(026) BN NCTPanicked False = 1 - BN NCTPanicked True 
(027) BN NCTPanicked True = NCT Panicked  
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8.2. Model Test Case Discussion 
In the construction, and simulation, of a suitably representative system dynamics model, and in the 
subsequent reduction of the inherent complexity in the output(s) using Bayesian methods and simple 
measures of complexity such as a Lyapunov exponent, the analysed results may be simplified and 
incorporated as an enhancement to the initial HAZOP.  Within the sequence of activities updating 
behaviour belief with evidence derived from the system dynamics by carefully selecting a number of 
representative vignettes, a set of test cases can be identified providing data on specific critical 
outcomes that ought to be explicitly developed in the HAZOP encompassing complex and emergent 
behaviour.  With this information a hazard scheme is finally introduced denoting measures of hazard, 
risk, and expectation of emergent behaviour, diagnostic utility, and overall event likelihood, as 
calculated by equation 8.1: 
               (   )                                                                        8.1 
Where H represents the final hazard value, CatA the relative rate of category A airprox events, CPA 
the rate of events observed at the closest classified point of approach.  R represents the risk, with M 
being the total number of test cases, E the rank within the test cases of the emergent behaviour, D 
represents the rank of the diagnostic consistency measure, and finally L represents the relative 
likelihood. 
8.2.1. Validation Test Cases and Hazardous Outcomes 
 
Figure 8.16 Hazard Modelling – separation as constraint violation [31] 
With the system dynamics modelling undertaken earlier within the project, at that point employing a 
more naïve and un-damped model of the system dynamics,  it was readily apparent that initial 
conditions with respect to direction of approach produced clear discontinuities in system behaviour, as 
indicated in Figure 8.16 [31].  Where the modelling of the overall effect upon the separation hazard 
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produced a violation of the safety constraint, complex behaviour was often exhibited and could be 
seen as a means of obtaining insight into model and the system dynamics.  For example from earlier 
versions of the 0.5 NM scenario, these exhibit five distinct dynamic behaviours dependent upon the 
initial relative heading: those approaching from within sector (A) often demonstrate a degree of 
entrainment (when both vehicles are at or near to the same speed); approach from direction (B) 
largely demonstrates direct and compliant avoidance; (C) demonstrates compliant avoidance with 
reduced separation; (D) demonstrates significant loss of safe separation (with insufficient space for an 
avoidance turn to the right); and finally (E) demonstrates suppression of the default interpretation of 
the Rules of the Air, with the substitution instead of the back-up emergency avoidance manoeuvre. 
Consequently, in taking account of these effects, these influenced both the form of the Bayesian 
Belief Network in part, and the selection and partitioning of the test cases.  Thereby, a comprehensive 
set of test cases are defined both for training and illustration purposes, Figure 8.17 below. 
 
Figure 8.17 Hazard Test Case Assignment by Direction of Approach 
Following a preliminary investigation of the behaviour of the model, twelve test cases were selected 
as itemised above, and as detailed in Table A.1 in Appendix A.  Encompassing these 5+ sets of test 
cases, each vignette was selected as an appropriate example of a particular sequence of events, within 
which the hazard is realised as a violated constraint.  Each was drawn from different sets of 200 
Monte Carlo simulation runs; wherein the maximum and minimum values indicated in Table A.1 
denote the range over which values were randomly selected within a uniform distribution at the start 
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of each simulation run (and where the darker sectors shown in Figure 8.17 graphically approximately 
represent the variations for initial heading and the principal vignettes). 
Additionally, two of the test cases are also decomposed into interesting subsidiary events.  Test Case 
12 includes an event immediately prior to collision as well as the event at the point of collision, whilst 
Test Case 2 also includes a precursor event occurring some seconds earlier, triggering a category “B” 
(“surprised” and “panicked”) air proximity event, as well as the entry and exit events within the 
subsequent near-miss.  Forty-five datasets have been generated using the final behavioural model 
representing a continuous distribution from all directions of approach and permitted speed ranges, 
wherein the range estimation error and latency are varied.  In addition to these datasets there are also 
six datasets representing special cases using an earlier variant of the model (from which cases for the 
questionnaire were selected), plus a further thirteen datasets more thoroughly exploring the “give-way 
to traffic from the right” behaviour, derived from the final variant of the system dynamics behavioural 
model.  In order to select a few representative cases with which to evaluate the Bayesian inference 
concept for internal self-consistency, all cases generating category “A” Airprox events are counted, as 
detailed in Table A.2, Appendix A.  Beyond this, all of the datasets have been used to train the 
Bayesian network, providing 201,600 training cases in 12,600 sixteen second sample windows. 
8.2.2. Hazard Context 
The notable difference between the initial STPA – based HAZOP and the enhanced HAZOP is the 
recognition that the context varies considerably according to the direction of approach, or interaction, 
which might be inferred directly from an interpretation of the rules of the air.  However, the splitting 
of the “behind” cases into “left” and “right” sub-cases is more due to convenience when defining the 
upper and lower bounds upon initial headings in the Monte Carlo cases, as this approach sector passes 
through 360° / 0° threshold. 
8.2.3. System Flaws and Deviations 
As the originally assigned relationships between flaws and deviations (inadequate control actions) 
formulated in the initial STPA – based HAZOP were a matter of conjecture, the realised constraint 
violations observed in the model, along with the simultaneously observed flaw and deviation events, 
allows these conjectured relationships to be confirmed, or not.  Combining the inferred flaws with the 
observed flaws for a particular combination of observed deviations facilitates an arrangement of these 
observed flaws into a primary flaw and a series of possible secondary flaws for this combination of 
deviations within the specific special condition.  
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8.2.4. Diagnosed Defects and Data Post Processing 
 
Figure 8.18 Vignette defective design precursor belief association in the Bayesian Network 
Diagnostic nodes were also added to the inference model so as to define a representation of inference 
for forms of misbehaviour associated with the six sub-system models identified in the STPA process; 
State Information, Rules of the Air Model, Non-Cooperative Traffic, Emergency Manoeuvre, Sensor 
Field of View, and Heading Subsumption.  Although not strictly necessary for the inference of flaw 
causes leading to deviation effects, these were constructed with hand-coded belief tables and adopted 
the same approach with regard to unknown states, although these nodes were not subsequently 
presented with training data.  So far this diagnostic approach has shown only limited success.  Having 
created a description of the HAZOP as a network of belief, the requirement then is to describe a 
constrained interface model linking the System Dynamics model and Bayesian forms, Figure 8.18.   
The measure of the diagnostic consistency evident in each test case starts with a calculation of a 
diagnostic belief threshold heuristic b for each sub-system.  These sub-systems may be diagnosed as 
being fine (ok) or flawed (fl), based upon the Bayesian inference yielding the probability p of the sub-
system being fine, flawed or unknown (uk), as returned in the “black-box” test results for each test 
case – equations 8.2: 
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From this a measure of consistency c in each test case, across S sub-systems, is calculated – equations 
8.4, where equations 8.3 yield the numbers of sub-systems fine (OK), flawed and unknown: 
    ∑     
 
        ∑     
 
                                                                 8.3 
Estimation
other True
UAS RoTA
other True
NCT RoTA
other True
Rigidity
other True
Lost NCT
other True
Delay
other True
Arbitration
other True
Rules of the Air Model
Flawed
Fine
Unknown
0.41
91.7
7.89
Non-cooperative Traffic
Flawed
Fine
Unknown
0.37
90.2
9.38
Emergency Manoeuvre
Flawed
Fine
Unknown
0.37
89.4
10.2
Sensor Field of View
Flawed
Fine
Unknown
0.16
87.1
12.7
Heading Subsumption
Flawed
Fine
Unknown
0.63
87.2
12.2
State Information 
Flawed
Fine
Unknown
0.62
85.7
13.7
Late Manoeuvre Engagem...
other True
Early Manoeuvre Disenga...
other True
Insufficient Manoeuvre
other True
Excessive Manoeuvre
other True
Wrong Manoeuvre
other True
No Manoeuvre
other True
Conflicted Manoeuvre
other True
Perceived Range Estimation Vignette
Farther
Tolerable
Nearer
31.6
47.2
21.2
Minimum Warning Time Vignette
Insufficient
Sufficient
3.17
96.8
Latency Vignette
Excessive
Acceptable
43.3
56.7
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This consistency measure is then used to calculate a diagnostic index i – equation 8.5 – and utility u 
for each test case, across M test cases – equation 8.6.  K is an arbitrary scale coefficient: 
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In applying the adapted STPA process, six sub-system models were identified (State Information, 
Rules of the Air Model, Non-Cooperative Traffic, Emergency Manoeuvre, Sensor Field of View, and 
Heading Subsumption), to which a variety of “Control Flaws” and “Inadequate Control Actions” 
(deviations) were assigned, and explicitly associated within the Bayesian network.  The diagnostic 
utility value arising with each test case indicates (by rank) the best, the worst and middling of these in 
their ability to consistently (rather than necessarily accurately) diagnose potentially faulty sub-system 
models.  From this evaluation the higher speed directly ahead test cases (7 & 8) appear to yield little 
useful diagnostic information, ranking 10th and 12th out of 12 for the high speed (TC7) and speed 
difference (TC8) vignettes respectively.  This is most likely a consequence of the speed related states 
in the Bayesian network being formulated as weak discriminators of faults in being associated with all 
control flaws, and hence treated (equally) as potential parents of all flaws, rather than the more 
discriminatory parent-child relationships defined in the other more specific defect causes (estimation, 
latency and warning time).  This poor discrimination might be viewed as an argument against a naïve 
Bayesian approach in that little appears to have been added through the learning process from cases.  
Conversely, it might be argued that the learning process has revealed a stronger association with the 
“rigidity” flaw than first conceived, and that this deserves further consideration to determine whether 
or not this is merely an incidental artefact.  This finding begs the question as to whether the “rigidity” 
flaw has been assigned to the most appropriate sub-system, or whether the consequence of a “rigidity” 
flaw might be that the deviation in manoeuvre response is more likely to be “less” rather that “wrong” 
in these circumstances.  In any event this particular diagnostic case appears to be poorly formulated. 
8.2.5. Inferred Airprox Events 
The constraints violated are taken, and adapted, from the definitions of air proximity categories and 
the “closest point of approach” required to “stay well clear” at 500 feet.  However, even at or beyond 
500 feet, if the observed behaviour of either vehicle is such as to appear to violate the rules of the air, 
from the other vehicle’s perspective, or incur an excessive response, or (visual) contact with the other 
is lost, then each of these events may escalate the violation category – taken here as the air proximity 
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category.  As each test case has already been selected on the basis that it contains either a category A 
or B violation, then what remains to be determined is how likely would the particular combination of 
deviations present in the test case at the point of violation be categorised as being either one or the 
other – clearly the category A events embody the higher risk of actual collision. 
The process to obtain the relative air proximity category rates takes the row from the Bayesian 
probability table for “Airprox”, contained within the trained Bayesian model, having input states 
matching the particular combination of deviations observed as active in the particular test case: 
 
The rows of the above table contain the distribution of probability across the five Airprox categories 
(including “None”), which in this case ought to be split mostly between A and B categories, with only 
small residual values for the remaining categories.  The combination of ICA=True detailed in the 
second row down of the table above is seen in both Test Case TC1, at the closest point of approach, 
and in Test Case TC2 at entry, both representing “Excessive Non-Cooperative Traffic Speed” hazard 
cases – redefined as a DIFFERENT manoeuvring airspeed deviation in the Enhanced HAZOP.  TC1 
is an “Ahead” vignette and TC2 a “Right” vignettes – Figure 8.17   Additionally, the same 
combination of events is also seen in sample runs (not specific test cases) S161 at collision, and S85 at 
collision, each drawn from the same respective vignette data sets – see also Figure A.30.  
 
 
From the above table, an inference made from the Bayesian probability tables after training, we can 
see that a CONFLICTING manoeuvre deviation, simultaneous with a DIFFERENT airspeed 
deviation, likely due to an “arbitration” flaw in both the ahead and right approach conditions, appears 
to be particular likely to produce a category A violation – and also likely to be subject to a collision 
Airprox
OMISSION COMMISION EARLY LATE LESS MORE CONFLICTING
None CatD CatC CatB CatA ICA01 ICA02 ICA03 ICA04 ICA05 ICA06 ICA07
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE
0% 0% 0% 13% 87% FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE
0% 0% 0% 14% 86% FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE
0% 0% 0% 15% 85% TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE
0% 0% 0% 18% 82% FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE
0% 0% 0% 18% 82% FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE
0% 0% 0% 19% 81% TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE
0% 0% 0% 22% 78% FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE
ICA07_CONFLICTING
ARBITRATION
TRUE DontKnow FALSE CF15
48% 0% 52% TRUE ← Cat A Airprox (2nd)
1% 98% 1% DontKnow
0% 0% 100% FALSE
< 196 ft
CF15_ARBITRATION Cat A Airprox (2nd)
TRUE DontKnow FALSE BN_PRE BN_L BN_NCTS BN_Speed BN_perc...T BN_Separation BN_Init...
1% 98% 1% Farther Excessive Excessive Excessive Left Collision Left
...abridged - table too large
25% 0% 75% Farther Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Behind LessThanCPA Right
...abridged - table too large
100% 0% 0% Tolerable Acceptable Acceptable Excessive Behind Collision Ahead ? ICA07_CONFLICTING
...abridged - table too large
0% 0% 100% Tolerable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Behind AvoidanceZone Right
?
NCT Too Close
?
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from behind.  This last observation might also suggest that the NCT “pilot” behaviour could be just 
too dumb as expressed in the model, and therefore something to be investigated further.   
In the next lower category A case, a LESS and CONFLICTING manoeuvre deviation combined with 
a LOW airspeed deviation, likely due to “arbitration” and “estimation” flaws in the right condition, 
also produces a similar outcome – see also Figure A.30, Test Case TC6, and also the third row down 
in the earlier Airprox Bayesian probability table.  It is appropriate therefore to classify both sets of 
these conditions and precursors as likely to produce the most hazardous behaviour. 
Similarly, the probability distributions for “NTC Too Close”, “UAS Surprised”, “UAS Threatened”, 
“NCT Surprised” and “NCT Panicked” are obtained in a similar manner from their respective 
probability tables within the trained Bayesian model. 
8.2.6. Inferred Flaws and Deviations Post Processing 
As with the determination of the diagnostic behaviour for each test case, the calculation updating the 
belief that the flaws identified in the initial HAZOP remain true, or whether indeed these ought to be 
replaced, is undertaken using another belief heuristic b, for both flaws f and deviations d – equations 
8.7 and 8.8.  Again these revised belief values are derived from the Bayesian inference returning the 
probabilities p that a flaw f or deviation d is present, set against the probabilities that the response 
from the Bayesian model is “don’t know” (pdkf and pdkd).  This revised belief is then factored by the 
enabling event e for the given flaw or deviation; where the term ef takes the value “1” where the 
system dynamics model reveals the actual existence of the flaw, zero otherwise – likewise with ed in 
the case of deviations. 
     (      )                                                                                                              8.7 
     (      )              ∑                                                                       8.8 
These revised beliefs are used subsequently to reorder the appearance of the control flaw information 
within the final enhanced HAZOP table.  The flaw having the now the highest belief value is 
classified as the “primary” flaw, with the remainder of flaws having non-zero belief values being 
classified as “secondary” flaws, and these can be assembled in descending order of belief.  In some 
cases (TC 8, 7 & 3 for example) the belief heuristic may be close in value and some judgement may 
be applied to this reordering, or perhaps the control flaw definitions themselves ought to be revisited. 
This process therefore matches the evidence that flaws and deviations as defined in the system 
dynamics model match those as originally identified in the initial HAZOP and thence embodied 
within the structure of the Bayesian Network.  From the detailed results (Appendix A) we can see that 
the “estimation” flaw (CF04) remains reasonably well matched with the deviations as originally 
associated, with the exception of the deviation EARLY; where this appears now more likely to be a 
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consequence of the “arbitration” flaw.  However, the “estimation” flaw – deviation relationships now 
also varies as a consequence of the additional airspeed deviations.  Conversely, the “rigidity” flaw 
(CF07) now appears associated with many more deviations other than COMMISSION, as originally 
determined, and is now the dominant flaw where the airspeeds are either high or significantly 
different.  The “latency” flaw (CF10) now rarely appears (in these test cases) apart from deviations of 
LESS from the left, and MORE from the right; the first appearing not to be turning sufficiently when 
threatened whilst having the right of way, the second in turning hard and late when required to give 
way, both embodying threat response delays in the range of 4 to 5 seconds – recognised as flaw CF10. 
8.2.7. Avoidance and Emergent Behaviour 
Whilst the individual trajectories of the respective entities clearly reveal apparent hazards in their 
behaviours these nevertheless represent only single cases drawn from the larger sets of 200 training 
cases arising with each Monte Carlo vignette group.  As the intention is to capture the tendency 
towards emergent behaviour in a quantifiable manner, and then present this in a succinct form within 
the updated HAZOP process, then a more general measure is required than observations made on the 
occasional interesting trajectory.  
For this it was decided that an established measure of emergent behaviour would be employed, 
wherein the Lyapunov Exponent should suffice, as defined previously in Figure 7.17. 
However certain peculiarities ought to be noted.  Inspecting the “Lambda Tee – λT” distribution plots 
in Figure 8.19, indicates that where the NCT is the first to manoeuvre then the value is initially 
negative, whereas where the UAV manoeuvres first or more aggressively, then the initial value is 
usually positive, but in either case both stabilise within a “bottle-neck” within a couple of seconds 
(within approximately the first 8 - 16 samples) – which occurs well before the main sequence of the 
interaction.  Notice also that for Test Case TC6 the majority of the trajectories return positive 
exponent values at 25 seconds from the start of the encounter, as revealed in the corresponding 
histogram cross section shown in Figure 8.20, indicating that the encounter is not yet over – as the 
NCT has taken extreme avoiding action and has yet to resume its original heading, Figure 8.21. 
In general, for this model, the manoeuvres of the UAV are often initially performed at rates greater 
than that of the NCT.  Negative dips, or spikes, in the λT distribution plots reveal where significant 
reversals of direction occur, whilst smoothly rising trajectories indicate a progressively increasing rate 
of manoeuvre, typically peaking where the two successfully avoid one-another – then to continue to 
settle back towards their original headings as the Lyapunov trajectories continue to fall.  This 
behaviour is most clearly seen in three test cases (TC8, 7 & 3 – see Figure A.31, uppermost three 
cases) representing conflicts from directly ahead with each vehicle quickly passing the other with 
minimum deflection – and not colliding. 
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Figure 8.19 Lyapunov Exponent Distributions from 0 to 25 seconds for Test Case 6 (TC6) 
 
Figure 8.20 The Corresponding Lyapunov Exponent Distribution Histogram at 25 seconds 
time [testResult] SAA Scenario Perceived Range Estimate Vignette [Lyapunov λT]
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Figure 8.21 Hazard Test Case 6 (TC6) 
 
 
Figure 8.22 Hazard Test Case 1 (TC1) 
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Figure 8.23 Hazard Test Case 2 (TC2) 
Of more interest, if it is accepted that “emergence” can be defined in the saliency of a persistent 
similarity of patterns arising with the interaction of simple underlying rules [54], test cases TC1 and 
TC2 exhibit a degree of emergence caught in the Monte Carlo system dynamics modelling process.  
Comparing the pie-charts in Figure 8.22 and Figure 8.23, it can be seen that at 7 and 10 seconds 
respectively both reveal a similar distribution of separation hazard and air proximity violation, and 
similar distribution of flaws – with the exception that in the case of TC1 the UAS is also likely to lose 
track (along lines of sight) of the Non-Cooperative Traffic (NCT).  It can also be seen that in the case 
of TC2 at 11 seconds that the UAS exhibits a COMMISSION deviation, in that it momentarily turns 
towards the NCT as it passes behind it.  Both cases demonstrate a distinct similarity of behaviour but 
with differences based upon the context (principally the relative bearings starting the encounters). 
Together test cases TC1, TC2 and TC6 stand as counter examples that may be used to falsify any 
assumptions made about the safety of this dynamical system, where that assumption is based solely 
upon a straight forward application of the Rules of the Air.  More generally correlations between the 
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initial relative heading, the distribution of Lyapunov Exponents, and Airprox are revealed in Figure 
8.24 and Figure 8.25, and these are investigated in detail with regression analysis in Appendix A.  
 
Figure 8.24 Lyapunov Scatter Plots with respect to Initial Relative Heading 
 
Figure 8.25 Airprox Scatter Plots with respect to Initial Relative Heading 
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8.2.8. Black Box v White Box Internal Consistency 
 
 Figure 8.26 Validate Goal System Behaviour Belief Sequence Diagram 
The method by which the diagnostic consistency measure (section 8.2.4) and the final inferred 
relationship between flaws and deviations (section 8.2.6) are extracted from the Bayesian model is 
through a series of tests to determine the belief model internal self-consistency – sequentially 
described in Figure 8.26.  Initially we assume that an observed combination of physical and constraint 
violation states might accurately, or even uniquely, infer corresponding flaw–deviation combinations.  
 
Figure 8.27 Black-box versus White-box inference 
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This is the black box model that assumes that we know nothing about the mechanisms internal to the 
system linking flaws to deviations.  The second part is to apply only the observed and captured flaw – 
deviation state combinations derived from the test cases.  This is the white box model that assumes 
that we have complete faith in the flaw – deviation relationship, whatever the mechanism within the 
system that connects the two, to be revealed in external behaviour.  The comparison of the two reveals 
varying degrees of consistency and residual uncertainty within the inference model from which to 
judge the quality (i.e. uniqueness, but not necessarily accuracy of interpretation) of diagnosis and 
belief in the flaw – deviation relationships; subsequently used to update the HAZOP study model. 
8.2.9. Worst and Improbable Case Example 
 
Table 8.1 Observed Inadequate Control Actions for a Unique Airprox Event 
Upon a detailed inspection of the Bayesian probability tables a unique event is revealed whereby only 
one combination of deviations, or inadequate control actions, gives rise to a single category A air 
proximity event and appears in no other category event – identified in Table 8.1 above, and in the first 
row of the earlier Airprox Bayesian probability table.  On the occasion of this event, deviation states 
representing OMISSION, LATE and MORE occur simultaneously.  By applying these three “True” 
ICA01_OMISSION
ESTIMATION
TRUE DontKnow FALSE CF04
13% 0% 87% TRUE ← Cat A Airprox (1st)
1% 98% 1% DontKnow
0% 0% 100% FALSE
ICA04_LATE
ESTIMATION DELAY
TRUE DontKnow FALSE CF04 CF10
19% 0% 81% TRUE TRUE ← Cat A Airprox (1st)
1% 98% 1% TRUE DontKnow
11% 0% 89% TRUE FALSE ← Cat A Airprox (1st)
1% 98% 1% DontKnow TRUE
1% 98% 1% DontKnow DontKnow
1% 98% 1% DontKnow FALSE
1% 0% 99% FALSE TRUE
1% 98% 1% FALSE DontKnow
0% 0% 100% FALSE FALSE
ICA06_MORE
ESTIMATION UASRoTA
TRUE DontKnow FALSE CF04 CF05
38% 0% 61% TRUE TRUE ← Cat A Airprox (1st)
1% 98% 1% TRUE DontKnow
42% 0% 58% TRUE FALSE ← Cat A Airprox (1st)
1% 98% 1% DontKnow TRUE
1% 98% 1% DontKnow DontKnow
1% 98% 1% DontKnow FALSE
62% 0% 38% FALSE TRUE ← Cat A Airprox (1st)
1% 98% 1% FALSE DontKnow
0% 0% 100% FALSE FALSE
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states, along with the remainder of the equivalent “False” states, and from the closest inferred 
approximation to the observed control flaws it can be discovered that this event most probably 
occurred with an initial encounter arriving from behind, and passing the UAV most closely by on the 
left, and clearly within the limit of the CPA.  This combination can be identified in the inference 
results within the Bayesian Network shown in Figure 8.29 – in this the shaded (grey) nodes represent 
the above assumed observations entered as findings with the inferences remaining on the flaws, 
confirming a likely strong failure in ESTIMATION (and also in RIGIDTY), along with degraded 
UASRoTA behaviour and some likely DELAY. 
Within the limited selection of test cases, the nearest equivalent available cases are found in TC9 and 
TC10, Figure 8.28, although neither of these test cases represents the speed combination inferred in 
the unique example, where in the unique case both vehicles would appear to have been travelling with 
excessive speed (circa 250 kts).  In these two potential alternative counter-examples each has the UAS 
being overtaken, and then “taken by surprise” so then to attempt to suddenly “give way” to the traffic 
on the right – likely due to an over simplified interpretation of the perspective on the NCT as seen 
from the UAS (not representing the relative velocity as inferring a particular intent on the part of the 
NCT).  Of itself this is of little importance in the current model.  However, what it does reveal is that 
rare but plausible behaviours may be discovered in a methodology combining system dynamics 
modelling, Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis and Bayesian reasoning, and so provides a tool to further 
explore rare near-miss cases which may serve as counter-examples to the safety assumptions – and 
hence falsify a particular safety hypotheses in support of a HAZOP study. 
 
Figure 8.28 Hazard Test Cases 9 and 10 (TC9, TC10) 
ATC view of Unmanned Autonomous System on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
UAS Track
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
NCT Track
ATC view of Unmanned Autonomous System on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
UAS Track
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
NCT Track
Test Case
50% 75% 95% 100%
Lambda Tee
4
-2
-8
-14
-20
0 6.25 12.5 18.75 25
Time (Second)
Test Case
50% 75% 95% 100%
Lambda Tee
20
10
0
-10
-20
0 6.25 12.5 18.75 25
Time (Second)
149 
 
  
Figure 8.29 Inferred States at the Unique Airprox Event 
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8.3. Final Outcomes – Informing HAZOP 
8.3.1. Diagnostic Example – Threat-Offset Direction 
As a consequence of observations and investigations using the system dynamics model, additional and 
modified safety constraints and design decisions may also arise with improved understanding of 
system behaviour and diagnosable causes.  For example, in test cases TC1 and TC2 where the UAV 
reveals an “S” shaped manoeuvre, and in briefly turning towards the other aircraft, passing 
immediately in front or behind at 8 and 11 seconds respectively, as the UAV changes direction both 
CONFLICTED and COMISSION deviations are flagged (Figure 8.22, Figure 8.23).  Simultaneously 
to this the Bayesian model reveals that, “NCT RoTA”, “Rigidity” and “Arbitration” control flaws are 
likely to be flagged, with the “Rigidity” control flaw (CF07) dominating as the most or very likely; 
and also immediately prior to the near-miss the “Lost NCT” control flaw (CF08) significantly appears 
too.  Interrogating the diagnostic Bayesian nodes, presented earlier in Figure 8.18, the “Emergency 
Manoeuvre”, “Heading Subsumption”, and “Non-cooperative Traffic” sub-system models emerge as 
the most probable causes of this defective behaviour.  The “Rigidity” system control flaw occurs 
where the UAS appears to interpret the Rules of the Air too rigidly when closing within 500ft and is 
associated with test-cases involving approaches at significantly different airspeeds from ahead and to 
the right of the centre-line.  An alleviation of this form of rigidity on the part of the UAS suggests an 
additional design decision (DD15) altering the direction to the perceived threat so as be offset by +47° 
(to the right) to allow for the other aircraft if passing from right to left ahead of the UAV.  This 
decision varies the decision-threshold angular offset value from straight-ahead, and the point where 
the back-up emergency manoeuvre invokes a specific direction for the emergency turn.   Comparing 
the diagnoses for test-case TC1 (below left) and TC2 (below right), it can be seen that the revised 
diagnoses does appear to reduce the likelihood that the “Heading Subsumption” model is at fault, but 
at the same time the  “Emergency Manoeuvre” would appear now to be more likely to be at fault.   
 
This is unsurprising as the action performed by the emergency manoeuvre direction decision threshold 
is on the boundary between emergency manoeuvring and subsuming other behaviours, and hence the 
arbitration of other manoeuvres.  In both cases the real culprit is the Non-cooperative Traffic which is 
24.82%
34.35%
30.29%
0.01%
0.25% 10.29%
Emergency Manoeuvre
Heading Subsumption
Non-cooperative Traffic
Rules of the Air Model
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State Information 
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travelling too fast for the encounter.  It can be argued that this example reveals a potential to diagnose 
design defects with the application of an appropriate model and an integrated diagnostic methodology. 
8.3.2. Enhanced HAZOP 
 
Table 8.2 Enhanced HAZOP Table 
In the enhanced HAZOP, as shown above in Table 8.2, four additional features have been 
incorporated, arising with the analysis of observed behaviour captured from the system dynamics and 
as incorporated into the Bayesian model: 
1) The key hazard event is now decomposed also by a Special Condition – in this case describing 
each of the five approach sectors; 
2) An additional deviation parameter has been identified – Airspeed, with guidewords LOW, HIGH 
and DIFFERENT; 
Validation
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3) Deviations and Flaws have been rationalised to cover only the more plausible and dangerous 
cases; 
4) A traffic-light scheme has been introduced to denote measures of hazard, risk, expectation of 
emergent behaviour, diagnostic utility, and overall event likelihood – but in this example only for 
cases arising with misestimating range and delays in enacting the emergency backup behaviour. 
A more detailed view of each of the separate sections of the Enhanced HAZOP can be found in 
Appendix A – Figure A.2 to Figure A.7, inclusive. 
With this traffic-light scheme, green stands for a best or better measure, yellow for medium, red for 
significantly degraded, and any black “traffic-light” indicates the worst behaviour or outcome for the 
particular measure, as expressed by equation 8.9 below: 
               (   )                                                                      8.9 
In this expression, H represents the final hazard value, CatA the relative rate of category A Airprox 
events, and CPA the rate of events observed at the closest classified point of approach.  R represents 
the risk, with M being the total number of test cases, and E expresses the rank within the test cases of 
the emergent behaviour – with the most emergent test cases awarded the lower ranks, as depicted later 
in Figure 10.5.  Finally, parameter D represents the rank of the diagnostic consistency measure, and L 
represents the relative likelihood.  Whilst this is the final form in which the HAZOP is to be presented 
the utility and efficacy of this has not yet been assessed with potential users.  
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8.4. Recapitulation of Requirements 
Although the requirements for this project are relatively broadly defined, derived as they are from the 
earlier literature review, the purpose of the validation process is to confirm system requirements.  
Therefore in the context of the project system modelling requirements we might consider to what 
extent these have been satisfied in the evidence presented so far.   
02.23 Simulate different combinations of deviations – with the revision of the initial HAZOP, as 
previously described, the addition of “Airspeed” as a deviation parameter with new 
guidewords LOW, HIGH and DIFFERENT demonstrate that at least pair-wise 
combinations are feasible.  Furthermore, in the sequence of events observed through any 
particular vignette it is clear that more than one guideword might also apply at any time.  
The Bayesian representation accommodates this.  An increase in the dimensionality of the 
hazard assessment would suggest a further requirement to adopt a methodology such as an 
experimental Parameter Design method to guide the selection of parameters in multiple 
parameter investigations; 
02.23.01 Model exemplar hazard HAZ010 for the VFR case, from the NIAG SG-134 
Hazard Scenarios – a VFR scenario implies that both vehicles are responsible 
for their own separation, as is the case in the system dynamics model; 
02.23.02 Define a simplified but believable and informative mid-air collision avoidance 
scenario with which to evaluate the hazard model – consequently whilst the 
VFR case presents the more challenging Sense and Avoid hazard scenario in 
practice, the design of the simulation is actually greatly simplified in having no 
need to necessarily represent involvement with Air Traffic Management.  The 
response from the questionnaire suggests that the consensus opinion considers 
the two situations where the UAV changes direction at the last moment are 
believable, caused by either misestimating the separation distance or misjudging 
the intercept point due differences in speed. 
02.17 Evaluate hypothetical deviations from intent – avoidance design intent with respect to 
arbitration is principally embodied within the Subsumption model, with this also featuring 
in the diagnostic example.  This demonstrates that conventional deviations such as 
OMISSION, COMISSION, LESS, etc. can be applied to manoeuvring, but also abstract 
hypothetical deviations with guidewords such as ARBITRATION might be evaluated too. 
02.20 Associate failure conditions with corresponding failure types – relationships between 
system control flaws and deviations are updated in the Bayesian representation of the 
HAZOP with data derived from Monte Carlo simulations of the system dynamics model; 
02.14 Combine flow based HAZOP and function based FHA – addressed in part.  
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Part 3. Questionnaire, Results & 
Conclusions 
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Chapter 9. Questionnaire 
“I love deadlines. I like the whooshing sound they make as they fly by.” 
 Douglas Adams, "The Salmon of Doubt" 
 
9.1. Questionnaire design 
It is generally recognised that the validation of a hazard analysis is difficult to accomplish objectively 
in the absence of meaningful hazard statistics.  Consequently, the hazard modelling method is to be 
validated, at least in part, by drawing upon the knowledge and experience of a group of subject matter 
specialists.  Within the sequence of activities to validate the system dynamics model, by executing the 
dynamical and inference models within a series of hazardous vignettes certain subtleties were 
identified and embodied as multiple-choice questions for the specialists. 
General hypothesis – risk events within complex adaptive systems are often caused by deviations 
from design or operating intentions and unanticipated non-linear causal interactions among system 
elements that violate safety constraints, and that these interactions cannot be adequately intuitively 
assessed without an appropriate representation of likely system dynamics.  Also to specifically refute 
that measures and representations of system dynamics do not enhance nor advance the understanding 
of complex safety related interactions in the beliefs and processes employed in a Hazard and 
Operability study as applied to a complex system – i.e. a system likely to exhibit some degree of 
complex and emergent behaviour. 
In order to determine where exactly an exemplar model might reveal either deviations from intentions 
or unanticipated interactions, and whether this is perceived to be true might be evaluated with respect 
to the expertise of domain experts capable of judging the relevant hazard.  An attempt to confirm, 
validate, or falsify (reject), at least a part of the above hypothesis has been carried out.  The responses 
to a questionnaire describing a series of modelled interactions are recorded and analysed. The 
respondents have acted in effect as a virtual HAZOP team and judge the advice of the model.  
Through this we effectively obtain a judgement on at least the first step towards the combination of 
STAMP and HAZOP. This questionnaire has been developed to assess to what extent dynamic 
behaviour for a given system might be intuitively grasped by specialists drawn from the field.  With 
the outline system description given it is not the intention that the respondent necessarily attempts to 
mentally emulate the model so much as to employ whatever experience, engineering judgement, and 
even “gut-feeling”, as they might if considering the manoeuvre “deviations” described therein as 
though a member of a HAZOP team – the description serves as a guide only to intended behaviour.  It 
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was suggested that respondents should allow from one to a maximum of two hours for the reading and 
completion of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was anonymous.  However, respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their 
experience (no experience, less than a year of effective experience, one or more but less than five 
years of effective experience, five or more but less than twenty years of effective experience, more 
than twenty years of experience) in fields related to this study: 
 Operator, piloting, air crew and / or air traffic; 
 System safety engineering; 
 Robotics or autonomous systems engineering; 
 Applying HAZOP to hazard identification; 
 System simulation and / or modelling; 
 System diagnostics. 
This was to help cross-reference, correlate and benchmark the responses to the multiple-choice 
questions.   
Each respondent was also asked to select exactly four terms or expressions that might best qualify 
their approach and perspective regarding the assessment of system safety, with this information to be 
used to aid the development of further requirements and help adjust perspectives: 
Component Failure Mode; Functional Failure Mode; Mission Phase Analysis; Classified Severity of 
Effect; Probabilistic Occurrence Rates; Release and Flow of Energy; System Operating State; Causal 
Propagation; Parameter Deviations; Human Reliability Error; Captured Expertise; Captured Socio-
technical Behaviour; Captured Complex System Dynamics; Adaptation and Migration of Behaviour; 
Active Exploration; Safety Constraint Violation. 
The main body of the questionnaire comprises eleven multiple choice questions contained within four 
sub-sections.  These questions were designed to explore what is, or is not, intuitive in an 
understanding of the one-on-one collision avoidance scenario, based upon the simplified system 
model as previously described.  Each question is based on a situation with four plausible outcomes, of 
which only one is completely correct according to the model and its observed behaviour.  The aim 
was to determine how close the respondents’ specialist assessment of the situation is to matching the 
model.  So as to provide wider scope in this assessment hedging with the selection of multiple options 
was allowed wherever it was believed that the true answer lay in more than one choice.  Clearly, 
selecting all four options for a question reveals nothing, this being identical to having selected none at 
all.  The measure of inter-rater agreement, Cohen’s Kappa [20], is calculated on the choice of options 
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on a per question basis – generating a pair of agreement values for each question with respect to both 
the “correct” model based option and an option identified from the consensus. 
In the discussion below, options which are correct with respect to the design intent or the model 
behaviour are outlined with a box, and additional commentary is provided beneath each figure.  
Figures may relate to more than one question – as described in the commentary.  The aggregate 
analysis and overall results are presented in section 9.2, below.  The wording of the actual questions is 
contained in Appendix B. 
9.2. Questionnaire results 
9.2.1. General Situation Awareness 
The first group of multiple-choice questions endeavour to determine whether each respondent 
correctly understands the fundamental nature of the interaction as implied by the stated rules of the air 
within CAP 393 [15].  These were mostly contained within two categories of interactions; a set of 
interactions caused by the explicit introduction of defects, and another set of interactions with hazards 
apparently implicit in the speed, or the difference in speeds, of the two vehicles – Figure 9.1.  
 
Figure 9.1 Behaviours – interpretation of interactions & intuition [32, 33] 
The “defects” set contained interactions arising with the NCT initially appearing from the right, and 
perhaps not too surprisingly the “speed” hazard set all start with interactions with NCT appearing 
from straight ahead.  At the stage were the questionnaire was created the system dynamics modelling 
employed a somewhat naïve and un-damped model of the system dynamics in relation to the rate at 
which a turn would be initiated, essentially demanding an instantaneous change in bank angle.  This 
had the effect of producing abrupt manoeuvres that effectively pre-empted the initial direction of turn. 
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With the basic situations depicted in Figure 9.2, fourteen of the eighteen respondents correctly 
identify option (a) as the situation where the greatest hazard is most likely to occur.  This is 
commented upon and properly understood by Respondent 6 (R6) as being the case where Rule 10 is 
invoked with the vehicles approaching head-on, and hence where both vehicles are then obliged to 
give way by altering course to the right in order to pass with the other on the left.  R8 also correctly 
observes that this further implies that dependent upon how far to the right each is to the other at the 
start of the encounter; a turn to the right may turn each into the direct path of the other.  The 
opportunity to avoid each other in this case is limited by the achievable rate of turn, closing velocity 
and initial separation distance – and thence quality of judgement. 
 
Figure 9.2 General situation awareness - general hazardous region at 0.5 NM (Q1) 
Therefore for the first question and without applying anything other than a mental model of the 
situation, the majority of respondents correctly perceive the relevant hazard scenario.  With a 
subsequent narrowing of the respondents to a smaller consensual virtual focus group of 8 people, this 
smaller group is unanimous in their agreement for this question and there is general consensus around 
all the questions.  Helpfully this smaller group might be taken to be a better indicator of the measure 
of understanding and agreement in relation to the subsequent questions – in effect reinforcing the 
identity of the more expert respondents against which any benchmark might be set.  Therefore the 
views of both the larger cohort of 18 respondents and the narrower consensus of 8 respondents are 
compared across this review of responses. 
The next two questions and responses, as depicted in Figure 9.3, relate to narrower versions of the 
general case presented in the first question.  Option (a) in Figure 9.3 is representative of where there is 
no specific internal defect; rather it is more likely to result in a systemic failure with greater approach 
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
agreement in 14 : 4 split
Consensus agrees 
also in 14 : 4 split
Unanimous in the 
narrowed consensus 
virtual focus group
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speeds – assuming initial separation and manoeuvrability are constants. The correct answer 
encompasses both rules 9 and 10 of the rules of the air (Figure 6.6), where the UAV is obliged to give 
way or adjust course, and hence encompassing potential failures due both to systemic and specific 
internal defects.  For option (a) in Q2 only respondent R6 dissented from the (more expert) consensus 
focus group, although the consensus within the wider group of 18 respondents was 11 in favour of (a), 
versus 7 against.  Again, generally those within the core of the consensus, and arguably therefore with 
greater convergence of expertise, readily identify the off-set head-on hazard – in the absence of 
specific defects, with speed not treated as a defect. 
 
Figure 9.3 General situation awareness - narrower hazards with and without defects (Q2 & 
Q3) 
Option (b) in Q3 represents the case where a variety of internal defects might occur in such that the 
UAV attempts to interpret Rule 9 but then fails part-way in not correctly invoking the emergency 
behaviour, but having now turned inappropriately toward the incursion.  This situation is not so 
readily perceived with only 7 out of 18 in partial agreement.  In fact 14 out of the 18 prefer option (a) 
seeing the situation in Q3 the same as in Q2.  However, R12 correctly observes that in all options 
other than (b) the other aircraft should manoeuvre, such that only in case (b) does a failure in the 
UAV make a collision more likely – but such deduction arises only with this lone observation.  The 
more typical view is expressed by R14 that in a failure case the behaviour is not predictable and 
therefore conflict in any forward segment could be hazardous.  What appears not to be generally 
appreciated in the distinction between the speed related and emergency response failure cases is the 
nature of the interaction of the two rule-based behaviours of the UAV.  The rules of the air and the 
emergency manoeuvre behaviours may be in conflict, a threat may be deferred or misperceived and 
that this is likely to be a greater hazard where an avoidance manoeuvre under a single rigid 
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Speed related failures
agreement in 11 : 7 split
Emergency response 
failures
partial agreement in 7 : 11 split
Consensus also  
nominates (a) 
more than (b) for 
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The consensus focus 
group is also in 
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interpretation of the rules of the air has already been (inappropriately) invoked.  The emergency 
manoeuvre behaviour is in effect an additional safety barrier that might fail. 
9.2.2. Anticipation of Interactions 
This next section deals with four specific failure or near-miss vignettes within the scenario.  
Unbeknownst to the respondents, each vertical pair of cases in Figure 9.4 and Figure 9.5 form one of 
the four specific vignettes, each then with slight variations of direction or warning time to produce the 
pairs of outcomes as shown.  The purpose of these questions was to challenge the respondent to 
identify the more plausible behavioural outcome for the type of defect or flaw modelled. 
 
Figure 9.4 Anticipation of interactions - hazardous interactions with respect to defects (Q4 
& Q5) 
Both questions Q4 and Q5, as presented in Figure 9.4, represent variations of behaviour with regard to 
the case to give way to traffic from the right. Q4, option (b) represents the outcome where due to a 
failure to correctly estimate the distance to the threat the UAV implements an interpretation of Rule 9 
that causes it to delay invoking the alternative emergency avoidance safeguard.  Agreement amongst 
the respondents that this is the case is evenly split.  Of the four within the consensus virtual focus 
group who accepted this option, R1 and R5 did not agree that option (d) is not true also. However, R1 
positively recognised that the situation includes a discontinuity of behaviour – with a delayed 
switching of behaviour between a rigid (simple) interpretation of Rule 9 and a turn to the left.  The 
wider group of respondents responded similarly in half identifying the correct option is (b), with R3 
and R4 identifying the relationship between (b) and (d) – although R4 did not manage to correctly 
also identify the general situation in any of the three preceding questions!  As options (b) and (d) are 
close variations of the same causal situation, with (b) being the near-miss for case (d), it might be 
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judged that this likely vignette has a 50:50 chance of being recognised through inference and 
deduction without the aid of a dynamical model – and also not be very dependent upon a participant’s 
degree of expertise. 
Question Q5, option (a) represents the outcome where no warning of an increased threat is given 
having implemented a rigid interpretation of Rule 9, and therefore inhibiting the overriding safeguard 
of the emergency avoidance behaviour.  However, agreement amongst the respondents that believed 
that options (a) represented the outcome is partial at best.  Of the two who selected option (a), R1 and 
R6, within the more expert consensus focus group, R1 was unable to also rule out cases (b) and (d).  
In fact four respondents within the more expert group selected option (c) as the most appropriate 
outcome – where this is actually the behaviour paired with (a) with the system responding safely as 
intended.  However, R1 expected that there would be no discontinuity of behaviour in this vignette – 
as the behaviour in changing from a rigid (simple) interpretation of Rule 9 to an otherwise sharp left 
turn does not occur.  Conversely, R8, also a member of the more expert group, considered that none 
of the options represented the outcome, stating that the UAV would not change course if unaware of 
the impending conflict.  This comment suggests that the wording of the question is perhaps defective.  
It suggests that the system description ought to have been clearer in describing the differences in the 
model of detection for a simple line-of-sight detection, sufficient to implement a simple interpretation 
of the rules of the air, and the perceived range based estimate employed against the more imminent 
threat.  R16 did recognise, however, that the UAV has to give way to the aircraft approaching from 
the right. 
The next two questions, Q6 and Q7 in Figure 9.5 (over the page) represent variations of the off-set 
head-on case where both vehicles would be expected to alter course to the right under Rule 10 of the 
rules of the air.  Furthermore, in each of these vignettes at least one of the vehicles is travelling faster 
than 140 kts; the maximum permitted speed at the VFR operating minima of 1500 metres (~0.8 NM) 
visibility at altitudes less than 3000 feet.  Q6 describes the situation where both vehicles are travelling 
towards each other at the maximum IFR speed limit of 250 kts beneath 10,000 feet.  For this question, 
whilst incorrectly chosen (a), R4 notes that the intruder would turn left according to the emergency 
manoeuvre rule and that the intruder would turn right according to the RoTA (Rules of the Air).  
Conversely, R14 queries why the UAV might evade to the left in any case. 
In fact in all of the options shown in Figure 9.5 an outcome similar to (a) is quite likely, with 
variations only in the relative lengths of the two trajectories tracking towards the collision; all of the 
other options shown represent different near-miss cases.  However, there are differences in each of 
these that the observant respondent ought to have detected.  Vignettes (a) and (c) reveal a relative 
difference in the length of the two vehicle trajectories to the point of crossover, as should be expected 
from a reading of the wording of Q7 (q.v. Appendix B).  For Q7 R3 correctly nominates option (c) but 
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hedges this selection with (a), with the observation that this would depend on deficient behaviour on 
the part of the intruder.  Clearly R3 has seen the relationship between the two outcomes for Q7.  
Likewise respondent R4 makes the same nomination and hedge, observing that the UAV appears to 
decide to turn left according to the (emergency) evasion manoeuvre whilst the intruder appears to 
decide to turn right according to the RoTA, but the difference in speed may make the decision of 
UAV to turn left a poor one.  
 
Figure 9.5 Anticipation of interactions - hazardous interactions due to speed (Q6 & Q7) 
Interestingly, whilst nearly all of the respondents focused on options (a) and (c), some for correct 
reasons and some not, only one respondent saw the likelihood of outcome (b) in certain interactions 
with near matching speeds.  For Q6 the model illustrates that this type of interaction may result in a 
period of entrainment before an escape on the part of the autonomous vehicle.  This is clearly an 
emergent behaviour outside the design intent, being typical of that found at or near the “edge of 
chaos”; as such this is the kind of behaviour that might not otherwise be revealed without a dynamic 
model – and even then possibly disbelieved when observed in the output of the model. 
9.2.3. Inferences 
Each of the four vignettes shown in Figure 9.6 and Figure 9.7 represents outcomes with respect to the 
“separation” variable in the results of four Monte Carlo simulations of 200 runs apiece, with the 
vertical axis in Figure 9.6 representing distributions of separation trajectory distance in feet.  Figure 
9.7 presents the same distributions with time slices at 50 seconds as histograms.  In both questions, 
each vignette embodies a variance of ±5° on the headings of both vehicles, ±5 kts on each airspeed, 
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and an initial separation in the range of 0.4 – 0.6 NM.  Some vignettes also embody variances of 0 to 
2 seconds emergency warning and -75% to +300% tolerances on the perceived range estimation. 
The intention with Q8, Q9 and Q10 is to explore the related issues of the respondents’ perception of 
raw separation and hazard data presentation, in conjunction with model interpretation (q.v. Appendix 
B, along with Figure 9.6, Figure 9.7, Figure 9.8 and Figure 9.9).  Again, unbeknownst to the 
respondents the outputs presented in these questions are matched together in a specific manner, both 
with each other and also to the four questions from the preceding section.  In these three questions 
options (a), (b), (c) and (d) each consistently correspond with the same four vignettes – specifically 
the Minimum Warning Time, Perceived Range Estimation, NCT Excessive Speed (203 kts), and the 
Both Excessive Speed (250 kts) vignettes, respectively.  In addition, options (a) and (b) correspond 
also to options (a) and (b) in questions Q4 and Q5, Figure 9.4.  Likewise, options (c) and (d) 
correspond also to options (c) and (d) in questions Q6 and Q7, Figure 9.5.  All of which are therefore 
drawn from just these four vignettes, each developed with two cases. 
 
Figure 9.6 Inferences – sensitivity of separation to initial variations (Q8) 
However, the respondents were not made explicitly aware of these direct correlations, although a clue 
does arise later with Q10.  Instead in Q8 and Q9 the respondents were asked to make judgements on 
this more-or-less raw statistical data alone.  For the separation trajectory distributions, Figure 9.6, R11 
nominated option (a) for Q8, as “there appeared to be a residual risk of collision as the vehicles don't 
separate as quickly as in option (b)”.  By comparing these two options with the corresponding 
histograms in Figure 9.7, in can be seen that both options (a) and (b) exhibit very similar probabilities 
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where around 2.5% of the interactions result in collisions by 50 seconds, these having occurring at 
between 8 and 16 seconds respectively (Figure 9.6) – although option (b) is marginally less frequent. 
However, as suggested by R11, other factors such as the overall separation profile ought to inform the 
choice as well.  It might be inferred that outcome (b) would seem to indicate clean departures from a 
set of near-misses, as flagged by the arrow indicated in (b), Figure 9.6.  From this one might infer that 
as profile (a) appears to be indicative of a tendency for the two entities to become entwined – even 
appearing to threaten to converge again beyond 50 seconds – that (a) is the more risky.  And this is the 
view as expressed by R11, a member of the more expert group, but it would appear that respondent 
R11 has also perhaps misread the question, as Q8 asked for the identification of the data set exhibiting 
the least likely risk (q.v. Appendix B) – which is option (b).  Other expert group respondents, such as 
R16, also suggested that the minimum separation distance arising with the simulation ought to be 
examined.  In all cases it would have been reasonable to hedge one’s choices in response to Q8 by 
selecting both options (a) and (b), given the limited information available in these separation 
trajectory views. 
 
Figure 9.7 Inferences – separation histograms at 50 seconds (Q9) 
As stated, the histograms in Figure 9.7 represent slices of the separation distributions at 50 seconds – 
with the one special (although non-obvious) proviso that collisions occurring earlier than this have 
their separation frozen at collision.  Unfortunately, R6 and R8, both members of the expert group felt 
that these questions were “not very clear” and that they “don't understand the graphs”.  Nevertheless, 
the expert group revealed a 50:50 likelihood of correct response, along with a degree of consensus.  
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But overall this was a poor response, and further consideration needs to be given as to how this type 
of data might be best presented – e.g.  Bayesian data is now presented as pie-chart representations 
 
Figure 9.8 A Close Encounter – to derive inferences of deviation from (Q10) 
Referring also to the graphical depictions of data described earlier by example in section 7.1.3, the 
time-series plots presented in Figure 9.9 represent four inferences taken from the previous vignettes 
that were to be compared with the UAV trajectory in Figure 9.8, above.  Each of these time-series 
based inferences represent the varying degree of belief in different likely system defects as the hazard 
escalates and then abates, with each band of ‘belief’ based upon a HAZOP deviation, or Inadequate 
Control Action, as previously described as ‘Hazard Identification’ – with these deviations applied to 
an abstract parameter “Manoeuvre”.  The question posed to the respondents was: which of the 
inference plots then represents the close encounter as depicted in Figure 9.8, where there is a failure of 
the UAV to anticipate the appropriate change in heading on the part of the other aircraft, and thereby 
then incorrectly to initiate a poorly resolved dangerous emergency manoeuvre taking it toward the 
other aircraft and also too close then to ensure that it might safely turn away? 
 
Figure 9.9 Inferences – Bayesian inferences in HAZOP & dynamics (Q10) 
 
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
NCT Track
ATC view of Unma ned Autonomous System on Surveillance Radar
l iles
UAS
Consensus agrees in 7 : 11 split
0.00E+00
5.00E-01
1.00E+00
1.50E+00
2.00E+00
2.50E+00
3.00E+00
3.50E+00
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Scenario Time Step (seconds)
Inadequate Control Actions:
ICA07_CONFLICTING
ICA06_MORE
ICA05_LESS
ICA04_LATE
ICA03_EARLY
ICA02_COMMISION
ICA01_OMISSION 0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Scenario Time Step (seconds)
Inadequate Control Actions:
ICA07_CONFLICTING
ICA06_MORE
ICA05_LESS
ICA04_LATE
ICA03_EARLY
ICA02_COMMISION
ICA01_OMISSION
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Scenario Time Step (seconds)
Inadequate Control Actions:
ICA07_CONFLICTING
ICA06_MORE
ICA05_LESS
ICA04_LATE
ICA03_EARLY
ICA02_COMMISION
ICA01_OMISSION 0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Scenario Time Step (seconds)
Inadequate Control Actions:
ICA07_CONFLICTING
ICA06_MORE
ICA05_LESS
ICA04_LATE
ICA03_EARLY
ICA02_COMMISION
ICA01_OMISSION
Commission Conflicting
Commission Conflicting
Less
Conflicting
More
Late
(a) (b)
(c) (d)General agreement in 7 : 11 split
Other aircraft at higher speed with decision change
The narrowed consensus focus group also agrees in a 5 : 3 split
166 
 
Perhaps this question is phrased in a slightly leading manner (“poorly resolved” = Conflicting, 
“toward” = Commission, “too close” = Less), but with this assistance a limited consensus does 
emerge with the correct selection of (c), although R16 expressed “no confidence”. 
9.2.4. Prioritising Risks 
 
Figure 9.10 Prioritising risks – therefore which list is inferred as true? (Q11) 
This final question of the questionnaire was intended to reveal whether any lessons might have been 
taken from the previous questions and applied to the final choice here – where a supposed riskiest 
consideration is at the top of each of the four lists in Figure 9.10.  If the respondent had by now 
determined that the greater hazard beliefs appear to have arisen with the high-speed off-set head-on 
vignettes, then the conclusion must be that (c) is the correct answer.  In itself, this was also intended 
to reveal a lesson, in that internal defects may have less effect upon the risk outcome than the 
relationship between speed (viz. energy) and the first safety barrier – namely the initial safe separation 
constraint.  Within the more expert group only R1 chose option (c), having previously clearly 
identified the head-on approach options at the start of the questionnaire, also correctly identifying 
three out four of the interactions – albeit with an equal amount of hedging, and identified two out of 
three of the inferences, but did hedge this last question with option (d) as well.  So unfortunately, only 
R1 responded as expected, whereas R15 answered Q11 perfectly, but was wrong on nearly all of the 
other questions – although the general risk direction, minimum warning time and differential speed 
interactions were correctly identified, with some hedging.  Overall, the respondents’ interpretation of 
the effect of a reduced warning time appeared to be inconsistent.  For example R4 appears to believe 
that a greater warning time might be more dangerous, whilst R12 correctly observes that a warning of 
less than one second is likely to be as bad as no warning at all. 
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9.3. Intermediate Outcomes – Questionnaire 
The more general lessons to be taken from the responses to the questionnaire at this point are: 
 The narrowed consensus (expert) group exhibited greater correct general situation awareness; 
 The more extreme emergent behaviour was likely to be disbelieved, even by most experts; 
 Inferences drawn from raw data and Bayesian interpretations are unlikely to be correctly 
interpreted, although for an appropriate representation the expert group may correctly out-vote 
dissenters; 
 Internal defects are seen as a greater hazard than increases in system energy v safety constraints. 
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Chapter 10. Summary of Results, Outcomes and Future Work  
“I may not have gone where I intended to go, but I think I have ended up where I needed to be.” 
 Dirk Gently, "The Long Dark Tea-Time of the Soul" by Douglas Adams 
 
10.1. Summary of work 
 
Figure 10.1 Sense and Avoid Scenario System Goal Model 
This work proposes a building-block approach to the construction of an integrated system dynamics 
and hazard inference model, incorporating the generic elements as identified first in Figure 6.4, and 
now in detail in Figure 10.1 for the specific “Sense and Avoid” exemplar.  A broad purpose, as 
declared with the objective to formulate this within a provisional systems engineering modelling 
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framework, is to explore the entirety of the likely modelling domain so that such a framework might 
be broadly identified; in so far as that is possible within the scope of the project.  
10.2. Principal results 
10.2.1. Questionnaire Responses, Hypothesis and Preferences 
The assumption that risk events within complex adaptive systems are caused by deviations from 
design or operating intentions and unanticipated non-linear causal interactions among system 
elements that violate safety constraints, as suggested by Leveson [67, 70], and that these interactions 
cannot be adequately intuitively assessed without an adequate representation of likely system 
dynamics – appears at least not to have been rejected.  That this is untrue is refuted in the responses to 
the questionnaire – even where the respondents disagree, and especially where individual respondents 
also disagree with the consensus.  The belief in the modelled interactions is supported to some degree 
with the responses to all of the questions; in that half of the modelled interactions are often correctly 
identified, with the less believed interactions nearly so when considered only within the consensus 
group of the marginally more expert, isolated from the less expert respondents.  However, this view is 
slightly undermined by a degree of interpretative bias arising with the phrasing and representation in a 
few of the questions. 
 
Figure 10.2 Questionnaire Respondent Agreement Distributions (for 18 respondents) 
The questionnaire was distributed in an electronic form to more than thirty recipients, each enabled 
with a semi-automated e-mail return.  As a result of this, eighteen recipients responded, usually after a 
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degree of encouragement by way of follow-up calls, and then with these responses being rendered 
anonymous for processing.  These responses were processed with a question by question comparison 
of multiple-choice responses – compared both against the model-based benchmark and against the 
emergent consensus responses derived for each question.  With the overall respondent agreement 
measure then classified and counted in each category, along with a count weighted by the average 
respondent relevant experience in each category, the results as depicted in Figure 10.2 were produced.  
In this figure, note also that where respondents are revealed to be in poor agreement with the 
consensus, in general they also exhibit more-or-less equally poor agreement with the model.  The 
distribution is of a generally diagonal nature – with “poor” responses being grouped in the lower 
corner.   
 
Figure 10.3 Model versus Consensus – “expert” respondent agreement maps 
In two sub-groups, of eight of the more “expert” respondents, extracting their respective measures of 
agreement separately produced the two consensus-agreement maps in Figure 10.3.  Note that for these 
nearer-to-consensus sub-groups the replacement of one marginal respondent (R9), with an almost 
equally marginal (but different) respondent (R5) improved the consensus – indicating that respondent 
R5 is not only more in agreement with the group, but also moved the consensus towards the model.  
The detailed respondent results, along with additional comments, form the basis of the commentary to 
each question response previously presented in Chapter 9 – the Questionnaire itself is given in full in 
Appendix B.  Overall, the eighteen respondents’ opinions of the hazardous interactions, in Figure 
10.4, identified the “correct” behaviours as shown; noting that all of the interactions were produced 
from model behaviours, but each with initial conditions other than those specified in the questions 
A subsidiary aspect of the questionnaire also asked which of four terms or expressions might best 
qualify the respondent’s approach and perspective toward system safety assessment.  Combining this 
with the general hypothesis appears to reveal some limited support for the first part of the basic 
hypothesis (belief in the effect of deviations and unanticipated non-linear interactions) but only a 
weak requirement for a non-chain-of-events, behaviour-constraint-based approach. 
(including R9) (including R5)
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Figure 10.4 Responses to Questions Concerning Anticipation of Interactions 
In these responses there appears to be only minority support for Causal Propagation (5 out of 18 
respondents, and 2 out of 8 in the more expert consensus), and Behavioural Modelling and Adaptation 
(3:18 in general and 2:8 expert) as priority system safety assessment considerations.  Conversely, the 
general bias of the respondents is very much more inclined towards conventional chain-of-event 
safety assessment priorities of Component Failure Modes (9:18 and 5:8), Functional Failure Modes 
(12:18 and 5:8), and Probabilistic Occurrence Rates (8:18 and 5:8).  Therefore in applying this 
modelling approach to an enhanced HAZOP process, consideration might be given to the following 
observations: 
 More experienced system safety engineers and least experienced ‘operators’ (private pilots) 
exhibit the greater measures of agreement here, both with the model and consensus; although with 
this respondent sample, the less experienced HAZOP group and the more experienced System 
Simulation cohorts would likely have more influence upon the associated stakeholder 
requirements and safety assessment approach due to their majority. 
 The apparent requirement for HAZOP and STAMP-like features in complex system safety 
analysis is judged to be substantially less important to this group of respondents than features 
usually associated with conventional Functional Hazard Assessment, Fault Tree and Failure 
Modes and Effects analysis, etc.  (re: “chain-of-events”) 
 Functional Failure Modelling – has by far a greater degree of support.  Hence the hazard 
assessment process ought to at least accommodate deviations of behaviour that include the 
guidewords Omission, Commission, and Error applied to relevant parameters and signals. 
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 Causal Propagation Modelling – is supported by more than a third of those respondents claiming 
some experience in system safety engineering, with half of these being in the more experienced 
group, both of whom demonstrate ‘fair’ agreement with the model; this ought to be built upon. 
 Behaviour Adaptation & Migration Modelling – is seen as less important by the respondents, but 
is also an important constituent of STAMP, and so trust needs to be created where complex and 
emergent behaviour is likely and otherwise difficult to comprehend or intuit from design intent. 
 However, Complex System Dynamics Capture – appears as a preference of those less encumbered 
by their degree of apparent expertise in this scenario, although this does include a holder of a 
private pilot’s licence – perhaps these are more inclined toward new perspectives.  
 Finally, System Expertise Capture – emerges with just two respondents, of whom one exhibits 
‘moderate’ agreement with the model, as high a degree of agreement as any exhibited here.   
10.2.2. Avoidance and Emergent Properties 
Close inspection of the Lyapunov exponent distributions, showing the spectrum of exponents as 
histograms, reveal that some of these approximate to Gaussian distributions, or skewed distributions 
as for example in Figure 8.20, whilst others appear to be bi-modal (q.v. Figure A.12 to Figure A.16, 
Figure A.31 and Figure A.33, Appendix A).  Where these modes are split between negative and 
positive groups, this likely indicates that certain Monte Carlo sets contain both a more dissipative 
(negative Lyapunov) group wherein after a simple manoeuvre each then quickly settles towards their 
respective original headings, and possibly a more emergent (positive Lyapunov) group, involving a 
degree of entrainment and / or entailing prolonged or excessive manoeuvring. 
In ordering the test cases by rank of the most positive (maximum) Lyapunov exponent values, as 
calculated over 25 seconds from initiation, wherein there ought either to be resolution in the collision 
avoidance or continuing dangerous interaction6, and comparing this rank with a similar ranking by the 
diagnostic utility of the same cases, reveals an intriguing result – Figure 10.5.  This suggests an 
additional hypothesis for the possible existence of a correlation between “diagnosability” (equation 
8.6) and emergent behaviour. Within this correlation there also appears to be some grouping of the 
“approaching from the left” (red), “approaching from the right” (green) and “approaching from 
ahead” (white) cases.  If such correlation actually exists it might be postulated that this occurs because 
emergent cases are an embodiment of more complex behaviour within which to form a diagnosis.  For 
example the “S” shaped avoidance behaviour observed in test cases TC1 and TC2 – Figure 10.6 – are 
both indicative of the same control flaw as each arise with the same combination of deviations, 
although from slightly different directions and also where the earlier system dynamics model used in 
TC1 embodies different and less realistic (effectively instantaneous) responses. 
                                                     
6
 Test case 12 contains an outlier Lyapunov exponent that produces a positive value until 250 seconds. 
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Figure 10.5 Comparison of Test Case Rank Order for Diagnosis and Emergence 
Comparing the respective λT distribution profiles of these two test cases also reveals a similarity 
between the two, although the much faster response of the model used in TC1 produces a greater 
range and a higher value (0.23) for the maximum exponent at 25 seconds, Figure 10.6, below. 
 
     
Figure 10.6 Lyapunov Distributions for Test Cases TC1 (left) and TC2 (right) to 25 Seconds 
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The 9000 sampled data points reveal a degree of a positive correlation between the Lyapunov 
exponent value and constraint violation – where these data points arise with the 200 Monte Carlo 
runs, each for nine different speed combinations and from five different initial directions of approach 
– where for each sample run there is also a corresponding Lyapunov exponent and Airprox (constraint 
violation) value.  Illustrating this previously in Figure 8.24, this Lyapunov exponent was shown 
plotted against initial relative heading, and then also in Figure 8.25 the Airprox violation value is 
likewise plotted against initial relative heading.  Comparing these two scatter plots suggests a possible 
correlation between Lyapunov exponent and Airprox.  This suggests that even a provisional mapping 
of the distribution of Lyapunov Exponents – as in these scatter plots and also in Figure 10.7 – reveal a 
visible relationship in air-proximity constraint violation detections and initial relative headings, 
especially in the most hazardous situations where the other aircraft approaches from the right (~270°). 
In support of the inclusion of a measure of the maximum Lyapunov exponent as a proxy for safety 
constraint violation, a plotted regression analysis reveals various degrees of correlation dependent 
upon the initial relative bearing, Figure 10.8.  This suggests a hidden relationship between Airprox 
and Lyapunov within the actual system behaviour; although this may be explainable with the scenario 
(and perhaps thereby more generally) with proper understanding of the nature of the interactions. 
Head-on interactions are obviously dangerous but entail virtually no complex manoeuvring behaviour 
as having insufficient space within which to manoeuvre, revealing in general a negative correlation.  
However all of the remaining interactions reveal positive correlations, especially with the interactions 
arising from the behind, both right and left, where violations are rare but usually prolonged where 
they involve entrainment – in this model.  Therefore, it can be argued that both the Lyapunov 
exponent combined with a domain specific measure of safety constraint violation (e.g. Airprox) might 
usefully enhance and contextually filter the final HAZOP output.  A breakdown of the individual 
regression plots with respect to all heading and speed combination vignettes are to be found in Figure 
A.20 to Figure A.29, in Appendix A. 
Note in this “Sense and Avoid” exemplar scenario that the "Initial Relative Heading" is the critical 
parameter (that is the heading of the other aircraft with respect to the vehicle of interest – the putative 
UAV), where "Manoeuvre" (i.e. variations from this initial setup by the UAV) is used as the 
parameter to which the deviations and guidewords apply, whilst the combined "rates of turn" (of both 
entities) provide the basis of measurement for the Lyapunov Exponent – in effect this measure 
preserves the history of the degree of manoeuvring up to a particular point in time: where negative 
Lyapunov values indicate a system settling down into a new steady-state, and positive values indicate 
the opposite, and with this likely emergent and possibly dangerous behaviour.  Clearly the measures 
of "Initial Relative Heading", "Manoeuvre", and "rates of turn" obviously have direct relationships to 
each other, and the nature of this relationship ought to be considered in the identification of any 
parameter and guideword to be used within an enhanced HAZOP. 
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Figure 10.7 Lyapunov v Airprox Correlation as Scatter Plot (9000 data points) 
 
Figure 10.8 Lyapunov v Airprox Correlation as Linear Regression Plots 
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10.3. Lessons learnt, alternative approaches and improvements 
10.3.1. Questionnaire 
The aim of this work overall is to investigate the development of Hazard Assessment methods 
employing the simulation of behavioural models within a range of plausible deviations.  In a similar 
context, Alexander, et al [1], briefly describe how simulation models representing SoS have been used 
to identify hazards with deviations within the HIRTS DARP project.  Alexander’s approach also 
employs machine learning to extract patterns from the simulation outputs.  The expectation is that 
such techniques may aid the construction of goal structured representations, as required in the 
production of safety-cases satisfying Def-Stan 00-56 [76], by providing a ‘vector’ for the description 
of complex environments and interactions, and thereby offering advantage over free-text policies in 
being a more clearly expressed representation of plausible outcomes [1].  However, the issue of 
plausibility and acceptance of these representations itself also ought to be addressed.  Therefore, the 
aim of the questionnaire, as developed and analysed in this work, is to assist in the formulation of a 
requirement deeper than that initially identified for the project [30], in considering the terms of 
plausibility and extent that the required expertise within a HAZOP team might be enhanced with 
behavioural models and simulation where complex system behaviour results.  Part of this is also to 
understand where exactly these models might be placed with respect to the position of the experts, and 
what role they might play in either bolstering trust, in the likely system behaviour, or alternatively in 
prompting additional appropriate questions of the team.   
The results of the questionnaire make it clear that for a range of suitably technically informed 
respondents, the overall responses to the putative outcomes expressed by the model vary widely.  
Where a more narrowly focused group of respondents has been considered, containing slightly more 
of the relevant expertise in piloting, system safety, simulation and HAZOP, the view narrows, 
becoming more consensual whilst exhibiting ‘fair’ to ‘moderate’ degree of agreement with the model.  
More specifically, where a respondent with a system reliability background and some pilot experience 
is included in the expert group the model-consensus agreement becomes only ‘fair’, but rises to 
‘moderate’ when replaced by a respondent having considerably greater simulation experience – but 
none of piloting an aircraft.  From this and the general result for the more expert group, one might 
conclude that this marginally more expert group exhibits slightly more trust in the model of 
behaviour, and that having a simulation and modelling viewpoint is also likely to enhance this more 
than experience in the piloting of an aeroplane – although the sample is too small to deduce this with 
any certainty.  Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that the responses of a respondent with 
significant additional experience in simulation and modelling may have had some influence in shifting 
the ‘expert’ consensus towards the model, Figure 10.9 (q.v. Figure C.6 and Figure C.8, Appendix C – 
Respondent Results and Analysis). 
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Figure 10.9 Agreement & Authority by Experience (< 5 years – left, > 5 years – right) 
In the context of the responses to the questionnaire, a perspective of equivalence is revealed in the 
interpretation of the modelled behaviours, in that one of group of respondents appeared to have 
attempted to apply a purely logical process to the behaviour whilst others appear to rationalise their 
own beliefs or experience in selecting behaviours according to their expectations – which itself might 
be considered as a perspective of ‘human equivalence’.  Within the first group the logical process 
extends, at least in the case of one respondent, in attempting to model the rules described so as to 
almost mentally simulate the outcomes in their mind’s eye as objectively as possible; i.e. not 
conditioned by other expectations.  Of course this processing is what the model itself exists for – 
however if the respondent’s own ‘gut-feeling’ flies against the objectivity as represented by the 
modelled behaviour then a process is required to bring about a better understanding of this likely 
behaviour through a closed-loop iteration of the safety constraint design and continual refinement of 
the modelled behaviour. 
From the responses to the questionnaire, the more expert cohort appears to share a greater consensus 
of understanding and interpretation of behaviour then an otherwise similarly experienced but more 
broadly versed technical cohort.  This might be revealed immediately in a degree of identification 
with a statement regarding the general situational awareness related to the hazard in question. 
However, even experts are likely to find particular forms of emergent behaviour incredible, and so 
would require adequate access to the model to determine why such behaviour might occur – noting 
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that the models might be necessarily simplified in such a manner so as to be tractable whilst also 
attempting to identify likely worst-case behaviours.  The consideration of worst-case behaviours 
better suits the philosophy of the scientific method in attempting to invalidate a particular hypothesis, 
in this case a system safety hypothesis, rather than the more typical developmental approach of 
attempting to validate a specific intended design requirement.  Many engineers appear to downgrade 
the outcome of a central tenet of system complexity, in that failures of ordered behaviour often occur 
where systems are driven too hard towards and over the “edge of chaos” [62, 63]; preferring rather to 
believe that accidents are simply due to single point failures and proximate causes.  More effort 
appears to be required so as to persuade creators and operators of systems the truth of this. 
Perhaps at the core of this approach, considering behavioural modelling and the simulation of 
hazardous deviations, there is a fundamental challenge to the concept of demonstrating (pilot) 
‘equivalence’ with behavioural models, or indeed any other hazard assessment methodology applied 
to autonomous systems exhibiting complex behaviour.  Alexander, et al [1], argues that an emphasis 
on achieving human equivalence in the case of the external perception of the operation and behaviour 
of a UAV is perhaps misplaced when considering the actual goal of achieving optimum safety. 
10.3.2. Monte Carlo Modelling 
Through the belief validation study various graphical representations of system behaviour were 
introduced, representing Monte Carlo behaviour and probabilistic data, beyond trajectories and one-
dimensional time series data.  The first of these presents the varied and rich behaviour captured 
succinctly by the expression of the Lyapunov exponent as probability distributions over time and as a 
snap shot (Figure 8.20, Figure 10.6).  The second representation presents the sensitivity of system 
violation events to a combination of defects by way of the violation likelihood, either as a stacked plot 
(Figure 7.7, Figure 9.9), or as a pie-chart (as shown within Figure 6.1, and Figure 10.10, below). 
 
Figure 10.10 Observed Control Flaw Relative Likelihoods for Test Case 6 
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At present it is uncertain as to how the richness of these representations might be easily presented to 
and then interpreted by a HAZOP team, especially in the case of any greater dimensionality as may 
arise with a more complicated scenario.  However, maximum peak values and breadth of distributions 
may be relatively easily obtained from these forms, thereby providing representative single value 
items that can then be incorporated directly into a HAZOP table – resulting in the more readily 
assimilated “traffic-light” scheme as employed in the final enhanced HAZOP representation, Table 
8.2.  These schemes should provide additional guidance and focus to particular areas of concern 
regarding both emergent behaviour and sensitivity to defective design, all to the benefit of the system 
engineer and their efforts to produce safer systems.  Furthermore, in order to generate these 
categorisations of events it is necessary to define these in terms of constraint violation rates, and not 
only in terms of accident rates.  However, before being incorporated into a more general HAZOP tool, 
further investigation with potential users is required, whilst consideration should also be given to how 
representations containing many more parameters, deviations and flaws might be best represented.  
Finally, a more systematic approach should be considered for the selection of parameters to be 
exercised (randomised) in the Monte Carlo simulations and sensitivity analysis, especially in the case 
of a more complex, hierarchical and higher dimensionality system; otherwise the modelling approach 
and analysis cannot be scaled to larger problems.  Design of experiments, experimental design, or the 
related Parameter Design methods developed by Taguchi [7] are all methods that might be considered. 
10.4. Industry use, benefits, and exploitation 
Throughout this work, every effort has been made to consider and accommodate the Guidelines for 
Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems [101], the Guidance for Unmanned Aircraft System 
Operations in UK Airspace [17], the Guidance material for UAS system safety requirements [16], and 
the Sense and Avoid hazard assessment work by the NATO Industrial Advisory Group [81]. 
Since 2005, the UK aerospace industry’s ASTRAEA programme purpose has been to identify the 
requirements for technologies so as to enable the integration of UAVs in routine operation within un-
segregated airspace.  At inception this programme consisted of a number of technology themes, 
including themes addressing investigations and demonstrations of technologies to provide a 
transparent approach to “Sense and Avoidance”, and a “pilot equivalent” approach and framework for 
UAV systems health management [29], amongst others.  Within the systems health management 
theme a need for an increased focus on the development of software requirements for safety was 
identified, believed to be necessary to help prevent modes of failure due to new airborne technologies, 
such as machine-based decision making systems.  Within this programme, West, et al, [113] proposed 
that the uncertainty in autonomous decision making be handled as a risk where the outcomes are 
mitigated by actions to be determined through hazard analysis.  It is also recognised that new accident 
models based on systems theory (for example STAMP) suggest that constraints on systems behaviour 
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act as barriers to the occurrence of accidents.  West also notes that this is especially true of software 
intensive systems.  It is apparent that industrial expertise in this area is perhaps ready to incorporate 
new accident theories and assessment methods; especially where the industry is now considering the 
incorporation of models of behaviour normally attributable to humans to be embodied as machine-
based decision making systems.  This work continues. 
10.5. Future work – Frameworks for Behavioural Hazard Assessment 
Further work yet needs to be done so as to determine the most usable documented form for this style 
of hazard assessment, along with efforts to define the requisite inter-tool and model capture interfaces 
of the causal modelling and Bayesian tool sets as used to produce these behavioural results.  More 
fundamentally perhaps, a significant issue yet to be addressed is in the scalability and modularity of 
the proposed modelling approach, in terms of both hierarchical decomposition and propagation 
models in an approach encompassing more than a single isolated scenario with a small number of 
associated dysfunction vignettes.  The approach taken in the creation of the model employed here has 
been described in earlier work, Downes, et al [31-33], and it ought to be noted that the modelling does 
not automatically identify paths between consequences and faults, as is the case for HAZID for 
example, McCoy, et al [73].  However, unlike systems and industrial plants formed within relatively 
confined architectures, such as those described with Pipe & Instrumentation Diagrams or with circuit 
schematics, it is not obvious as to how automatic hazard identification might be achieved through 
similar propagation methods of qualitative deviation and effect as addressed by HAZID.  Such 
methods adequately address static and quasi-static behavioural models, but further consideration has 
to be given to the encapsulation and propagation of behaviour of systems that are quintessentially 
dynamic and embody evolutionary potential.  Certainly process plant models are treated as closed 
systems, operating at particular set-points, with deviations applied to specific parameters around these 
set-points, but systems embodying goal seeking behaviours cannot be safely treated as closed systems. 
Rather the method of hazard identification employed here adapts the STPA process [86, 104, 105], as 
described by Owens, Stringfellow, et al, and then to apply behavioural sensitivity simulation and 
Bayesian belief capture so as to explore the likely dynamic constraint violation behaviours, and in 
essence validate the hazards identified in the employment of this adapted form of STPA.    
The purpose at this preliminary stage of the hazard assessment is to identify the adequacy of the top-
level safety constraints and protective barriers for the autonomous system, whilst initiating the 
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) processes by providing a view of the likely uncertainty inherent 
in the system with regard to control flaws, false alarm and misdiagnosis rates, incorporating also the 
likely allowable tolerance upon machine perception and latency characteristics.  The formulation and 
initial description of the safety constraints and protective barriers are likely to be of an essentially 
qualitative nature as derived through either a HAZOP [66] or STPA [71] process.  The Functional 
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Hazard Assessment enables a transition from a qualitative to a quantitative safety assessment 
processes, through the application of FTA, DD, FMES methods [100] at the far end of the process.  
Otherwise, in the case of FHA, behavioural analysis is described only in the context of Markov 
Analysis (finite state modelling), and sensitivity analysis appears to be confined to Fault Tree 
Analysis, and no apparent consideration is given to the possibility that complex system dynamic 
behaviour is an intrinsic aspect in the design of an autonomous, machine-based decision making, 
system. Therefore applying sensitivity analysis to the conditions, states, and safety constraints (or 
constraints more generally), and specifically then measuring the stability and convergence of the key 
control parameter states, provides the necessary, and otherwise missing insight into the likelihood of 
emergent behaviour – i.e. behaviour operating “at the edge of chaos” [62, 63] and with the saliency of 
a persistent similarity of patterns arising with the interaction of simple underlying rules [54]. 
It is expected by the regulatory authorities that any decision-making by an Autonomous Systems 
should be repeatable, except where a machine-made decision might cause the trajectory of a system to 
pass beyond a go / no-go decision threshold – “The decisions made by an autonomous system are 
made on a rational basis. In addition, to ensure consistent behaviour that will encourage human trust 
the system’s decision-making should be repeatable. That is, the system should exhibit the same 
behaviour each time it is exposed to identical circumstances and it should not produce large changes 
in behaviour for small changes in inputs. An obvious exception to this is where the input to the system 
results in a ‘yes/no’ decision, such as a point of no return (e.g. deciding to return to the departure 
airfield instead of continuing to the destination due to a very small difference in the amount of fuel 
remaining). Such behaviours can be evaluated using sensitivity analysis, relating system inputs to 
output.” CAP 722, Section 2, Chp 7, Para 3.4.1. [17]  And so the issue of developing a hazard 
assessment process that systematically takes account of uncertainty in machine-based situational 
awareness and system sensitivity to initial conditions remains.  
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Chapter 11. Recommendations and Conclusions  
“But it's turtles all the way down!” 
 an old lady, anecdotal Anonymous – possibly by William James or Bertrand Russell 
referenced by Stephen Hawking, "A Brief History of Time" 
 
  
11.1. Recommendations 
So as to facilitate the incorporation of this methodology into useful industrial applications, the 
following tasks ought to be considered: 
 Assemble a library of representative dynamical model fragments (Molecules in the parlance of 
Vensim, or masked blocks and s-functions in the case of Matlab / Simulink).  These fragments 
might include model fragments representing rule structures, fuzzy logic, heuristics, motion 
models and transforms, Lyapunov exponent and entropy calculations, and constraint 
representations, amongst others. 
 Construct a family of models of constraints encompassing a) physical behaviours and limits, b) 
models of dysfunction and defect, c) proximity and safety violation, d) system state monitoring, 
including FTLE, and e) Bayesian Monte Carlo model capture; all ought to be identified. 
 Investigate the development of mechanisms facilitating automated construction of models from a 
single representation, possibly with a SysML representation as the reference form.  In the first 
instance a means to automate the production of the initial un-trained Bayesian network consistent 
with the initial HAZOP formulation would be most helpful.  Next useful would be the connection 
of the deviations, design decisions and flaws identified in the STPA process to the corresponding 
sub-models within the System Dynamics model, as well as identifying and managing the model 
elements represented by nodes within the Bayesian network. Together this would close a loop 
around the whole model, at least in a provisional manner to facilitate more rapid prototyping. 
 Define data interfaces managing the conversion, reformatting and archiving of large quantities of 
data between the different software tools, also as required to facilitate rapid prototyping, 
especially with consideration to Monte Carlo simulation. 
 Develop improved visualisation mechanisms. 
 Embed questionnaire based validation, or “reality checking” of observed dynamical behaviour, 
perhaps with guidelines on “cherry picking” comparable general, typical and extreme cases. 
 Investigate the creation and incorporation of acceptable human and socio-technical interaction 
models, perhaps linked with questionnaire based validation and knowledge capture techniques. 
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11.2. Conclusions 
In the introduction to this thesis a hypothesis was put that a conventional, and essentially manual, 
HAZOP process can be improved with information obtained with model-based dynamic simulation, 
using a Monte Carlo approach, to update a Bayesian Belief model representing the expected relations 
between cause and effects – and through this approach thereby produce an enhanced HAZOP.  
Through this it is claimed that by informing and improving the HAZOP process in this manner, the 
contribution of this thesis is to make unanticipated hazardous conditions more predictable. 
However, it is necessary to make clear that an approach towards hazard assessment based upon 
simulation cannot exhaustively determine all potentially unanticipated hazards even within a simple 
system as the method only represents a selective exploration of the infinite state space of an open 
system.  Clearly it is impossible to address combinatorial complexity with simulation alone, where for 
example even a simple system with 1000 failure modes will have 500,000 combinations of any two of 
those failure modes.  Rather what this study attempts to reveal is that rare but plausible behaviours 
may be discovered by a method of simulation and inference, potentially providing an additional tool 
to further explore rare near-miss cases which may serve as counter-examples to a given set of safety 
assumptions – and hence falsify a particular safety hypotheses in support of a HAZOP study. 
Therefore, as the scope of the problem space is too large for induction and proof, the goal in the 
capture of system dynamics for the hazard assessment ought to be in the falsification, rather than the 
proof, of safe behaviour.  As has been shown, test cases TC1, TC2 and TC6 stand as counter 
examples that may be used to falsify certain assumptions made about the safety of this particular 
dynamical system; where that assumption is based solely upon a straight forward application of the 
Rules of the Air.  In particular, test cases TC1 and TC2 both exhibit a salient persistent similarity of 
patterns arising with the interaction of a few simple underlying rules, and the introduction of a simple 
perceptual flaw.  Whilst similar, these two cases feature notably different underlying dynamics, in so 
far as their respective models incorporate different significantly damping properties (i.e. one 
essentially has no damping). It may therefore be reasonably argued that this similarity is due to the 
dynamic interaction of the underlying rules, rather than the more basic physical properties.  
Furthermore, all three test cases also exhibit a range of consistently positive Lyapunov exponent 
values even many seconds after the initial encounter has occurred – which in this model indicates that 
one or both vehicles are still manoeuvring, and appear not have yet started to move towards a new 
equilibrium state.  In the context of this work unexpected patterns of salient persistent similarity are 
taken as examples of Emergent Behaviour, whilst positive Lyapunov exponent values are taken as 
indicators of Behavioural Complexity – with the two being directly correlated. 
There is also some evidence of (less direct) correlation between Air-proximity safety constraint 
violation category values and corresponding Lyapunov exponent values, as revealed in the regression 
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analysis of the scatter plots arising with these two measures taken from the Monte Carlo simulation 
data sets.  This correlation perhaps only exists where the more significant behavioural complexity is 
exhibited – therefore it is argued that whilst the Lyapunov exponent may be used as a proxy for the 
detection of safety constraint violation in detecting behavioural complexity and potentially emergent 
(i.e. non-explicit but similar salient) behaviour, it would perhaps be best used along with an explicit 
measure of safety constraint violation. 
Consequently, it is proposed that the probabilities and likelihoods produced by the Bayesian Belief 
and Bayesian Monte Carlo models may stand as reasonable estimates with the purpose of guiding the 
system engineer and designer towards safer design decisions.  In the modification to the HAZOP 
method, the inferred likelihood and maximum Lyapunov rank values are returned to an enhanced 
HAZOP to be used to code a “Relative Likelihood” traffic-light indicator and the calculation of a 
deviation-based combined hazard risk value.  Where specific dysfunction, defect and flaw models are 
considered these might need only represent a model of worst case behaviour, as the objective is to 
produce plausible counter-examples, which of itself facilitates simplification of the whole model. 
Currently Leveson and the research group at MIT [65, 67-71, 86, 104, 105], with others elsewhere, 
are developing a Systems Approach to Safety that incorporates the concepts of dynamical systems, 
complexity and un-intended consequences.  These works reveal mathematically, conceptually and 
philosophically challenging ideas, perhaps particularly to the conservative nature of the wider 
engineering profession – and maybe more so in the case of system safety engineering.  However, the 
very nature of machine intelligence, autonomous decision making and inherent uncertainty within the 
operating environment appears to provide sufficient justification to challenge the status quo.  
Consequently, it would be reasonable to expect that further research is required in these directions, 
and a part of this ought to be to explore the challenge to systematise and assure these processes, and 
where possible also to simplify or otherwise embody these techniques so that they might find adoption 
by the wider professional engineering community. 
In the meantime it might be expected that the lessons learnt within this work, applied as it is here to 
collision avoidance, may also be generalised in due course to any behavioural system wherein 
perceptual errors, decision thresholds, and latencies potentially give rise to unanticipated behaviour, 
and so provide opportunities to identify and mitigate any dangerous behaviour through a formalised 
iterative HAZOP – System Dynamics modelling approach, incorporating Bayesian inference. 
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Appendix A.  Enhanced HAZOP Employing Inference Test Cases 
A.1. Initial STPA – based HAZOP 
 
Figure A.1 Initial STPA Based HAZOP: Single Deviation Type (Manoeuvre)  
System (control) flaw entries shown as bold text in Figure A.1 are explicitly implemented in the model, whereas the 
remaining flaws are not explicitly implemented.  Entries highlighted with a light blue background indicate the primary 
flaws, Perceived Range Estimation and Latency; used in the construction of the Category A/B Air Proximity constraint 
violation conditional likelihood function.   Items in grey in the following text are also not explicitly implemented.   
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A.2. Original HAZOP Definitions 
Hazard 
HAZ 01.10 – UAV separation minima is breached by the other aircraft (NIAG SG-134 Separation Provision Error 
HAZ010). 
Deviations (Avoidance Manoeuvre) 
OMISSION (ICA01) – The UAV does not manoeuvre to avoid the other aircraft. 
COMMISSION (ICA02) – The UAV manoeuvres in the wrong direction attempting to avoid the other aircraft. 
EARLY (ICA03) – The UAV prematurely ceases a manoeuvre to avoid the other aircraft and returns to the given 
heading. 
LATE (ICA04) – The UAV belatedly initiates a manoeuvre to avoid the other aircraft. 
LESS (ICA05) – The UAV rate of manoeuvre is insufficient to avoid the other aircraft. 
MORE (ICA06) – The UAV rate of manoeuvre is excessive in attempting to avoid the other aircraft. 
CONFLICTING (ICA07) – The UAV is unable to resolve the conflict between realising the System Goal and avoiding 
the other aircraft. 
Possible Contributory System (Control) Flaws – grey unimplemented 
CF01 – The UAV fails to detect the other aircraft altogether. 
CF02 – The UAV does not command a turning manoeuvre from the flight control system (FCS). 
CF03 – The UAV flight control surfaces do not respond to demands from the FCS. 
CF04 – The UAV incorrectly estimates the location and direction to the predicted point of conflict. 
CF05 – The UAV fails to follow established Rules of the Air. 
CF06 – The other aircraft fails to follow established Rules of the Air. 
CF07 – The UAV interprets the Rules of the Air too rigidly when closing within 500ft of the other aircraft. 
CF08 – The UAV loses detection of the other aircraft. 
CF09 – The UAV fails to detect the other aircraft at sufficient range. 
CF10 – The UAV delays the commanding of a turning manoeuvre from the flight control system (FCS). 
CF11 – The UAV flight control surfaces are slow to respond to demands from the FCS. 
CF12 – The UAV demanded rate of turn is insufficient for the closing angle, speed and range to the other aircraft. 
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CF13 – The UAV maximum demanded rate of turn exceeds the maximum achievable rate of turn. 
CF14 – The UAV demanded rate of turn is excessive for the closing angle, speed and range to the other aircraft. 
CF15 – The UAV does not arbitrate the competing heading demands appropriately. 
A.3. Final Enhanced HAZOP 
 
 
 
Figure A.2 Final Enhanced HAZOP: Cases for Approaches from Ahead, Behind and Left 
In the above traffic-light scheme, green stands for a best or better measure, yellow for medium, red for significantly 
degraded and any black indicates the worst behaviour or outcome for the particular measure; calculated as follows: 
               (   )                                                                                                    (   ) 
Where H represents the hazard value, CatA the relative rate of category A airprox events, CPA the rate observed at the 
closest classified point of approach.  R represents the risk, with M being the total number of test cases, E the rank of the 
emergent behaviour, D the rank of the diagnostic consistency measure, and with L representing the relative likelihood.  
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Figure A.3 Final Enhanced HAZOP (cont.): Cases for Approaches from the Right 
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Figure A.4 Final Enhanced HAZOP: Consequences for Approaches from Ahead 
 
 
Figure A.5 Final Enhanced HAZOP: Consequences for Approaches from the Left 
 
 
 
Figure A.6 Final Enhanced HAZOP: Consequences for Approaches from Behind (Left and Right) 
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Figure A.7 Final Enhanced HAZOP: Consequences for Approaches from the Right 
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NCT Too CloseAirprox Event Likelihood Airprox CategoryDeviations
LOW PREL - S91 test case, at 
collision.  Test Case 12
LOW MWT - S3 test case, and also 
S27 at collision.  TC 5
ENCTS - S1 test case at 
entry, and S85 at collision.
Test Case 2
PRE - S34 test case.
Test Case 6
PRE - S34 test case.
Test Case 6
ENCTS - S1 test case, 
precursor.
Test Case 2
ENCTS - S1 test case, exit.
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also S67 at collision.
Test Case 4
EARLY 
(ICA03)
DIFFERENT
LESS
(ICA05)
LOW
MORE 
(ICA06)
HIGH
CONFLICTING 
(ICA07)
LOW
DIFFERENT
COMMISSION 
(ICA02)
DIFFERENT
A-201 
 
A.4. Additional HAZOP Definitions 
Additional Deviations (Manoeuvring Airspeeds) 
LOW – The airspeeds of both aircraft generally do not exceed the speed for which the absolute minimum permitted VFR 
(Visual Flight Rule) flight visibility might apply. 
HIGH – The airspeed of either or both vehicles approaches or exceeds the permitted speed limit for aircraft operating 
below 10,000 ft. 
DIFFERENT – The difference in airspeed between the two vehicles approaches or exceeds one quarter of the permitted 
speed limit below 10,000 ft. 
New Design Decisions 
DD14 – The field of regard of the onboard sensor system shall be a minimum of ± 65° with respect to the forward 
longitudinal axis in the plane of the turn when banked at ± 40°. (SC02.1.3) 
DD15 – The direction to the perceived threat shall be offset by + 47° (to the right) to allow for the other aircraft passing 
from right to left ahead of the UAV. (SC02.1.5.1) 
Air Proximity Definitions 
Items in grey in the following text are implemented in the system dynamics model but are not represented in the 
corresponding Bayesian Network model.  Items in bold text indicate the primary constraint violation indicator(s). 
Category A – Risk of collision: an actual risk of collision existed. 
Category B – Safety not assured: the safety of the aircraft was compromised. 
Category C – No risk of collision: no risk of collision existed. 
Category D – Risk not determined: insufficient information was available to determine the risk involved, or inconclusive 
or conflicting evidence precluded such determination. 
UAS / NCT Surprised – The NCT / UAS appears not to be applying the Rules of the Air by either crossing ahead from 
left to right at a rate greater than the Transit Sensitivity (0.075) x 65° per second azimuth, or behind from right to left 
within half a second - how far from right to left is determined by the value of the Transit Sensitivity (from 140° at 
minimum to 220° at maximum). 
UAS Threatened – The UAS is forced into behaviour other than a strict interpretation of the Rules of the Air, with a turn 
to port greater than Rate Two (-6° per second). 
UAS / NCT Panicked – The UAS / NCT is forced to perform excessive manoeuvring, with a rate of turn greater than 
Rate Three (12° per second). 
UAS / NCT Alarmed – The UAS / NCT manoeuvres aggressively and whilst banking excessively (> ± 40°) the NCT is 
out of view.  
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A.5. Validation Test Cases and Hazardous Outcomes  
 
Figure A.8 Hazard Test Case Assignment by Direction of Approach 
Test 
Case 
Initial 
Traffic 
Separation 
Initial NCT 
Heading 
NCT Speed UAV Speed Perceived 
Range 
Estimation 
Minimum 
Warning 
Time 
Latency in 
Perceiving 
Threat 
Threat 
Offset 
Direction 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
8 0.5 NM 122° 238° 195 
kts 
305 
kts 
71.5 
kts 
117 
kts 
70% 140% 15 s 0 s 5 s 47° 
169.50 210.45 kts 103.18 kts 72.13% 1.51 s 
7 122° 238° 195 
kts 
305 
kts 
195 
kts 
305 
kts 
70% 140% 0 s 5 s 
136.41° 276.94 kts 204.20 kts 135.95% 0.76 s 
3 
 
ES 
0.4 
NM 
0.6 
NM 
197.5° 207.5° 245 
kts 
255 
kts 
245 
kts 
255 
kts 
100% 10 s 20 s 1 s 47° 
0.42 NM 207.49° 253.53 kts 252.96 kts 15.13 s 
1 
 
ENCTS 
0.4 
NM 
0.6 
NM 
197.5° 207.5° 198 
kts 
208 
kts 
89.25 
kts 
99.25 
kts 
10 s 20 s 0° 
0.47 NM 201.60° 198.30 kts 92.28 kts 16.96 s 
12 0.5 NM 238° 312.5° 71.5 
kts 
117 
kts 
71.5 
kts 
117 
kts 
70% 140% 15 s 0 s 5 s 47° 
285.46° 114.62 kts 72.99 kts 88.41% 1.47 s 
2 
 
ENCTS 
0.4 
NM 
0.6 
NM 
283° 293° 198 
kts 
208 
kts 
89.25 
kts 
99.25 
kts 
100% 1 s 42° 52° 
0.46 NM 287.53° 205.89 kts 96.62 kts 51.98° 
6 
 
PRE 
0.4 
NM 
0.6 
NM 
296.5° 306.5° 135 
kts 
145 
kts 
89.25 
kts 
99.25 
kts 
25% 400% 5 s 47° 
0.56 NM 304.41° 137.34 kts 91.24 kts 75.51% 
5 
 
MWT 
0.4 
NM 
0.6 
NM 
283° 293° 135 
kts 
145 
kts 
135 
kts 
145 
kts 
100% 0 s 10 s 
0.55 NM 290.45° 136.24 kts 144.42 kts 1.52 s 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
A/C Separation to Near-Miss
Ahead
Left
Behind
Left
Behind
Right
Right
TC 8
TC 7
TC 1 (ENCTS)
TC 10
TC 9
TC 11
TC 3 (ES)
TC 5 (MWT)
TC 4 (L)
TC 2 (ENCTS)
TC 12
TC 6 (PRE)
Key Test Cases:
ENCTS – Excessive Non-
Cooperative Traffic Speed
ES – Excessive Speed
L – Latency
MWT – Minimum Warning Time
PRE – Perceived Range 
Estimation
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L 
0.4 
NM 
0.6 
NM 
278.5° 288.5° 245 
kts 
255 
kts 
245 
kts 
255 
kts 
15 s 0 s 5 s 
0.44 NM 281.99° 253.16 kts 245.22 kts 4.99 s 
10 0.5 NM 312.5° 360° 117 
kts 
195 
kts 
71.5 
kts 
117 
kts 
70% 140% 15 s 0 s 5 s 47° 
323.38° 183.86 kts 88.84 kts 75.26% 1.86 s 
9 0.5 NM 0° 47.5° 195 
kts 
305 
kts 
71.5 
kts 
117 
kts 
70% 140% 15 s 0 s 5 s 47° 
0.25° 289.69 kts 75.34 kts 89.99% 1.40 s 
11 0.5 NM 47.5° 122° 195 
kts 
305 
kts 
71.5 
kts 
117 
kts 
70% 140% 15 s 0 s 5 s 47° 
105.73° 257.52 kts 99.87 kts 73.88% 3.98 s 
Table A.1 Hazard Test Case Assignment by Direction of Approach, Speed, etc. 
 
Table A.2 Airspace Interaction Airprox Category Rates of Occurrence by Dataset (Test Cases) 
Airprox 
CatA
Airprox 
CatB
Airprox 
CatC
Airprox 
CatD
Airprox 
None
0.44% 0.53% 2.05% 18.07% 78.91% Airspace Interaction Ahead
0.00% 0.19% 1.56% 19.91% 78.34% PREL-1800-1400-1400-0nm5
1.31% 1.28% 3.34% 16.22% 77.84% PREL-1800-1400-2500-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 0.31% 17.09% 82.59% PREL-1800-1400-9425-0nm5
0.03% 0.69% 2.91% 18.84% 77.53% PREL-1800-2500-1400-0nm5
1.06% 1.31% 4.09% 17.97% 75.56% PREL-1800-2500-2500-0nm5 TC7
0.00% 0.00% 0.81% 18.34% 80.84% PREL-1800-2500-9425-0nm5
0.00% 0.19% 1.25% 21.44% 77.13% PREL-1800-9425-1400-0nm5
1.53% 1.13% 3.69% 17.84% 75.81% PREL-1800-9425-2500-0nm5 TC8
0.00% 0.00% 0.44% 15.00% 84.56% PREL-1800-9425-9425-0nm5
0.01% 0.02% 0.28% 8.81% 90.89% Airspace Interaction Behind_L 1.50% 0.23% 1.08% 17.58% 79.61% Airspace Interaction Behind_R
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.44% 92.56% PREL-0240-1400-1400-0nm5 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 25.53% 74.44% PREL-3360-1400-1400-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 0.47% 16.25% 83.28% PREL-0240-1400-2500-0nm5 2.56% 0.75% 2.47% 40.69% 53.53% PREL-3360-1400-2500-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% PREL-0240-1400-9425-0nm5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 98.41% PREL-3360-1400-9425-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.88% 94.13% PREL-0240-2500-1400-0nm5 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 16.53% 83.34% PREL-3360-2500-1400-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.03% 91.97% PREL-0240-2500-2500-0nm5 0.00% 0.00% 1.50% 34.19% 64.31% PREL-3360-2500-2500-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% PREL-0240-2500-9425-0nm5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 99.88% PREL-3360-2500-9425-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.81% 97.19% PREL-0240-9425-1400-0nm5 0.88% 0.28% 1.00% 11.91% 85.94% PREL-3360-9425-1400-0nm5 TC10
0.06% 0.19% 2.06% 38.84% 58.84% PREL-0240-9425-2500-0nm5 TC9 10.03% 1.06% 4.47% 26.34% 58.09% PREL-3360-9425-2500-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% PREL-0240-9425-9425-0nm5 0.00% 0.00% 0.16% 1.31% 98.53% PREL-3360-9425-9425-0nm5
0.05% 0.13% 3.13% 14.83% 81.88% Airspace Interaction from Left 2.18% 0.95% 3.91% 43.22% 49.75% Airspace Interaction from Right
0.00% 0.00% 3.25% 15.81% 80.94% PREL-0850-1400-1400-0nm5 1.25% 0.38% 3.25% 48.00% 47.13% PREL-2750-1400-1400-0nm5
0.06% 0.25% 3.25% 13.72% 82.72% PREL-0850-1400-2500-0nm5 3.44% 2.06% 6.16% 43.19% 45.16% PREL-2750-1400-2500-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 3.38% 12.28% 84.34% PREL-0850-1400-9425-0nm5 0.41% 0.09% 1.25% 44.94% 53.31% PREL-2750-1400-9425-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 2.41% 13.31% 84.28% PREL-0850-2500-1400-0nm5 1.84% 1.25% 4.31% 42.63% 49.97% PREL-2750-2500-1400-0nm5
0.00% 0.09% 2.16% 12.31% 85.44% PREL-0850-2500-2500-0nm5 2.59% 1.31% 5.56% 41.81% 48.72% PREL-2750-2500-2500-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 1.94% 12.28% 85.78% PREL-0850-2500-9425-0nm5 0.72% 0.66% 2.25% 46.34% 50.03% PREL-2750-2500-9425-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 3.72% 18.34% 77.94% PREL-0850-9425-1400-0nm5 1.44% 0.59% 4.56% 43.22% 50.19% PREL-2750-9425-1400-0nm5
0.34% 0.78% 4.22% 21.91% 72.75% PREL-0850-9425-2500-0nm5 TC11 7.59% 2.00% 5.66% 37.16% 47.59% PREL-2750-9425-2500-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 3.81% 13.50% 82.69% PREL-0850-9425-9425-0nm5 0.34% 0.19% 2.19% 41.66% 55.63% PREL-2750-9425-9425-0nm5 TC12
8.10% 2.15% 10.21% 50.56% 28.98% Airspace Interaction with EM 2.15% 0.86% 4.05% 35.29% 57.65% Airspace Interaction without
Flaw EM Flaw
18.50% 2.94% 23.03% 48.69% 6.84% ENCTS-2025-9425-2030-0nm5 TC1 0.00% 0.00% 1.88% 23.06% 75.06% ENCTS-2025-9425-2030-0nm5
14.19% 1.66% 7.03% 31.75% 45.38% ES-2025-2500-2500-0nm5 0.00% 0.00% 1.78% 31.84% 66.38% ENCTS-2205-9425-2030-0nm5
2.13% 1.53% 7.34% 76.66% 12.34% L-2835-2500-2500-0nm5 0.00% 0.00% 1.63% 31.78% 66.59% ENCTS-2275-9425-2030-0nm5
5.94% 2.78% 11.84% 64.88% 14.56% MWT-2880-1400-1400-0nm5 2.53% 0.97% 4.38% 41.34% 50.78% ENCTS-2700-9425-2030-0nm5
0.03% 0.03% 3.66% 50.09% 46.19% MWT-3015-1400-1400-0nm5 12.75% 3.59% 15.94% 53.22% 14.50% ENCTS-2880-9425-2030-0nm5 TC2
7.81% 3.97% 8.34% 31.28% 48.59% PRE-3015-9425-1400-0nm5 1.44% 0.16% 2.34% 24.84% 71.22% ES-2025-2500-2500-0nm5 TC3
Original Model Datasets as used in the "User Test" Questionnaire 2.72% 2.00% 5.69% 36.84% 52.75% L-2835-2500-2500-0nm5 TC4
6.16% 2.03% 6.69% 53.88% 31.25% MWT-2880-1400-1400-0nm5 TC5
0.00% 0.00% 2.53% 59.25% 38.22% MWT-3015-1400-1400-0nm5
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.88% 99.13% NONE-1850-2500-2500-3nm0
0.00% 0.00% 0.66% 36.88% 62.47% NONE-3050-2500-2500-3nm0
2.38% 2.38% 8.91% 38.25% 48.09% PRE-3015-9425-1400-0nm5 TC6
0.00% 0.00% 0.28% 26.69% 73.03% PRE-3050-2500-2500-3nm0
Airprox 
None
Airprox 
CatA
Airprox 
CatB
Airprox 
CatC
Airprox 
CatD
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In selecting the test cases for validation and subsequent incorporation into the enhanced HAZOP, highlighted in Table 
A.2, the aim was to identify those with the highest rated generating category “A” occurrences whilst also involving the 
slowest combination of interaction speeds.  In the case of the approaches from ahead a second test case was chosen at 
maximum speeds also.  Whilst it is expected that head-on interactions at higher closing velocities are obviously 
hazardous, which appears to be borne out by the incidence category “A” events revealed by the table, this particular case 
(TC7) is of interest in considering whether it might be more or less diagnosable using the Bayesian inference model.  The 
remaining special cases were selected on the basis of their representation of specific flaws and in producing a higher 
relative rate of category “A” occurrences.  Individual test cases were then subsequently drawn from each dataset by 
identifying an appropriate category “A” air proximity event within each dataset (plus a few representative collisions).  
Having identified, selected and obtained the specific test case results, both directly from the system dynamics model 
output data and as processed by the Bayesian learning, these event series are then processed to reveal the extra 
information subsequently used to enhance the HAZOP capturing the likely complex behaviour in a succinct form. 
A.6. Validation Test Cases and Results 
 
Figure A.9 Collision Avoidance Process Control Loop context: Hazard Vignettes and Flaws 
«ContextDiagram»
ibd [block] SAA Scenario Collision Avoidance Process Control Loop
«block»
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NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
Satisfies
«requirement»
Identify Control Flaws
Hazard Vignettes:
[Remain Clear System Process]
HAZOP
Team
Collision Avoidance System:
[Behavioural Models]
Collision Avoidance HAZOP
[Control Flaws]
Violations: Behaviours:
Flaws:
Deviations:
Perceived Range Estimation Vignette:
[Remain Clear System Goal]
Excessive NCT Speed Vignette:
[Remain Clear System Goal]
Minimum Warning Time Vignette:
[Remain Clear System Goal]
Excessive Speed Vignette:
[Remain Clear System Goal]
Latency Vignette:
[Remain Clear System Goal]
UAS Emergency Manoeuvre:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
UAS Avoid RoTA Behaviour Viewpoint:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
UAS Heading Maintenance:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
Collision Avoidance Dysfunctions:
[Behavioural Models]
NCT Avoid RoTA Behaviour Viewpoint:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
NCT Heading Maintenance:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
UAS Detect Viewpoint:
CausalLoopSystemTruthInterface
UAS and NCT Threatened Intrusions:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
Estimation Control Flaw:
[Flaw Requirement]
UAS RoTA Control Flaw:
[Flaw Requirement]
NCT RoTA Control Flaw:
[Flaw Requirement]
Rigidity Control Flaw:
[Flaw Requirement]
Delay Control Flaw:
[Flaw Requirement]
Arbitration Control Flaw:
[Flaw Requirement]
Dysfunctions:
3 NM PRE Vignette:
[Remain Clear System Goal]
Deviations & Guidewords
: STHAZOPItems
Identified Control Flaws
: STHAZOPItems
Design Decisions
: STHAZOPItems
Constraint Violation Definitions
: STHAZOPItems
Inadequate Control Actions
: STHAZOPItems
UAS Track Error Limits:
CausalLoopSynthesisedView
Lost NCT:
[Flaw Requirement]
Validation confirms 
the existence and 
influence of the 
defined control flaws 
found to be present 
in these hazard 
vignettes 
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Ibd SAA Scenario System Goal Perceived Range Estimation Vignette [behaviour]
Perceived Range Estimation Vignette:
[Remain Clear System Goal]
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 301.5° ±5°
Non-Coop Traffic Speed = 140kts ±5kts
UAS Heading = 0°
UAS Speed = 94.25kts ±5kts
Minimum Warning Time = 15s ±5s
Perceived Range Estimation = 25% .. 400%
Perceived Range Estimation Behaviour:
near-miss
Perceived Range Estimation Behaviour:
collision
«allocate» «allocate»
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
NCT Track
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
NCT Track
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 297°
Perceived Range Estimation ~ 184%
Incurs a mid-way decision change.
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 301.5°
Perceived Range Estimation ~ 184%
Range overestimated by 84%
NB: for Level 3 Intent Spec., “Black-box Model Behaviour View”
stm [testCase] SAA Scenario System Goal Perceived Range Estimation Vignette [states]
Control Monte Carlo 
Simulation
Define vensim Monte Carlo parameters
Random selection of values
to initialise each run
Save datasetStart
Increment to next run
Done = 200 runs
System Behaviour
Time = 25 sec
UAV Behaviour
Initialise
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
UAS Heading = 0°
UAS Speed = 94.25kts ±5kts
Minimum Warning Time = 15s ±5s
Perceived Range Estimation = 25% .. 400%
Avoidance Zone
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
separation > 1NM OR
separation < 500'
separation > 1NM OR
separation < 500'
emergency manoeuvre
commanded
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
emergency manoeuvre commanded
Separation Zone
PRE * separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
separation < 0.5NM
separation < 0.5NM
PRE * separation
> Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
PRE * separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
PRE * separation > Initial Traffic Separation * Clearance Margin
Less Than Closest Point of Approach
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
separation > 750' OR
separation < 35'
separation > 750' OR
separation < 35'
emergency manoeuvre
commanded
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
emergency manoeuvre commanded
Collision separation < 35' separation > 750'
Critical Constraint 
Violation
separation < 500' separation > 1NM
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
NTC Behaviour
Initialise
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 301.5° ±5°
Non-Coop Traffic Speed = 140kts ±5kts
Collision
separation < 35'
separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
separation < 35'
separation < 35'
separation
> Initial Traffic Separation
separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
separation > Initial Traffic Separation
Time = 0 sec
RoTA Behaviour
RoTA Behaviour RoTA Behaviour RoTA Behaviour
Emergency Manoeuvre 
Emergency Manoeuvre Heading Maintenance Heading Maintenance
Transitions in this zone are affected by 
the Perceived Range Estimation value.
The emergency manoeuvre command depends 
upon perceived range & track error limits to PoC.
The emergency 
manoeuvre command 
depends upon perceived 
range & track error limits 
to Point of Conflict.
A-206 
 
 
 
Ibd SAA Scenario System Goal Excessive NCT Speed Vignette [behaviour]
Excessive NCT Speed Vignette:
[Remain Clear System Goal]
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 202.5° ±5°
Non-Coop Traffic Speed = 203kts ±5kts
UAS Heading = 0°
UAS Speed = 94.25kts ±5kts
Minimum Warning Time = 15s ±5s
Excessive NCT Speed Behaviour:
near-miss
Excessive NCT Speed Behaviour:
collision
«allocate» «allocate»
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 198°
Due to difference in higher speed of NCT.
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 202.5°
Due to difference in higher speed of NCT.
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
NCT Track
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
1
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0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
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NB: for Level 3 Intent Spec., “Black-box Model Behaviour View”
stm [testCase] SAA Scenario System Goal Excessive NCT Speed Vignette [states]
Control Monte Carlo 
Simulation
Define vensim Monte Carlo parameters
Random selection of values
to initialise each run
Save datasetStart
Increment to next run
Done = 200 runs
System Behaviour
Time = 25 sec
UAV Behaviour
Initialise
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
UAS Heading = 0°
UAS Speed = 94.25kts ±5kts
Avoidance Zone
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
separation > 1NM OR
separation < 500'
separation > 1NM OR
separation < 500'
emergency manoeuvre
commanded
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
emergency manoeuvre commanded
Separation Zone
PRE * separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
separation < 0.5NM
separation < 0.5NM
PRE * separation
> Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
PRE * separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
PRE * separation > Initial Traffic Separation * Clearance Margin
Less Than Closest Point of Approach
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
separation > 750' OR
separation < 35'
separation > 750' OR
separation < 35'
emergency manoeuvre
commanded
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
emergency manoeuvre commanded
Collision separation < 35' separation > 750'
Critical Constraint 
Violation
separation < 500' separation > 1NM
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
NTC Behaviour
Initialise
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 202.5° ±5°
Non-Coop Traffic Speed = 203kts ±5kts
Collision
separation < 35'
separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
separation < 35'
separation < 35'
separation
> Initial Traffic Separation
separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
separation > Initial Traffic Separation
Time = 0 sec
RoTA Behaviour
RoTA Behaviour RoTA Behaviour RoTA Behaviour
Emergency Manoeuvre 
Emergency Manoeuvre Heading Maintenance Heading Maintenance
The higher speed and the head-on 
direction of the non-cooperative traffic is 
perceived to be a greater threat triggering 
an inappropriate emergency manoeuvre 
command to the left as the NCT is 
arriving from the right of centreline. 
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Ibd SAA Scenario System Goal Minimum Warning Time Vignette [behaviour]
Minimum Warning Time Vignette:
[Remain Clear System Goal]
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 301.5° ±5°
Non-Coop Traffic Speed = 140kts ±5kts
UAS Heading = 0°
UAS Speed = 140kts ±5kts
Minimum Warning Time = 1s ±1s
Minimum Warning Time Behaviour:
ok
Minimum Warning Time Behaviour:
near-miss
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Nautical Miles
NCT Track
«allocate» «allocate»
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 297°
Minimum Warning Time > 2s
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 297°
Minimum Warning Time < 1s
Collisions occur at 301.5°
Due to no nearness threat warning.
NB: for Level 3 Intent Spec., “Black-box Model Behaviour View”
stm [testCase] SAA Scenario System Goal Minimum Warning Time Vignette [states]
Control Monte Carlo 
Simulation
Define vensim Monte Carlo parameters
Random selection of values
to initialise each run
Save datasetStart
Increment to next run
Done = 200 runs
System Behaviour
Time = 25 sec
UAV Behaviour
Initialise
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
UAS Heading = 0°
UAS Speed = 140kts ±5kts
Minimum Warning Time = 1s ±1s
Avoidance Zone
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
separation > 1NM OR
separation < 500'
separation > 1NM OR
separation < 500'
emergency manoeuvre
commanded
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
emergency manoeuvre commanded
Separation Zone
PRE * separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
separation < 0.5NM
separation < 0.5NM
PRE * separation
> Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
PRE * separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
PRE * separation > Initial Traffic Separation * Clearance Margin
Less Than Closest Point of Approach
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
separation > 750' OR
separation < 35'
separation > 750' OR
separation < 35'
emergency manoeuvre
commanded
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
emergency manoeuvre commanded
Collision separation < 35' separation > 750'
Critical Constraint 
Violation
separation < 500' separation > 1NM
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
NTC Behaviour
Initialise
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 301.5° ±5°
Non-Coop Traffic Speed = 140kts ±5kts
Collision
separation < 35'
separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
separation < 35'
separation < 35'
separation
> Initial Traffic Separation
separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
separation > Initial Traffic Separation
Time = 0 sec
RoTA Behaviour
RoTA Behaviour RoTA Behaviour RoTA Behaviour
Emergency Manoeuvre 
Emergency Manoeuvre Heading Maintenance Heading Maintenance
The emergency 
manoeuvre is not 
commanded where the 
warning time is 
insufficient.
The emergency manoeuvre is not commanded 
where the warning time is insufficient.
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Ibd SAA Scenario System Goal Excessive Speed Vignette [behaviour]
Excessive Speed Vignette:
[Remain Clear System Goal]
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 202.5° ±5°
Non-Coop Traffic Speed = 250kts ±5kts
UAS Heading = 0°
UAS Speed = 250kts ±5kts
Minimum Warning Time = 15s ±5s
Excessive Speed Behaviour:
near-miss
Excessive Speed Behaviour:
entrainment
«allocate» «allocate»
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 198°
Latency in Perceiving Threat = 1s
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 202.5°
Latency in Perceiving Threat = 1s
Excessive speed in the offset head-on 
case causes capture and entrainment.
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
4
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Nautical Miles
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ATC view of Unmanned Autonomous System on Surveillance Radar
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NB: for Level 3 Intent Spec., “Black-box Model Behaviour View”
stm [testCase] SAA Scenario System Goal Excessive Speed Vignette [states]
Control Monte Carlo 
Simulation
Define vensim Monte Carlo parameters
Random selection of values
to initialise each run
Save datasetStart
Increment to next run
Done = 200 runs
System Behaviour
Time = 25 sec
UAV Behaviour
Initialise
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
UAS Heading = 0°
UAS Speed = 250kts ±5kts
Minimum Warning Time = 15s ±5s
Avoidance Zone
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
separation > 1NM OR
separation < 500'
separation > 1NM OR
separation < 500'
emergency manoeuvre
commanded
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
emergency manoeuvre commanded
Separation Zone
PRE * separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
separation < 0.5NM
separation < 0.5NM
PRE * separation
> Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
PRE * separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
PRE * separation > Initial Traffic Separation * Clearance Margin
Less Than Closest Point of Approach
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
separation > 750' OR
separation < 35'
separation > 750' OR
separation < 35'
emergency manoeuvre
commanded
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
emergency manoeuvre commanded
Collision separation < 35' separation > 750'
Critical Constraint 
Violation
separation < 500' separation > 1NM
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
NTC Behaviour
Initialise
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 202.5° ±5°
Non-Coop Traffic Speed = 250kts ±5kts
Collision
separation < 35'
separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
separation < 35'
separation < 35'
separation
> Initial Traffic Separation
separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
separation > Initial Traffic Separation
Time = 0 sec
RoTA Behaviour
RoTA Behaviour RoTA Behaviour RoTA Behaviour
Emergency Manoeuvre 
Emergency Manoeuvre Heading Maintenance Heading Maintenance
The combined high speed and the head-on 
direction of the encounter is perceived to be a 
sufficient threat triggering an inappropriate 
emergency manoeuvre command to the left 
as the NCT is arriving from the right of 
centreline. 
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Ibd SAA Scenario System Goal Latency Vignette [behaviour]
Latency Vignette:
[Remain Clear System Goal]
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 283.5° ±5°
Non-Coop Traffic Speed = 250kts ±5kts
UAS Heading = 0°
UAS Speed = 250kts ±5kts
Minimum Warning Time = 15s ±5s
Latency in Perceiving Threat = 5s ±5s
Latency Behaviour:
near-miss
Latency Behaviour:
collision
«allocate» «allocate»
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 279°
Latency in Perceiving Threat > 4.5s
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 283.5°
Latency in Perceiving Threat > 4.5s
ATC view of Non Cooperative Traffic on Surveillance Radar
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ATC view of Unmanned Autonomous System on Surveillance Radar
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NB: for Level 3 Intent Spec., “Black-box Model Behaviour View”
stm [testCase] SAA Scenario System Goal Latency Vignette [states]
Control Monte Carlo 
Simulation
Define vensim Monte Carlo parameters
Random selection of values
to initialise each run
Save datasetStart
Increment to next run
Done = 200 runs
System Behaviour
Time = 25 sec
UAV Behaviour
Initialise
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
UAS Heading = 0°
UAS Speed = 250kts ±5kts
Minimum Warning Time = 15s ±5s
Latency in Perceiving Threat = 5s ±5s
Avoidance Zone
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
separation > 1NM OR
separation < 500'
separation > 1NM OR
separation < 500'
emergency manoeuvre
commanded
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
emergency manoeuvre commanded
Separation Zone
PRE * separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
separation < 0.5NM
separation < 0.5NM
PRE * separation
> Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
PRE * separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
* Clearance Margin
PRE * separation > Initial Traffic Separation * Clearance Margin
Less Than Closest Point of Approach
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
separation > 750' OR
separation < 35'
separation > 750' OR
separation < 35'
emergency manoeuvre
commanded
emergency manoeuvre
NOT commanded
emergency manoeuvre commanded
Collision separation < 35' separation > 750'
Critical Constraint 
Violation
separation < 500' separation > 1NM
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
NTC Behaviour
Initialise
Initial Traffic Separation = 0.5NM ±0.1NM
Non-Coop Traffic Heading = 283.5° ±5°
Non-Coop Traffic Speed = 250kts ±5kts
Collision
separation < 35'
separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
separation < 35'
separation < 35'
separation
> Initial Traffic Separation
separation
< Initial Traffic Separation
separation > Initial Traffic Separation
Time = 0 sec
RoTA Behaviour
RoTA Behaviour RoTA Behaviour RoTA Behaviour
Emergency Manoeuvre 
Emergency Manoeuvre Heading Maintenance Heading Maintenance
A delay in issuing an emergency manoeuvre 
command risks collision.
At a closing speed of 500kts it takes only 3.6 seconds to close 
to zero feet separation, when directly head-on.  Even with the 
other aircraft coming from the right a delay in issuing an 
emergency manoeuvre command risks collision by causing the 
UAS to attempt to manoeuvre according to rules of the air 
before determining that this is not possible due to the speeds.
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bdd SAA Scenario Behaviour Belief Network
«block»
Goal System Behaviour Belief Network
Speed Difference Vignette
Excessive
Acceptable
45.3
54.7
NCT RoTA
other True
Rigidity
other True
Arbitration
other True
Excessive Speed Vignette
Excessive
Acceptable
28.0
72.0
UAS RoTA
other True
i i it
t r r
r itration
other True
Perceived Range Estimation Vignette
Farther
Tolerable
Nearer
31.6
47.2
21.2
Minimum Warning Time Vignette
Insufficient
Sufficient
3.17
96.8
Latency Vignette
Excessive
Acceptable
43.3
56.7
Estimation
other True
Lost NCT
other True
Delay
other True
Conflicted Manoeuvre
other True
Excessive Manoeuvre
other True
Insufficient Manoeuvre
other True
Late Manoeuvre Engagem...
other True
Early Manoeuvre Disenga...
other True
Wrong Manoeuvre
other True
No Manoeuvre
other True
ICAxx MonteCarlo :
neticaCaseData
Test Case Observed Flaw
– Deviation Associations :
neticaInference
CFyy MonteCarlo :
neticaCaseData BN Defects MonteCarlo :
neticaCaseData
Control Flaw – Inadequate
Control Action Node
Structure : neticaLinks
Scenario Vignette
Nodes : neticaLinks
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
bdd SAA Scenario Lyapunov State Monitoring Viewpoint
«block»
UAS & NCT State Monitoring
NCT rate of turn :
vensimVar
Collision :
vensimVar
Lambda Tee :
vensimVar
UAS rate of turn :
vensimVar
Lyapunov Exponent :
vensimVar
UAS previous RoT NCT previous RoT
<Time>
NCT RoT Lyapunov
previous NCT RoT
Lyapunov
NCT Lyapunov
UAS RoT Lyapunov
previous UAS RoT
Lyapunov
UAS Lyapunov
Lyapunov Exponent
Lambda Tee
previous
Lambda Tee Lambda Tee spikes
Lambda Tee Qprevious LT Q
<Collision>
<UAS rate of turn>
<NCT rate of turn>
Time :
vensimIntrinsic
NB: for Level 1 Intent Spec., “Customer Usage & Goals View”
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Figure A.10 Control Flaw Relative Likelihoods for Test Cases 6, 1 and 5 from Bayesian Learning 
pie [testResult] SAA Scenario Perceived Range Estimate Vignette [inference] 
CF15
64%
CF04
36%
Enabled System Flaws @ 22 sec
CONFLIC
TING
62%
LESS
31%
NONE | 
OTHERS
7%
Detected Deviations @ 22 sec
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
pie [testResult] SAA Scenario Excessive NCT Speed Vignette [inference]
CF15
41%
CF08
12%
CF06
20%
CF07
27%
Enabled System Flaws @ 7 sec
CONFLIC
TING
78%
NONE | 
OTHERS
22%
Detected Deviations @ 7 sec
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
pie [testResult] SAA Scenario Minimum Warning Time Vignette [inference]
CF04
73%
CF08
24%
CF07
3%
Enabled System Flaws @ 9 sec
MORE
12%
NONE | 
OTHERS
88%
Detected Deviations @ 9 sec
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
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Figure A.11 Control Flaw Relative Likelihoods for Test Cases 3 and 4 from Bayesian Learning 
pie [testResult] SAA Scenario Excessive Speed Vignette [inference]
CF15
24%
CF08
15%
CF07
33%
CF05
28%
Enabled System Flaws @ 3 sec
MORE
35%
NONE | 
OTHERS
65%
Detected Deviations @ 3 sec
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
pie [testResult] SAA Scenario Latency Vignette [inference]
CF15
25%
CF10
11%
CF08
14%
CF07
23%
CF05
27%
Enabled System Flaws @ 4 sec
MORE
39%
NONE | 
OTHERS
61%
Detected Deviations @ 4 sec
NB: for Level 2 Intent Spec., “Systems Engineering View”
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Figure A.12 Lyapunov Exponent Distributions at 25 seconds for TC 6 
hist [testResult] SAA Scenario Perceived Range Estimation Vignette [Lyapunov]
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NB: for Level 1 Intent Spec., “Customer Usage & Goals View”
time [testResult] SAA Scenario Perceived Range Estimate Vignette [Lyapunov λT]
Test Case
50% 75% 95% 100%
Lambda Tee
6
-0.5
-7
-13.5
-20
0 6.25 12.5 18.75 25
Time (Second)
NB: for Level 1 Intent Spec., “Customer Usage & Goals View”
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Figure A.13 Lyapunov Exponent Distributions at 25 seconds for TC 1 
hist [testResult] SAA Scenario Excessive NCT Speed Vignette [Lyapunov]
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NB: for Level 1 Intent Spec., “Customer Usage & Goals View”
time [testResult] SAA Scenario Excessive NCT Speed Vignette [Lyapunov λT]
Test Case
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Lambda Tee
20
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NB: for Level 1 Intent Spec., “Customer Usage & Goals View”
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Figure A.14 Lyapunov Exponent Distributions at 25 seconds for TC 5 
hist [testResult] SAA Scenario Minimum Warning Time Vignette [Lyapunov]
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NB: for Level 1 Intent Spec., “Customer Usage & Goals View”
time [testResult] SAA Scenario Minimum Warning Time Vignette [Lyapunov λT]
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Lambda Tee
20
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NB: for Level 1 Intent Spec., “Customer Usage & Goals View”
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Figure A.15 Lyapunov Exponent Distributions at 25 seconds for TC 3 
hist [testResult] SAA Scenario Excessive Speed Vignette [Lyapunov]
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NB: for Level 1 Intent Spec., “Customer Usage & Goals View”
time [testResult] SAA Scenario Excessive Speed Vignette [Lyapunov λT]
Test Case
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NB: for Level 1 Intent Spec., “Customer Usage & Goals View”
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Figure A.16 Lyapunov Exponent Distributions at 25 seconds for TC 4 
hist [testResult] SAA Scenario Latency Vignette [Lyapunov]
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NB: for Level 1 Intent Spec., “Customer Usage & Goals View”
time [testResult] SAA Scenario Latency Vignette [Lyapunov λT]
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NB: for Level 1 Intent Spec., “Customer Usage & Goals View”
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A.7. Bayesian Monte Carlo Responses 
For the Bayesian Monte Carlo results, Figure A.17 and Figure A.18 present the observed distributions of 
sample averages formed with ten samples apiece, for varying combinations of just two of the deliberately 
injected control flaws – variations in the perceived range estimation (CF04) and in the latency or delay in 
commanding the emergency backup manoeuvre (CF10).  Each of these distributions represents observations 
on the distribution of these parameters given the simultaneous presence of either a category A or B violation 
event.  Therefore these distributions represent probability density functions for possible cause given category 
A or B events, p(possible cause | CatAB), with the overall rate representing the corresponding likelihood that 
a category A or B event occurs due to the possible cause, L(CatAB | possible cause). 
By forming the distributions with sample averages, each distribution tends towards normal (Gaussian) as a 
consequence of the central limit theorem.  Consequently, most of the larger distributions in these figures 
present an approximately normal shape, with the notable exception of the occurrences from “behind left” 
where there are very few CatAB events.  Given the uniform distribution of values from which these causes are 
derived in the Monte Carlo simulations if we assume an absence of bias
7
 the expectation would be that the 
mean and mode of the distribution tend towards the centre of the range, and be distributed evenly on either 
side of the mode.  However, inspecting the top left plot (PRE for all occurrences from Left) reveals a very 
clear bi-modal distribution with the dip between the modes centred upon 1.05 (105% range estimation).  
Where these PRE values are then separated into “Farther” and “Nearer” groups, with the elimination of any 
potential “latency” control flaws, it would be expected that two distinct distributions are formed as can be 
seen, but again the modes for these are further apart than they should be for no bias. 
Consequently, the behaviour of the model revealed through the Monte Carlo cases does provide a varying bias 
to the error value means responsible for defective behaviour; and in the case of the estimation error these 
values also fall naturally into Farther and Nearer Estimation Error defect groups.  A particularly interesting 
feature of this is that the “Nearer” estimation errors, where the UAS estimates the NCT to be nearer than it 
actually is, produces a higher rate of CatAB events than “Farther” estimates – most apparent in the approaches 
from the left.  This behaviour is also borne out in observations on the trained Bayesian network, where it was 
first observed.  The implication of this is that in certain circumstances a “trigger-happy” approach to 
emergency behaviour is perhaps more likely to incur a constraint violation than deferred action.  To some 
extent this is also borne out by the “latency” error behaviour (right-hand plot group) for the Left and Right 
approach cases each exhibiting a smaller peak at 1 second delay, and the main group modes occurring at 
between 3.4 and 3.8 seconds – again indicative of possible problems associated with a “trigger-happy” 
premature and overly responsive back-up behaviour. 
 
                                                     
7
 The distributions are not perfectly uniform, the latency population average is 2.469s in a 0-5 second window and the 
perceived range estimate population average is 1.044 in a window extending from 0.7 to 1.4. 
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Figure A.17 Probability Density Functions for Sample Averages of Estimation 
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Figure A.18 Probability Density Functions for Sample Averages of Latency 
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The final step in this Bayesian Monte Carlo analysis is then to synthesise a probability density function 
surface correlating the likely probabilities that either a given estimation error (within CF04) and / or a given 
latency value (CF10) might cause a category A or B violation event.  Unfortunately, as to whether a violation 
occurs as a consequence of only one of the causative factors, or in combination with the other, or indeed due 
to some other hidden cause, is unknown.   Therefore the estimate has been composed as an average of two 
methods combining the maximum rates of occurrence of each potentially causative value with the other defect 
eliminated where detected (e.g. PRE selected only where the delay flaw CF10 is not detected), with the 
minimum rates accounting for where the two are believed to occur together – equations A.1 – A.4. 
     [
 (      |     )   (      |     )   (      |     )   (      |     )
   
 (       |     )   (      |     )   (       |     )   (      |     )
]                     (A.1) 
     [
√ (      |    )   (      |    )  √ (      |    )   (      |    )
   
√ (       |    )   (      |    )  √ (       |    )   (      |    )
]                              (A.2) 
     [
   ( (      |     )  (      |     ))     ( (      |     )  (      |     ))
   
   ( (       |     )  (      |     ))     ( (       |     )  (      |     ))
] 
 (A.3) 
     [
   ( (      |    )  (      |    ))     ( (      |    )  (      |    ))
   
   ( (      |    )  (      |    ))     ( (       |    )  (      |    ))
]                 (A.4) 
Finally the likelihood surfaces for each direction of approach are calculated as shown in Figure A.19.  These 
surfaces provide an estimation of the likelihood that category A or B violations occur as a consequence of a 
particular combination of perceived range estimation and latency values, within a rectangular interval (ΔPRE 
= 0.05, ΔLat = 0.4s); where S is the number of strips (14) across the plot and CatAB is the number of all 
category A or B violations within each set – equation A.5.  In exploring this approach, it was observed that the 
numeric exclusive OR / AND method, and the MAX / MIN method, both produced very similar surfaces after 
renormalisation, where the option was then taken of blending the two, which together produces a slightly 
smoother and easier to interpret result. 
 (     |       )
 
       
 
 {
         
∑ ∑ (                       )
   
          
    
            
 
         
∑ ∑ (                       )
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                                                                     (A.5) 
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Figure A.19 Vignette Bayesian Monte Carlo parameter sensitivity surfaces 
So as to make clear the relative scale of each surface, the prominent percentage values superimposed over the 
surface plots, in Figure A.19 above, represent the overall rate at which category A or B violations occur within 
the particular sector.  As the only faults that are deliberately and knowingly injected into these vignettes are 
the variations in perceived estimation of range and latency, this violation rate might be taken as the overall 
likelihood that these violations occur due only to the defective values contained within the range of these 
variables.  As the violation rate obviously varies also according to the direction of approach then clearly this is 
not true.  The behaviour of the system is also affected by speed and direction, and perhaps embodies other 
hidden and unknown defects – certain speed ranges might themselves be considered defective.  Given also 
that we do not know exactly where a particular boundary, in terms of speed or direction, lies within the model 
it may be very difficult to fully separate these effects.  For the purposes of this study, the larger value is taken 
as the likelihood that over the entire range of speed, estimation and latency combinations, as explored by the 
Monte Carlo simulations, a violation event may occur within the given range of directions of approach for that 
sector.  Whereas, assuming that the overall rate within any sector accommodates the speed and direction 
elements, then the surface under this is taken to represent variations in this rate due to estimation error and 
latency defects alone – which may not be entirely true as the exact location of the directional boundary is 
unknown, and even that assumes that there is a clear boundary and that there are no other unknown defects.  
Even so, a purely mechanical use of these surfaces might extract likelihood values for use in the calculation of 
risks related to the more narrowly defined combinations of defects as occur in the special cases (TC1 – 6).  
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A.8. Correlations between Lyapunov Exponent Values & Airprox Violations 
 
 
Figure A.20 Lyapunov v Airprox Correlation as Scatter Plot & Linear Regressions inc. TC 9 
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Figure A.21 Scatter Plots with respect to Initial Relative Heading including TC 9 
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Figure A.22 Lyapunov v Airprox Correlation as Scatter Plot & Linear Regressions inc. TC 11 
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Figure A.23 Scatter Plots with respect to Initial Relative Heading including TC 9 
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Figure A.24 Lyapunov v Airprox Correlation as Scatter Plot & Linear Regressions inc. TCs 7 & 8 
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Figure A.25 Scatter Plots with respect to Initial Relative Heading including TCs 7 & 8 
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Figure A.26 Lyapunov v Airprox Correlation as Scatter Plot & Linear Regressions inc. TC 12 
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Figure A.27 Scatter Plots with respect to Initial Relative Heading including TC 12 
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Figure A.28 Lyapunov v Airprox Correlation as Scatter Plot & Linear Regressions inc. TC 10 
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Figure A.29 Scatter Plots with respect to Initial Relative Heading including TC 10 
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A.9. Hazardous Outcome Test Case Summaries 
 
Figure A.30 Hazardous Outcome Test Cases: Flaws, Deviations and Consequences for Approaches from Ahead and the Right  
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Figure A.31 Hazardous Outcome Test Cases: Flaw, Deviation, Perceived Estimation, and Latency Likelihoods, and Behaviours for Approaches from 
Ahead and the Right 
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Figure A.32 Hazardous Outcome Test Cases: Flaws, Deviations and Consequences for Approaches from Behind and the Left  
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Figure A.33 Hazardous Outcome Test Cases: Flaw, Deviation, Perceived Estimation, and Latency Likelihoods, and Behaviours for Approaches from 
Behind and the Left 
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Appendix B.  Hazards Advising Autonomy: Questionnaire  
Motivation 
This questionnaire arises from an on-going Systems Engineering Doctorate project.  The purpose of this 
project is to investigate the development of a methodology and framework to determine autonomous 
system safety requirements relating to advisory functions in the context of system complexity and 
uncertainty.  A variant of HAZOP (Hazard & Operability) study is proposed, along with the modelling of 
the likely system dynamics together with an inference mechanism to validate interpretations of predicted 
behaviour.  These modelling approaches may even be used to represent a missing member of the HAZOP 
team – one with expertise accounting to some degree for the intended machine intelligence and its likely 
behaviour.  It is a considerable challenge to adapt the HAZOP process to the fuzziness of systems with 
autonomous behaviour, including the dynamics of potentially dangerous interactions.  Therefore the 
investigation is contextualised with a “toy-version” of a suitably representative problem.  This 
questionnaire has been developed to assess to what extent dynamic behaviour for a given system might be 
intuitively grasped by specialists drawn from the field.  With the outline system description given it is not 
the intention that you necessarily try to mentally emulate the model so much as to employ whatever 
experience, engineering judgement, and even “gut-feeling”, as you might if considering the manoeuvre 
“deviations” as a member of a HAZOP team – the description serves as a guide only to intended 
behaviour.  Please allow from an hour to 105 minutes to thoroughly read and complete this questionnaire – 
thank you.  
Scenario Background 
To this end a simplified “sense and 
avoid” system model has been created 
in order to facilitate an investigation of 
the hazard assessment concept, 
representing a two-dimensional 
interaction model with simplified rules 
and physics.  The essential scenario is as 
presented alongside in Figure B.1.  
From this figure and for all of the 
vignettes within the scenario it is 
assumed that both vehicles are initially 
heading toward a common point of conflict (PoC). 
Both vehicles embody the Rules of the Air, as described overleaf.  However the entity representing the 
UAV also embodies an additional emergency manoeuvre behaviour that overrides these rules of the air 
when threatened by the other intruding aircraft – which in general will cause the “UAV” to attempt to turn 
away from the direction of the threat.  Also within these rules, each vehicle either takes the shortest turn 
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70°70°
towards its original heading where a rule allows a return to course or by default takes a turn to the left 
where the angle of turn required is approximately equal either way. 
“Rules of the Air” – CAP 393 Section 4 General Flight Rules8 (abridged) 
Avoiding aerial collisions – 8 
(5) … an aircraft which has the right-of-way under this rule shall maintain its course and speed. 
Converging – 9 
(3) … when two aircraft are converging in the air at approximately the same 
altitude, the aircraft which has the other on its right shall give way. 
Approaching head-on – 10 
When two aircraft are approaching head-on, or approximately so, in the air and there is a 
danger of collision, each shall alter its course to the right. 
Overtaking – 11 
(1) … an aircraft which is being overtaken in the air shall have the right-of-way and 
the overtaking aircraft, whether climbing, descending or in horizontal flight, shall 
keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right. 
For the emergency behaviour, the behavioural model for the 
UAV also presents a threat zone, of radius equivalent to that of a 
rate one turn at the current UAV airspeed, placed directly ahead, 
as illustrated alongside in Figure B.2.  If the UAV model 
perceives that this threat exists, and with sufficient warning 
time, then an emergency manoeuvre is initiated, turning the 
UAV in the direction away from the intruder’s current position 
with respect to the UAV’s extended centre-line.  The enactment 
of this behaviour is a discontinuity with respect to the “rules of 
the air” behaviour, and if this behaviour is incorrectly specified 
then the hazard is not mitigated but worsened.  Otherwise, the 
UAV executes an avoidance manoeuvre consistent with the 
rules of the air and based only upon the line of sight to the intruding aircraft.  When safe separation is 
achieved both model entities will then turn towards their original headings.  
Three specific system defects have been incorporated into the model: errors in the perceived range 
estimation, variation of the warning time of threats, and variation of the latency in reacting to threats.  
Sensor models, fields and depth of view, explicit aerodynamic behaviour, inertial properties and delays in 
                                                     
8
 CAP 393 - Air Navigation: The Order and the Regulations. London, UK: TSO (The Stationery Office) on 
behalf of the UK Civil Aviation Authority, Safety Regulation Group, 2010 
Emergency 
behaviour is 
invoked if the 
UAV is 
threatened 
within this zone
Emergency 
behaviour is 
invoked if the 
UAV is 
threatened 
within this zone
Li
ne
 o
f s
ig
ht
℄
Collision 
threat zone 
radius = 0.5 
NM.
Figure B.2. 
B-240 
 
controller and actuator mechanisms are all either ignored, assumed to be “perfect”, or otherwise 
considerably simplified.  Only dynamics essential for avoidance are represented.  
Any separation less than a certain minimum is deemed a collision – freezing any further movement of the 
two vehicles and consequently freezing the simulated separation as effectively zero. 
Pre-preliminary Safety Assessment / HAZOP Methodology 
For the purposes of this study a variation of the STPA (Systems Theoretic Process Analysis), as developed 
by the Complex Systems Research Laboratory at MIT (http://sunnyday.mit.edu/), has been applied in order 
to develop a provisional HAZOP.  This uses the abstract behavioural parameter “Manoeuvre” to which 
guidewords are applied, creating the seven deviations, or “Inadequate Control Action”, as detailed below: 
ICA01 – Omission  The UAV does not manoeuvre to avoid the other aircraft. 
ICA02 – Commission The UAV manoeuvres in the wrong direction attempting to avoid the other aircraft. 
ICA03 – Early  The UAV prematurely ceases a manoeuvre to avoid the other aircraft and returns to 
the given heading. 
ICA04 – Late  The UAV belatedly initiates a manoeuvre to avoid the other aircraft. 
ICA05 – Less  The UAV rate of manoeuvre is insufficient to avoid the other aircraft. 
ICA06 – More  The UAV rate of manoeuvre is excessive in attempting to avoid the other aircraft. 
ICA07 – Conflicting  The UAV is unable to resolve the conflict between realising the System Goal and 
avoiding the other aircraft. 
Associated with these deviations there are also the following fifteen potential control flaws, or system 
defects as identified through the STPA-HAZOP process.  Together with the observed system dynamical 
behaviour, these deviations and system defects are to be also to be used within a system safety diagnostic 
inference model – aiding system hazard identification, inference and validation.  However, only the 
highlighted control flaws are legitimate in the context of the current model – incorporating the specific 
defect representations as described in the scenario previously: 
CF01 The UAV fails to detect the other aircraft altogether. 
CF02 The UAV does not command a turning manoeuvre from the flight control system (FCS). 
CF03  The UAV flight control surfaces do not respond to demands from the FCS. 
CF04 The UAV incorrectly estimates the location and direction to the predicted point of conflict. 
CF05 The UAV fails to follow established Rules of the Air. 
CF06 The other aircraft fails to follow established Rules of the Air. 
CF07 The UAV interprets the Rules of the Air too rigidly when closing within 500ft of the other 
aircraft. 
CF08 The UAV loses detection of the other aircraft. 
CF09 The UAV fails to detect the other aircraft at sufficient range. 
CF10 The UAV delays the commanding of a turning manoeuvre from the flight control system (FCS). 
CF11 The UAV flight control surfaces are slow to respond to demands from the FCS. 
CF12 The UAV demanded rate of turn is insufficient for the closing angle, speed and range to the other 
aircraft. 
CF13 The UAV maximum demanded rate of turn exceeds the maximum achievable rate of turn. 
CF14 The UAV demanded rate of turn is excessive for the closing angle, speed and range to the other 
aircraft. 
CF15 The UAV does not arbitrate the competing heading demands appropriately.  
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About Yourself 
This questionnaire is anonymous.  Please indicate the extent of your experience in the fields related to this 
study.  This will help to cross-reference, correlate and benchmark the subsequent responses to the multiple-
choice section that follows.  You have the following years of experience in: 
Operator, piloting, air crew and / or air traffic none   <1 yr   1<5 yrs   5<20 yrs   >20 yrs  
System safety engineering   none   <1 yr   1<5 yrs   5<20 yrs   >20 yrs  
Robotics or autonomous systems engineering  none   <1 yr   1<5 yrs   5<20 yrs   >20 yrs  
Applying HAZOP to hazard identification  none   <1 yr   1<5 yrs   5<20 yrs   >20 yrs  
System simulation and / or modelling  none   <1 yr   1<5 yrs   5<20 yrs   >20 yrs  
System diagnostics    none   <1 yr   1<5 yrs   5<20 yrs   >20 yrs  
From the following list select exactly four of the terms or expressions that best qualifies your approach 
and perspective regarding the assessment of system safety.  There are no right or wrong choices in this: 
Component Failure Mode    
Functional Failure Mode     
Mission Phase Analysis     
Classified Severity of Effect    
Probabilistic Occurrence Rates    
Release and Flow of Energy    
System Operating State     
Causal Propagation     
Parameter Deviations     
Human Reliability Error     
Captured Expertise     
Captured Socio-technical Behaviour   
Captured Complex System Dynamics   
Adaptation and Migration of Behaviour   
Active Exploration     
Safety Constraint Violation    
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The Instructions 
It is generally recognized that the validation of a hazard analysis is difficult to objectively accomplish in 
the absence of meaningful hazard statistics.  Consequently, the hazard modelling method is to be validated, 
at least in part, by drawing upon the knowledge and experience of a group of subject matter experts.  By 
executing these dynamical and inference models within a series of hazardous vignettes certain subtleties 
have been identified to be embodied in the following questions. 
The main section of this questionnaire comprises eleven multiple choice questions contained within the 
following four sub-sections.  These questions are designed to explore what is, or is not, intuitive in an 
understanding of the one-on-one collision avoidance scenario, based upon the simplified system model as 
described in the scenario background previously.  Each question has four plausible options, of which only 
one is completely correct according to the model and its observed behaviour.  The aim is to determine how 
close your specialist assessment of the situation is to matching the model.  So as to provide wider scope in 
this assessment multiple selections are also allowed wherever you believe that the true answer may lie in 
more than one choice.  Clearly, however, ticking all four options for a question reveals nothing, identical to 
having ticked none at all.  For clarity, the UAV, where shown in the following, is at the centre or just 
below in each figure. 
Some Notes on Graphical Notation 
Consider the behaviour observed in the 50 second trajectories shown below.  The UAV (starting in a 
northerly direction to the left) continuously misestimates the perceived range to the non-cooperative 
aircraft (coming in from the right).  In this encounter the UAV attempts to 
manoeuvre behind the non-cooperative aircraft, being the aircraft which has the 
other on its right, and so shall give way.  At a certain point in the encounter the 
non-cooperative aircraft then observes that the UAV is directly ahead, and so 
gives way to the right, but the UAV still attempts to manoeuvre behind.  In the 
corresponding time-series plots, the distribution plot (below left) reveals purely 
statistical information in the encounter, whilst the plot to the right represents degrees of “belief” that a 
range of “Inadequate Control Actions” (ICA) are responsible for the behaviour.  From the left-hand plot 
we can see that closest point of approach (<3000 ft at > 37.5 seconds) is an outlier in the distribution of 
separations near to the 100% limit – note also the slight double-dip.  At the first closest approach, the 
initial peak in the “belief” plot, the inference is that the UAV is manoeuvring the wrong way and that it is 
attempting to return to heading with a behaviour that is “conflicted” – or unresolved.  At the second peak it 
is also inferred that the manoeuvring is now late, less than required, but more than is appropriate. 
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The Questions 
Section 1: general situation awareness 
 
Q1. 
Where a UAV is positioned at the centre of a minimum 
separation zone, with a non-cooperative aircraft then 
approaching from an initial distance of 0.5 NM from the 
edge of this zone on any of the various directions as shown 
in Figure Q1, from which of these different direction 
segments do you believe that hazardous encounters are more 
likely to result in a collision? 
Tick all that apply: 
(a) , (b) , (c) , (d)  
 
Q2. 
Where the UAV system does not exhibit internal defects with 
respect to estimating the location of the other aircraft, nor 
excessive latency in the emergency manoeuvre response, and 
has adequate warning time, from which of the different 
segments in Figure Q2 would you expect that hazardous 
encounters are more likely to result in a collision? 
Tick all that apply: 
(a) , (b) , (c) , (d)  
 
 
Q3. 
Where the UAV system does exhibit a specific defect with respect to either estimating the location of the 
non-cooperative aircraft, or excessive latency in the emergency manoeuvre response, or inadequate 
warning, from which of the segments in Figure Q2 would you expect that hazardous encounters are more 
likely to result in a collision? 
Referring to Figure Q2, tick all that apply: (a) , (b) , (c) , (d)  
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Optionally, add a reason here for your choice(s) 
Optionally, add a reason here for your choice(s) 
 
Optionally, also add a reason here for your choice(s) 
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Section 2: anticipation of interactions 
 
Q4. 
A non-cooperative aircraft breaches the 0.5 NM 
minimum separation constraint, flying with 
about 1½ times the airspeed of the UAV, on the 
approximate headings shown in Figure Q4.  The 
UAV continuously incorrectly perceives the 
other aircraft to be somewhat further away than 
it is.  Given that this produces a delayed 
switching of the UAV behaviour, which of the 
interactions represents the more likely outcome 
where initially the other aircraft is on a slightly 
more westerly heading, and consequently 
arriving more from the 3 o’clock position?  
         Tick all that apply: 
         (a) , (b) , (c) , (d)  
 
 
Q5. 
A non-cooperative aircraft breaches the 0.5 NM 
minimum separation constraint, flying at the 
same respective airspeeds as in Q4, and on the 
approximate headings as shown in Figure Q5.  
On this occasion the UAV system provides zero 
warning of the impending conflict and hence 
does not trigger an emergency manoeuvre and 
therefore its behaviour narrowly interprets the 
“rules of the air”, as described on page 2.  
Otherwise, no other defect is present.  Which of 
the interactions then represents the more likely 
outcome for this situation? 
         Tick all that apply: 
         (a) , (b) , (c) , (d)  
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Q6. 
A non-cooperative aircraft breaches the 0.5 
NM minimum separation constraint with both 
aircraft flying near to, or at, the 250 kts speed-
limit, on the approximate headings shown in 
Figure Q6.  Assuming that the emergency 
manoeuvre behaviour responds to threats 
observed to the right of the extended centre-
line with an evasive turn to the left, which of 
the interactions represents a plausible outcome 
if initially the other aircraft is on a slightly 
more westerly heading, and consequently 
arriving more from the 1 o’clock position? 
Tick all that apply: 
(a) , (b) , (c) , (d)  
 
 
Q7. 
A non-cooperative aircraft breaches the 0.5 NM 
minimum separation constraint, flying with 
slightly more than twice the airspeed of the 
UAV, on the approximate headings shown in 
Figure Q7.  The emergency manoeuvre 
behaviour responds in the same manner as 
outlined in Q6, and in all other respects no 
specific defects are present.  Which of the 
interactions might represent the outcome if 
initially the other aircraft is on a slightly more 
southerly heading, and therefore slightly more 
head-on with the UAV? 
Tick all that apply: 
(a) , (b) , (c) , (d)  
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Section 3: Inferences 
Each of the four vignettes shown in Figures Q8 and Q9 represents outcomes with respect to the 
“separation” variable in the results of four Monte Carlo simulations of 200 runs apiece.  Each vignette 
embodies a variance of ±5° on the headings of both vehicles, ±5 kts on each airspeed, and an initial 
separation in the range of 0.4 – 0.6 NM.  Some vignettes also embody variances of 0 to 2 seconds warning 
and -75% to +300% tolerance on the perceived range estimation, where appropriate. 
 
Q8. 
 
For the above varying spreads of separation trajectories, each over a 50 second period from the start of the 
encounter, and each showing the spread of separation distances in feet (vertical axis) across the 50%, 75%, 
95% and 100% confidence intervals, which vignette would appear to represent the least risk of collision? 
Tick the most appropriate: 
(a) , (b) , (c) , (d)  
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Q9. 
 
For the same Monte Carlo simulations as referred to previously in Q8, each of the above histograms 
represents the distribution of separation distances (horizontal axis) at 50 seconds into each vignette, which 
of these distributions appears to represent the greater risk of collision? 
Tick the most appropriate: 
(a) , (b) , (c) , (d)  
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Q10. 
 
Referring also to the example given in the ‘Notes on 
Graphical Notation’, the above time-series plots in Figure Q10 
represent four inferences taken from the previous vignettes.  
These represent inferences of the system defects, in terms of 
HAZOP deviations, or Inadequate Control Actions, with 
respect to an abstract parameter “Manoeuvre”.  Which of the 
above inference plots then represents the close encounter as 
depicted in the figure alongside where there is a failure of the 
UAV to anticipate the appropriate change in heading on the 
part of the other aircraft, and thereby then incorrectly to 
initiate a poorly resolved dangerous emergency manoeuvre taking it toward the other aircraft and also too 
close then to ensure that it might safely turn away? 
Tick the most appropriate: 
(a) , (b) , (c) , (d)  
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Optionally, also add a reason here for your choice(s) 
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Section 4: Prioritising risks 
 
Q11. 
Which of the following four item lists presents the apparent descending rank order of hazard risk 
associated with the four previously presented vignettes? Descending order – i.e. riskiest vignette at the 
top in each list. 
 
Tick the most appropriate: 
(a) , (b) , (c) , (d)  
 
 
End of questionnaire. 
 
 
  
c)  Higher speeds of up to 250 kts in the case of both vehicles
A higher differential speed for the non-cooperative traffic
A minimum warning time < 1 sec
Wider tolerance on perceived range estimation to 25% - 400%
a)  A minimum warning time < 1 sec
Wider tolerance on perceived range estimation to 25% - 400%
Higher speeds of up to 250 kts in the case of both vehicles
A higher differential speed for the non-cooperative traffic
b)  Wider tolerance on perceived range estimation to 25% - 400%
A minimum warning time < 1 sec
A higher differential speed for the non-cooperative traffic
Higher speeds of up to 250 kts in the case of both vehicles
d)  Wider tolerance on perceived range estimation to 25% - 400%
A higher differential speed for the non-cooperative traffic
Higher speeds of up to 250 kts in the case of both vehicles
A minimum warning time < 1 sec
Optionally, add a reason here for your choice(s) 
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Appendix C.  Respondent Results and Analysis 
Cohen’s Kappa [20] (κ) non-parametric statistical method for inter-rater agreement (α): where complete 
agreement  = +1. 
  [
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]  [
                         
                         
]                      (   ) 
 
  
  (               )
                    (       )  (       )
                                                                                 (   ) 
Consider where α21 = α12 = 0; where every respondent agrees with the response(s) for the “correct” outcome 
whilst also agreeing with all of the posited responses that stand against the “correct” outcome, i.e. indicating 
perfect agreement (κA): 
   
         
          (       )  ( )
                                                                                                                   (   ) 
Alternatively consider where α11 = α22 = 0; where every respondent disagrees with the response(s) for the 
“correct” outcome whilst also disagreeing with all of the posited responses that stand against the “correct” 
outcome, i.e. indicating perfect disagreement (κD): 
   
  (        )
          ( )  (       )
 
  
   
   
 
   
   
 {
          
           
           
                                                 (   ) 
However if α11 = α12 = 0, or α21 = α22 = 0, or α11 = α21 = 0, or α12 = α22 = 0; where every respondent either 
disagrees with the response(s) for the “correct” outcome whilst also agreeing with all of the posited responses 
that stand against the “correct” outcome (disagreeing with the model where “correct” but accepting all other 
options as incorrect also – and therefore accepting none), or agrees with the response(s) for the “correct” 
outcome whilst also disagreeing with all of the posited responses that stand against the “correct” outcome 
(selecting all model responses as equally correct), or disagrees with the response(s) for the “correct” outcome 
whilst also agreeing with all of the posited responses that stand for the “correct” outcome (a straight 
contradiction), or agrees with the response(s) against the “correct” outcome whilst also disagreeing with all of 
the posited responses that stand against the “correct” outcome (another straight contradiction), i.e. all indicating 
an indeterminate measure of agreement (κR): 
                                                                                                                                                                                        (   ) 
These measures of agreement have been categorised using a similar scale as proposed by Landis [64]: 
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C.1. Cohort Results and Question-by-Question Analysis 
 
Figure C.1 Questionnaire Responses for 6 : 12 split (any 6 agreements from 18 
respondents). 
In Figure C.1 and Figure C.3, “green” scores represent (aggregate) agreements categorised  as “substantial” or 
“almost perfect”, “orange” scores for “fair” to “moderate” categories, and “red” for “none” to “poor / slight” 
agreement. 
 
Figure C.2 Questionnaire Respondent Agreement Distributions (for 18 respondents). 
NB: an agreement must be upon 
both True and False responses to 
hold as complete agreement.
Section 1: general situation awareness
Q1 - 14 agree with the model in a 14 : 4 split
Q2 - 11 agree with the model in a 11 : 7 split
Q3 - 7 in partial agreement in a 7 : 11 split
Section 2: anticipation of interactions
Q4 - 9 agree with the model in a 9 : 9 split
Q5 - 6 in partial agreement in a 6 : 12 split
Q6 - the model answer is seen only once (R6)
Q7 - 11 in partial agreement in a 11 : 7 split
Section 3: Inferences
Q8 - 5 in partial agreement in a 5 : 13 split
Q9 - 7 agree with the model in a 7 : 11 split
Q10 - 7 agree with the model in a 7 : 11 split
Section 4: Prioritising risks
Q11 - the model answer is seen  twice (R1, R15)
agreement moderate
Comparison with the Model Responses
Response = True Response = False Multiple Choice Score
a b c d a b c d
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 3
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 3
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 89%
a b c d a b c d
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 3
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -2 3
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 33%
a b c d a b c d
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -1 3
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 3
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 3 3 56%
a b c d a b c d
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 -1 3 -33%
NB: consensus fragments at less than 
5 : 13 split and more than 6 : 12 split.
Mapped by degree of agreement with 
the Model answers and the 
Consensus answers
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Figure C.3 Questionnaire Responses for 4 : 4 split (any 4 agreements from best 8 
respondents). 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.4 Questionnaire Respondent Agreement Distributions (for best 8 respondents). 
Section 1: general situation awareness
Q1 - 8 agree with the model unanimously
Q2 - 7 agree with the model in a 7 : 1 split
Q3 - 3 in partial agreement in a 3 : 5 split
Section 2: anticipation of interactions
Q4 - 4 agree with the model in a 4 : 4 split
Q5 - 2 in partial agreement in a 2 : 6 split
Q6 - the model answer is seen only once (R6)
Q7 - 6 agree with the model in a 6 : 2 split
Section 3: Inferences
Q8 - the model answer is seen only once (R2)
Q9 - 4 agree with the model in a 4 : 4 split
Q10 - 5 agree with the model in a 5 : 3 split
Section 4: Prioritising risks
Q11 - the model answer is seen only once (R1)
agreement fair
Comparison with the Model Responses
Response = True Response = False Multiple Choice Score
a b c d a b c d
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 3
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -1 3 56%
a b c d a b c d
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 3
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 -1 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -2 3
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 17%
a b c d a b c d
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -1 3
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 3
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 3 3 56%
a b c d a b c d
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 0%
NB: an agreement must be upon 
both True and False responses to 
hold as complete agreement.
NB: consensus fragments at less than 
2 : 6 split and more than 4 : 4 split.
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C.2. Cohort Groupings and Authority (for best 8 respondents) 
 
 
Figure C.5 Model v Consensus – respondent agreement matrix (including R9 in best 8). 
In Figure C.5 respondent R9 claims substantial system simulation expertise, but degrades the degree of 
agreement between the consensus perspective and the “correct” behaviour indicated by the model. 
 
Figure C.6 Normalised average agreement & authority weighted by claimed experience 
(Experience < 5 years – left, > 5 years – right). 
A weighted average by experience is applied to these aggregate scores, for 1, 5, 20 and 40 or more years:  
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                                                                                                        (   ) 
 
Figure C.7 Model v Consensus – respondent agreement matrix (including R5 in best 8). 
In Figure C.7, by including respondent R5 claiming some piloting expertise, a better alignment is obtained 
between model’s “correct” behaviour and the belief held in the consensus concerning the expected behaviour. 
 
Figure C.8 Normalised average agreement & authority weighted by claimed experience 
(Experience < 5 years – left, > 5 years – right). 
Likewise, a weighted average by experience is applied to the aggregate scores, for 1, 5, 20 and 40 or more 
years’ experience (equations C.7 and C.8). 
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